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Abstract
This thesis adds to the design of new announcement schemes in vehicular ad hoc net-
works (VANETs). An announcement scheme allows vehicles to broadcast information
about their surrounding to other vehicles in their proximity. This enables neighbouring
vehicles to be aware of their driving environment and appropriate action can be taken
upon receiving the messages. This may enhance road safety and traffic efficiency. Safety
can only be achieved if the messages announced are reliable. A message announced is
considered to be reliable if a receiver can be assured it was sent unmodified by a legiti-
mate vehicle and the content of the message reflects the actual situation. Two common
techniques to achieve this property is by using threshold method and reputation-based
models. In a threshold method, a message is believed to be reliable if a vehicle receives
messages of the same content announced by a number of distinct legitimate vehicles of
a certain threshold within a time interval. In a reputation-based models, the reliability
of a message is evaluated according to the reputation of the reporting vehicles; higher
reputation reflects the likelihood a vehicle is announcing reliable messages. However,
verification of reliability may violate privacy. Sensitive information such as its identity
such be preserved and messages announced by a vehicle should be unlinkable. This is
to prevent unlawful tracing and user profiling, as otherwise, it would be difficult to at-
tract vehicles to join the network. The issues of security and privacy have been among
the main concerns in the adoption of this technology. Such concerns are justified in the
context of preserving and protecting user privacy whilst benefiting from the rich tools
of vehicular communication systems. On the other hand, should misbehaviour arise,
malicious vehicles should be traceable where it is identified to be held accountable and
liable. It should also not be able to deny of having sent the message. This motivates
the work described in this thesis.
We begin by defining the system and security model of an announcement scheme in
VANETs. We analyse some related existing schemes in the literature which are based
on (i) threshold mechanism and (ii) trust- and reputation-based models and examine
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the extent to which they satisfy the contradictory requirement of reliability, privacy and
accountability. Our analysis indicates that most schemes does not achieve message reli-
ability and some schemes does not fulfil the requirement of accountability. In addition,
most trust- and reputation-based schemes does not address the issue of privacy. This
highlights the need to design a more efficient reliable privacy-preserving announcement
schemes. Observation and comparison of different mechanisms used in some existing
announcement schemes leads to our construction of a generic abstraction of an authen-
ticated anonymous announcement scheme designed using threshold method. We also
formulate a generic abstraction for an authenticated anonymous announcement scheme
designed using reputation systems based on our proposed schemes. Within these ab-
stractions, we give construction to three announcement schemes. The first scheme uses
public key cryptography and reputation systems. We constructed another two schemes
using certificateless signature. These schemes consider the challenging conflicting secu-
rity requirements which we shall show has been achieved simultaneously in this thesis.
We analyse the security of our proposed schemes and evaluate their performance. We
validate the performance of our schemes by means of simulations. We then compare in-
stantiation of our schemes with state-of-the-art announcement schemes, demonstrating
that our schemes possess the attractive properties of message reliability, user privacy
and accountability while achieving system robustness and performance efficiency.
Keywords: announcement scheme, vehicular ad hoc networks, reliability, privacy,
accountability
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We state the motivation of our research. We then present an overview on Mobile Ad
Hoc Network (MANET) and Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) and specify the scope
of our thesis. We present the objectives and contributions toward the research in this
chapter.
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1.1 Motivation
Transportation safety and efficiency is one of the main driving forces for the develop-
ment of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) [8, 19, 53, 77, 100]. Vehicles equipped
with computing and communication devices will allow them to communicate with each
other, as well as with the roadside units located at critical points along the road. The
transmission of information in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) have the potential to significantly increase the safety of vehicular transportation
by warning, supporting and assisting vehicles in critical situations. Various sensors,
radar technology and computing platform can be incorporated to monitor, measure and
assess a vehicle’s surrounding to enable the issuance of early warnings to neighbouring
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vehicles. The drivers benefit from the system as information on traffic congestion, acci-
dents, potholes, and slippery roadways will allow receiving vehicles to respond quickly
by assessing the situation and making decisions accordingly.
VANETs may help to ease travel by informing vehicles about traffic condition to enable
drivers avoid congested route. Congestion is one of the most prevalent transport prob-
lems with the increasing traffic volume in recent years [47, 114]. Traffic delays continue
to increase especially during peak period, in major cities and highly populated areas.
Based on the annual road statistics reported in Transport Statistics Great Britain [108],
traffic grew 3.2% between 2001 and 2011. This corresponds to 34 million new cars reg-
istered in 2011 compared to about 32 million cars in 2001. Traffic congestion causes
an increase in vehicle operating costs (fuel and wear), productivity loss during traffic
delay, pollution emissions and stress, particularly as traffic volumes approach a road’s
capacity.
Despite the increasing traffic volume, a falling rate of road casualties has been ob-
served. According to the statistics published by the UK Department for Transport
[108], a number of 203,950 casualties of all severities were reported in 2011, which
is 35% lower compared to 2001. The rate drop is a positive progress which can be
partly attributed to passive safety system such as airbags and seat belts. Road safety
campaigns to increase public awareness and new and revised laws and regulations also
play a role. On average, worldwide, over 1.2 million people die of road casualty every
year and between 20 and 50 million others suffer non-fatal injuries, including disability
[74, 85, 113]. India has the worst road traffic accident rate worldwide with over 130,000
deaths annually revealed by World Health Organization (WHO) [113]. In most regions
of the world, the global epidemic of traffic accidents remains worrying. This epidemic
may be caused by poorly maintained road conditions, lack of safety awareness and hu-
man errors. With the recent progress in information and communication technologies
employed in VANETs, it may improve safety by early detection of potential dangers
and alert vehicles in its proximity to be aware of the situation ahead of them so that
appropriate actions can be taken.
Apart from road safety and traffic efficiency, additional add-on features such as in-
ternet access, parking, electronic toll collection, payment services, media download,
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and location-based services can be incorporated into vehicles. This may enhance the
user’s convenience and comfort.
1.2 Problem Overview
The integration of information technology within vehicles resulted in vehicles being
more than just a glass and steel but a hackable network of computers. The need
for scrutiny is growing as vehicles are increasingly automated and connected to the
internet. As vehicles get connected, they will face some of the same security threats as
other network devices. It opens up the possibility for malicious adversaries to control
certain aspect of the vehicle. This includes deactivating the brake system, send fake
warning signals to the driver and rob the when they pull over to check their vehicle or
disrupt with other accessories of the vehicles such as airbags, global positioning system
(GPS), headlights and cruise control.
Car hacking was a topic in Defcon 21 held in Las Vegas in 2013 [97]. A car hacking
code was released and car hacking via physical connection to the car was demonstrated.
While these instances of vehicles being hacked were mostly for research purposes, this
is due to change as connected vehicles become ubiquitous and therefore a more vul-
nerable target to criminals and scammers. In general, security is concerned with the
protection against malicious manipulation of vehicles and network system, and privacy
preservation of the vehicles. These aspects plays an important role when designing
and implementing such applications. As VANETs safety applications may prevent
life-endangering accidents, it must be protected against attacks. Security breach on a
vehicle could pose a threat, leaving them vulnerable and potentially causing harm. A
secure communication design in VANETs should be emphasized to ensure that vehicles
can fully utilize the benefits provided by the safety applications. Hence the security
of this category is mandatory, since the proper operation of any of these applications
should be guaranteed even in the presence of attackers.
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1.3 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [26] is a dynamic and self-configuring network
consisting of a group of mobile nodes that communicate without requiring a fixed wire-
less infrastructure. When the mobile nodes are embedded within vehicles, the network
is called a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). As VANET is a type of MANET, we
include a discussion on MANET for a comprehensive understanding of VANET.
Entities. A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is composed of mobile nodes com-
municating peer-to-peer. The communication takes place over relatively bandwidth
constrained wireless links in a self-organized pattern in the absence of a centralized
infrastructure.
Type of communications. MANET applications are usually based on one-to-one
(unicast) or one-to-many (multicast) messages. In a unicast with fixed addressing,
the receiver of a message is another node in the network specified by its IP address.
Similarly, in a multicast, the message by a sender is sent to a given subset of receivers.
The network is decentralized, where all network activities including discovering the
topology and delivering messages must be executed by the nodes themselves, that is,
routing functionality will be incorporated into mobile nodes. Therefore, the message is
sent over a single-hop (direct connection) or multi-hops (message relayed over multiple
nodes) until it reaches its destination.
Characteristics. In MANETs, information is transmitted through single- or multi-
hops between the nodes over a wireless channel. Wireless connection has lower capacity
than infrastructure networks. The realized throughput of wireless communication, after
accounting for the effects of multiple access, fading noise and interference conditions is
often less than a radio’s maximum rate. It has dynamic topologies where nodes move
arbitrarily with different speed and direction, thus the network topology may change
randomly and unpredictably. Mobile nodes in MANETs tend to be battery-operated
with limited processing power. Energy is consumed in processing and transmitting
information to its destination, as each node acts as an end user and a router.
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Challenges. MANETs need efficient distributed algorithms to determine network
organization, link scheduling, and routing. However, determining viable routing paths
and delivering messages in a decentralized environment where network topology fluc-
tuates is not a well-defined problem. While the shortest path (based on a given cost
function) from a source to a destination in a static network is usually the optimal
route, this idea is not easily extended to MANETs. Factors such as variable wireless
link quality, propagation path loss, fading, multiuser interference, power expended, and
topological changes, become relevant issues. The network should be able to adaptively
alter the routing paths to alleviate any of these effects. The challenges of MANETs are
limited wireless coverage, limited bandwidth and battery power, and dynamic network
topology [26, 88, 116].
Applications. In the past few years, with the rapid advances in mobile ad hoc
networking research, mobile ad hoc networks have attracted considerable attention
and interests from commercial business industry, as well as the standards community.
The introduction of new technologies such as the Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11 and cellular
mobile networks (e.g., GSM, GPRS, and 3G) has fostered the deployment of ad hoc
technology and new ad hoc networking applications has expanded substantially since
then. Some MANETs applications are presented in Table 1.1 below, along with the
services they provide in each area [26].
1.4 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Entities. A VANET [19, 21, 103] is comprised of nodes: vehicles and roadside units
(RSUs), and trusted parties (TPs). Onboard units (OBUs) embedded in vehicles enable
short-range wireless connection for communication to occur between vehicles (V2V) and
roadside units, which is commonly referred to as infrastructure (V2I). Stationary in-
frastructures located at fixed point along the road which are connected to the backbone
of the network may facilitate the communication and provide information for vehicles.
Types of communication. Communication can be classified according to the number
of senders and receivers involved. Single sender paradigms are: one-to-one (unicast)
17
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Applications Descriptions/services
Tactical Networks ◦ Military communication and operations.
◦ Automated battlefields.
Sensor Networks [4] ◦ Home applications and smart sensor nodes can be buried
in appliances to allow end users to manage home devices
locally and remotely.
◦ Environmental applications include tracking the move-
ments of animals, chemical/ biological detection, precision
agriculture, etc.
◦ Tracking data highly correlated in time and space, e.g.,
remote sensors for weather, earth activities.
Emergency Services ◦ Search and rescue operations, as well as disaster recovery;
e.g., early retrieval and transmission of patient data (record,
status, diagnosis) from/to the hospital.
◦ Replacement of a fixed infrastructure in case of earth-
quakes, hurricanes, fire etc.
Commercial ◦ E-Commerce: e.g., electronic payments from anywhere.
Home and Enterprise
Networking
◦ Home/Office Wireless Networking (WLAN) e.g., shared
whiteboard application; use PDA to print anywhere.
Educational ◦ Setup virtual classrooms or conference rooms.
◦ Setup ad hoc communication during conferences, meetings,
or lectures.
Entertainment ◦ Multi-user games.
◦ Outdoor Internet access.
Table 1.1: MANET applications
in which a single sender transmit message to a single receiver; one-to-all (broadcast)
in which one source sends message to all nodes in the network within its proximity;
and one-to-many (multicast) where a single source sends message to a given subset of
nodes. Unicast is important especially for commercial and entertainment applications.
Safety and efficiency applications, however, mainly use broadcast, which is sometimes
denoted as “beacon” [6, 32, 94, 110, 111] or “heartbeat message” [16, 17, 104] in the
literature. A variant of a broadcast is called geographic broadcast or simply referred to
geocast where the dissemination of a message is limited to a specific geographic region.
The message could be transmitted over a single-hop, where the transmission of the mes-
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sage is broadcast with no intermediate nodes, and/or multi-hops, where the message
can be relayed by neighbours to receivers out of the broadcast range of the originator.
In VANETs, both single-hop broadcast and multi-hop broadcast are used, depending
on the application and scenario. According to the DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Com-
munications) specifications [40] and due to their broadcast nature, safety messages are
transmitted over a single-hop with a sufficient transmission power to warn vehicles in
a range equal to the distance travelled in 10 seconds at the senders speed, thus elim-
inating the need for multi-hops. Nevertheless, some form of multi-hops exists. For
instance, vehicles that receive warning messages estimate whether the reported prob-
lems can also affect their followers; in this case, they forward the messages to them [82].
Channels. Mobile, wireless and medium access technologies are rapidly evolving,
and this evolution provides opportunities to utilize these technologies in support of
advanced vehicle safety applications. In particular, the DSRC at 5.9 GHz developed
by the IEEE team, with direct involvement from the European Telecommunications
Standard Institute (ETSI) and International Organization for Standards (ISO) offers
the potential to effectively support wireless data communications in V2V and V2I. We
summarize the information on representative vehicular communication wireless link in
Table 1.2 below [82].
Characteristics 802.11p WAVE
Bit rate 3 - 27 Mb/s
Communication range < 1000 m
Channel bandwidth 10 MHz
Allocation spectrum 75 MHz (US)
30 MHz (EU)
Frequency band 5.86 - 5.92 GHz
Standard IEEE, ISO, ETSI
Table 1.2: VANET channels
Characteristics. Similar to MANETs, nodes in VANETs have short radio trans-
mission ranges, low bandwidths, and self–organization and management of the nodes.
However, there are several aspects in which the communication in these two ad hoc
networks differ from each other [23]. Mobile nodes embedded in vehicles have higher
computational power. They also have high mobility. The very high speed of real time
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constraint is the unique characteristics of VANETs. It only gives a short period of
connection time between neighbors. This may result in frequent changes in network
topology and may cause considerable transmission overhead. Vehicle movements are
also constrained by the road topology.
Challenges. In a higher network density, the message generated by vehicles may ex-
ceed the available bandwidth during a busy traffic period, for instance. Subsequently,
this may cause network congestion that leads to transmission delay and packet loss.
The long life cycle of vehicles will also impose some challenges to the design of an archi-
tectural system that will allow the onboard system to thwart rising threats and risks.
A study in [59] proposed a component-based security architecture for VANETs that
allows reconfiguration, enhancement or replacement of the components (substituting
cryptographic algorithms, for instance) throughout the life cycle of the vehicle.
Applications. VANETs may become the largest ad hoc network ever deployed due
to the various applications and potential benefits they provide for the safety and com-
fort of future VANETs users. VANETs applications are usually classified as safety
and non-safety applications [19, 92]. Instances of non-safety applications include inter-
net access, infotainment, parking, electronic toll collection and location-based services
[64, 68, 98, 102]. Value added services contributes to enhance driver’s traveling ex-
perience and convenience. Safety applications are further categorised as safety-related
and safety-critical in [63]. Safety-critical is latency critical. This means that the infor-
mation has to be transmitted and received quickly. Some examples of safety-critical
applications [29, 69] include intersection transverse, lane merging or sudden brake alert.
Meanwhile, safety-related messages [24, 25, 34, 36, 55, 65, 91] such as information on
traffic congestion or road conditions (e.g. slippery road, potholes) has less time restric-
tion. A summary of VANET application is presented in Table 1.3 below.
In this thesis, we focus on a single-hop broadcast scenario for safety-related applications.
Our interest lies in improving transportation safety. This can be achieved via safety-
related applications deployed in VANETs. The nature of a broadcast communication
allows all vehicles within proximity to be aware of an event ahead of them, make
decisions accordingly, and act upon the message received. The use of dedicated short
range communication (DSRC) as a communication medium permits safety messages to
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Applications Descriptions/services
Safety-related ◦ Congestion notification.
◦ Road condition (e.g. slippery road, potholes).
◦ Detour notification.
Safety-critical ◦ Sudden braking.
◦ Intersection tranversing.
◦ Lane merging.
◦ Collision avoidance.
Non-safety ◦ Internet access (online game, instant messaging).
◦ Commercial information.
◦ Navigation (e.g. map, GPS).
◦ Automated toll payment service.
◦ Location-based services.
Table 1.3: VANET applications
be transmitted over a single-hop with a sufficient transmission power to warn vehicles
in a range equal to the distance travelled in 10 seconds at the sender’s speed, thus
eliminating the need for multi-hop. Nevertheless, some form of multi-hop still exists.
Vehicles that receive warning messages determine whether the reported problems can
also affect their followers; in this case, they forward the messages to them. In some
other case, a multi-hop may not be necessary, as an event occurring in a particular
location may not be of interest or affect vehicles in a wider radius coverage.
1.4.1 Current Developments
Significant developments to create a safer and more efficient driving environment have
taken place over the past years in the area of vehicular communication system. In this
section, we explain the main characteristics of the standardization process and research
projects initiatives, focusing on current developments in US, Europe, and Japan.
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1.4.1.1 United States of America
The first milestone of standardization process is achieved by the Federal Communica-
tions Consortium (FCC) in the United States (US) in 1997. A licensed frequency band
of about 75 MHz in the 5.9 GHz band was allocated for VANETs, which is commonly
referred to as Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) [40]. A similar band
has been allocated in Europe and Japan - the 802.11p, also referred to as wireless ac-
cess for vehicular environment (WAVE) adopted by the IEEE task group which provide
wireless data communications for vehicles and roadside infrastructure.
The Crash Avoidance Metric Partnership (CAMP) launched in 1995 by Ford, General
Motor, and Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Consortium (VIIC) has built research in
accident prevention and network connected vehicles. VIIC consists of BMW, Daim-
lerChrysler, Ford, GM, Nissan, Toyota, and VolksWagen. Within CAMP, the Vehicle
Safety Communication (VSC) project was initiated in 2002 under cooperation agree-
ment with US Department of Transportation (DoT). The project aims to develop and
facilitate the advancement of vehicle safety through communication technologies. VSC
has defined preliminary communications requirements which include security and pri-
vacy, depending on safety applications. They further evaluated proposed DSRC stan-
dards, identified specific technical issues such as standardization and installation of
security module (also known as a tamper resistant device) and related hardware inte-
gration required (e.g. GPS antenna and receiver, ethernet switch, and DSRC antenna).
In CAMP VSC-2 (2005-2009), successful completed projects demonstrated basic feasi-
bility of V2V communications using DSRC. The VSC project is currently in its third
phase (VSC-3) which consists of Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai-Kia, Mercedes, Nissan,
Toyota, and VW-Audi.
The US DoT, CAMP and their research associates initiated Vehicle Safety Pilot (VSP),
which consists of Safety Pilot Drivers Clinic (SPDC) and Safety Pilot Model Deploy-
ment (SPMD) [95]. The SPDC was conducted in 2011 and took place in six locations
in US: Michigan, Minnesota, Florida, Virginia, Texas and California. Approximately
100 drivers were selected in each driver clinic to have hands-on experience with vehicles
equipped with built-in wireless safety warning device. The test was to evaluate and un-
derstand drivers responsiveness and acceptance towards safety warnings in connected
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vehicles. It was also to determine whether they find the system useful and help them to
drive safer. The first phase received positive feedback where 9 out of 10 drivers value
the safety benefits derived from the technology. They also express their likelihood of
having the technology in their own vehicle [87].
The second phase of VSP, which is SPDM was initiated in the autumn of 2012, and ran
until the autumn of 2013. The trial is composed of RSUs and 3000 vehicles conducted
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. These participating vehicles include fully integrated safety
systems (ISS), aftermarket safety devices (ASD) and vehicle awareness device (VAD).
An ISS allows a vehicle to broadcast and receive messages, and process the information
via visual, audio, and/or haptic warning of received messages to alert the vehicle driver.
Such haptic technology that transfer information to the driver includes steering wheel
vibration [9, 75, 76], driver’s seat vibration [22, 33] and steering wheel torque signal
[9, 20, 41, 62, 86]. The frequency of vibrations applied onto a steering wheel can be up
to 200 Hz, with safety measure that such vibration will not affect the rotation of the
steering wheel without manual intervention by the driver [9]. The driver’s seat vibra-
tion is commonly used for vehicle navigation and warning system. For instance, the left
part of the seat pan vibrates to inform the driver to turn left or the back support of the
seat vibrates to warn the driver that the vehicle exceeded the speed limit permitted.
Meanwhile, the steering wheel torque signal initiates a steering reaction or prohibiting
a steering action of the driver. This will assist the driver in case of an imminent lane
departure or a possible dangerous lane change manoeuvre [9, 20]. An ASD can send and
receive messages from other vehicles over a DSRC wireless communications link. An
ASD has a driver interface, runs V2V and V2I safety applications, and issues audible
and visual warnings to the driver. Meanwhile, a VAD has limited capabilities. It does
not generate warnings, but transmits a vehicles speed and location only over a DSRC
wireless communications link. A demonstration of these safety applications were per-
formed at the 22nd ITS America Annual Meeting and Exposition on May 21-23, 2012,
at the Gaylord National Convention Center in National Harbor, Maryland [78]. This
demonstration involves vehicles from each of different participating manufacturers that
supports one or more of the following safety applications: Emergency Electronic Brake
Lights, Forward Collision Warning, Blind Spot Warning or Lane Change Warning, Do
Not Pass Warning, Intersection Movement Assist and Left Turn Assist. The purpose
of the demonstration is to evaluate human factor and usability, system effectiveness
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and performance. It collects empirical data to present a more accurate and detailed
understanding of the potential safety benefits from this technology. It also aim to show
how V2V interoperability among vehicles from different automotive manufacturers can
allow vehicles to communicate and understand each other. These connected vehicle
safety systems may help drivers avoid crashes despite of vehicle make, model or type.
The response solicited from participating drivers shows that 91% feels the V2V tech-
nology is necessary after training prior to the exposure. The acceptance rate increases
to 93% after exposure to the technology [107].
The evolution of automotive safety development is composed of three phases [1]; the
first and second phase which has been deployed were passive safety system (e.g. airbags
and seat belt tighten) and active safety system (e.g. electronic stability control,
collision avoidance system). In the current third phase (CAMP VSC-3), the V2V-
Interoperability project that focused on security management of the system was ini-
tiated. The objective of the project is to establish technical requirements of main
operations such as device initialization, certificate provisioning, and misbehaviour de-
tection and revocation. It also aims to develop, test, validate and utilize a prototype
security design [106, 107] that has been patent and published in 2011. The prototype
security system requires a PKI which is deemed necessary to provide basis for trust
relationship for vehicles in the system. It uses DSRC and 3G cellular as the communi-
cation system. Three types of communication were deployed in the prototype security
system design: (i) safety related messages announced by vehicles, (ii) misbehaviour
reported by vehicles to the trusted party (TP) and (iii) communication with the TP for
a vehicle to acquire new certificates and the TP update vehicles with certificate revoca-
tion list (CRL). It allows vehicles to be connected to the TP server by connecting it to
the infrastructure. The first batch of short term certificates were loaded onto vehicles
during its initialization phase and subsequent loaded can be perform over-the-air. The
short term certificates were updated automatically for privacy protection. The project
will continue to assess and identify any system vulnerabilities and improve V2V com-
munications for a deployment decision on vehicle safety coming in the next coming
years.
24
1.4 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
1.4.1.2 Europe
There are several active VANET-related projects, with collaborations from the automo-
tive industry, governmental agencies and academia in Europe. The European SeVeCoM
project (2006-2009) [100] is coordinated by Trialog, and the consortium consists of four
universities and three companies: Budapest University of Technology and Economics,
E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´ral de Lausanne, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Ulm Uni-
versity, DaimlerChrysler, Robert Bosch GmbH and Fiat Research Center. The project
objective was to define the security architecture of such networks as well as to propose
a roadmap for integration of security functions in these networks. It discussed different
aspects of vehicular communications (VC), such as secure communication protocols,
privacy issues, inter-vehicle security and various issues related to the implementation
and practical deployment aspects. A prototype that implements various security com-
ponents for a secure privacy-preserving vehicular communication was demonstrated at
the 7th Annual International Conference on Mobile System in Krakow, Poland [57].
The prototype follows the architectural components that satisfy the required security
objectives and formal specification developed by SeVeCoM. The SeVeCom implementa-
tion is based on the communication system provided by BMW and runs on a computer
connected to a dedicated vehicular communication subsystems, namely Denso Wireless
Safety Units (WSUs). The IEEE 802.11p was utilized as the wireless communication
system. The demonstrator composed of two application scenarios. The first one is a
cooperative awareness application. Vehicles communicate with each other via exchange
of periodic beacon messages. Warnings is displayed if there is a risk for collision, for
instance. The second application features a road hazard warning system based on
roadside units (RSUs) sending a road condition warning to approaching vehicles. This
includes multi-hop forwarding of warning messages to reach vehicles in a larger cover-
age. The security aspects of both applications were heavily considered. An emulation
of a hardware security module that is responsible for secure storage of secret key ma-
terial, performing cryptographic tasks (such as signature generation and verification),
and time stamping was designed. Vehicles were assigned with long-term identities with
the presence of back-end certification authority who is responsible for certificate man-
agement and revocation. Privacy is achieved by means of updating pseudonyms. This
includes change of cryptographic material and addresses used by the communication
system, such as MAC addresses [58]. The demonstration of the prototype provides a
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form of validation before such technology is deployed onto vehicles.
The CAR 2 CAR Communication (C2CC) Consortium [21] is an ongoing project
founded by a collaboration of several vehicle manufacturers, which is dedicated to
further increase safety and efficiency by means of inter-vehicle communications (IVC).
The goal of the C2CC is to standardize interfaces and protocols of wireless commu-
nications between vehicles and their environment in order to make the vehicles of
different manufacturers interoperable and also enable them to communicate with road-
side units. It further aims to create an open European industry standard for Car2Car
communication systems based on wireless communication and ensure European-wide
inter vehicle operability. This include proposing deployment strategies and business
models to catalyse market penetration.
The Network on Wheels (NoW) project (2004-2008) [77] was a joint effort of Germany’s
industry and academia: Mannheim University, Karlsruhe University, BMW, Daimler,
Volkswagen, Siemens, Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems (FICS),
and NEC Europe Ltd. Its objective is to specify and design a communication system for
transmission of sensor data for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I), introducting strategies and business models. The NoW project was deployed as
a basis for field operational test in Safety in Mobility - test field Germany (simTD), a
test field which we shall describe below.
The Safe Intelligent Mobility - Test field Germany (simTD), launched in 2012 in Frank-
furt, Germany, was one of the world’s largest field operational tests for V2V and V2I
communication [42, 112]. The field operational test comprises of 400 vehicles and 100
RSUs provided by participants Audi, BMW, Daimler, Ford, Opel, and Volkswagen.
The consortium also includes Bosch, Continental, Deutsche Telekom, regional infras-
tructure operators and German research institutions (Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen
und Berlin, Universita¨t Wu¨rzburg, Fraunhofer). In the project, various applications
and services in the areas of road safety, traffic efficiency and additional value-adding
services were tested. In one of the test fields conducted by Fraunhofer Institute for Se-
cure Information Technology (Fraunhofer SIT) under simTD, privacy protection tech-
niques were integrated within participating vehicles, where the identity of vehicles were
protected. This approach is realized by vehicles use pseudonyms that they frequently
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change to avoid being tracked. Based on the evaluation of the field test, pseudonym res-
olution is possible when the situation dictates, such as when a vehicle is malfunctioning.
Information transmitted over the ad hoc network between vehicles and infrastructure
can be encrypted and signed as required. The necessary digital certificates were used
by a special public key infrastructure (PKI) which is implemented and operated by
Fraunhofer SIT. These cryptographic mechanisms provides data integrity, message au-
thenticity and data confidentiality. The deployment of the test field were based on
specification and standardization of CAR 2 CAR Communication (C2CC) Consortium
and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The field operation
test is vital to demonstrate real-world and wireless connected vehicle safety capabilities.
The work will pave way for full deployment of V2V and V2I systems in Europe. The
test field will provide some of the data needed to develop next generation safety and
mobility features.
1.4.1.3 Japan
Considerable effort has been invested in investigating various aspects of VANET sys-
tems and architecture in Japan. A number of projects studying inter-vehicle communi-
cation (IVC) systems has been initiated since the early 1980s and expanded their study
to the standardization of IVC systems [43, 103].
The Advanced Cruise-Assist Highway Systems (AHS) [3] and Advanced Safety Vehicle
(ASV) [8, 53] are ongoing development projects driven by the Ministry of Land, In-
frastructure and Transportation (MLIT). The combination of AHS and AVS is called
Smartway. The AHS project focuses on V2I communications and employs infrastruc-
tures that help to monitor highway condition (such as other vehicles, obstacles, highway
surface conditions), assist drivers by providing information (such as speed limit and ob-
stacle detection and avoidance) and create efficient traffic system. A test field involved
participation by drivers from the general public was conducted from July 2000 to March
2001 in Tsukuba City. The demonstration site was at the National Institute for Land
and Infrastructure Management (NILIM) test course of approximately 6 km in length.
The results deduced from the test field verifies that the numerous safety applications
provided by the AHS are effective in actual accident prevention [2].
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The Advanced Safety Vehicle (ASV) program [8, 53] focuses on V2V communications
and is composed of two aspects: active and passive safety. In the active safety trial, sys-
tems are tested which addresses inattention and driver errors. This includes drowsiness
warning systems, vision enhancement systems, navigation systems, automatic collision
avoidance systems and lane departure systems. Meanwhile, the passive safety systems
includes impact absorption systems, occupant protection systems, pedestrian protec-
tion systems and door lock sensing systems. The project was initiated in 1991 and is
now in its fifth generation ASV-5.
Honda Motor Co., has participated in ASV program since phase 1. Based on research
conducted in ASV-1 (1991-1996) and ASV-2 (1996-2000), a number of advanced active
safety systems has been developed and commercialized such as Adaptive Cruise Control,
Collision Mitigation Brake System and Intelligent Night Vision System [48]. In 2005,
Honda Advanced Safety Vehicle ASV-3 [49] was presented. Honda ASV-3 vehicles were
designed with advanced technological features and support various safety applications
including Oncoming Vehicle Information Assistance System, Intersection Stop & Go
Assistance System, Head-on Collision Avoidance Assistance System, Cornering Speed
Control System and Advanced Mayday System. In phase 4 of Advanced Safety Vehicle
(2006-2010), Honda performed V2V and V2I testing on public roadways of its Driving
Safety Support Systems (DSSS) in Tochigi Perfecture, Japan using vehicles developed
in ASV-3 [50]. The purpose of the project was to utilize positional information gleaned
from communications between vehicles and road infrastructure to help prevent certain
types of traffic accidents. The objectives of the testing will be 1) to verify inter-vehicle
and road-to-vehicle communications functions; 2) to verify DSSS functions; and 3) to
collect and present data that will contribute to evaluating system effectiveness, thereby
contributing to the prevention of accidents involving rear-end collisions, collisions be-
tween turning vehicles and oncoming vehicles, and collisions involving turning vehicles
with vehicles passing on the inside.
In 2010, Honda participated in ITS-2010 where a large scale verification testing for
DSSS, ASV and Smartway were performed in Tokyo, Japan. The testing was con-
ducted using Honda latest generation of ASV-4 vehicles which are equipped with sev-
eral new advanced safety technologies. These include a system that uses cameras for
image recognition and radar that detects obstruction on roads. ASV-4 vehicles uses
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V2V communications to relay information to other vehicles about its position and con-
dition in a simple and clear way. Vehicles were alerted via audio and visual warnings,
and tactile signals such as vibrating the brake or accelerator. The camera installed
on vehicles will also be able to detect stop signs on road or notify vehicles when it
approaches red traffic lights. As the result of ITS-Safety 2010, two V2I safety systems
of DSSS and Smartway have been realized in Japan in 2011.
1.4.2 Security and Privacy Issues
In order to benefit from the tools of VANETs, the system requires secure communica-
tion protocols. Safety can only be achieved if the content of the messages transmitted
are reliable. A message is considered reliable if the announcement was sent unmodified
by a legitimate vehicle. The message should also reflect the actual situation. However,
frequent communication between vehicles may pose privacy issue. Individual vehicle
could be tracked based on messages announced, enabling profiling by an adversary.
From the vehicle’s perspective, sensitive information such as identity and location pri-
vacy should be preserved against unlawful tracing. This is an issue because aspect of
vehicle’s privacy has been studied in one of the projects. Lack of privacy may hinder
the broad acceptance of this technology. Solving an inherent conflict between reliability
and privacy poses significant challenges. At the same time, a compromise between a
vehicle’s privacy and accountability is desirable in case of dispute. In such situation,
the misbehaved vehicle should be traceable by trusted parties and revoke from the
system. They also could not deny having sent the message. We assume the presence of
small fraction of adversaries that aims to disrupt the system. Availability and system
robustness are also important issues.
1.4.3 Scope and Objectives of the Thesis
The scope of the thesis focuses on authenticated anonymous announcement (3A) schemes
in VANETs. A 3A scheme allows vehicles to broadcast safety-related messages regard-
ing vehicles, road situation and traffic condition in VANETs. We concentrate on V2V
communication, with the support of access points that relays messages between ve-
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hicles and the trusted parties (TPs), who are responsible for managing the admission
and eviction of vehicles to the scheme. We propose 3A schemes in a broadcast scenario
for VANETs. We show that our schemes are reliable and anonymous while achieving
performance efficiency.
Security and privacy are two critical concerns in the design of announcement schemes
in VANETs. This Ph. D. thesis intends:
1. to find constructions of announcement schemes that are usable, secure, efficient
and comparable (or better) than existing schemes;
2. to formulate a generic abstraction of a 3A scheme designed using threshold method;
3. to formulate a generic abstraction a 3A scheme designed using reputation system
model;
4. to design three anonymous authenticated announcement (3A) schemes conciliat-
ing security, privacy and performance in VANETs based on the proposed abstrac-
tions:
• the first scheme uses public key cryptography and reputation system;
• the other two schemes were constructed using certificateless signature.
1.5 Organisation of Thesis
This thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 studies the security and performance goals for the design of an efficient 3A
scheme for vehicular communications. We then present different techniques used to
achieve these goals and discuss the advantages and shortcomings of these techniques.
Chapter 3 reviews current literature on security and privacy-preserving announcement
schemes in VANETs. The chapter is partition into two. The first part is based on
threshold mechanism. We group recent protocols according to their main credentials
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techniques and examine the extent to which they satisfy the goals discussed in Chapter
2. The second part reviews current literature on announcement schemes based on trust-
and reputation-based models. We then summarize each part.
Chapter 4 presents a new 3A which is designed using public key cryptography and
reputation systems. This technique efficiently address the computation processing bot-
tleneck in 3A scheme for securing VANETs. We then perform simulations to evaluate
its performance efficiency and discuss the results. This chapter is an extension of the
publication below, where the scheme presented here provides privacy to vehicles.
• Q. Li, A. Malip, K. M. Martin, S. Ng, and J. Zhang. A Reputation-based An-
nouncement Scheme for VANETs. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
61(9):4095-4108, 2012.
In Chapter 5, we propose two privacy-preserving announcement schemes in VANETs.
The first proposed scheme employs certificateless signature (CLS) and reputation sys-
tems as building blocks. The second scheme is constructed with CLS using threshold
method. We show that our schemes allows entity authentication and message integrity
while eliminating the necessity of certificates. This vastly reduces the overhead asso-
ciated with certificate management. Analysis shows that cryptographic operations in
CLS introduce only very slight overhead to the underlying VANETs while achieves high
performance without degrading security. Most of the work presented in this chapter
appears in the following publication.
• A. Malip, S. Ng, and Q. Li. A Certificateless Anonymous Authenticated An-
nouncement Scheme in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks. Security and Communica-
tion Networks, 7(3):588-601, 2014.
Chapter 6 contains concluding remarks of the thesis. We summarize our contributions
and discuss some future directions of the research.
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Chapter 2
Anonymous Authenticated Announce-
ments Scheme
In this chapter, we define an anonymous authenticated announcements scheme and
describe the presence of entities in the network. We then examine the contradictory
requirements of a reliable, private and accountable VANET message announcement
scheme, and consider how these contradictions may be resolved. We examine different
techniques used to achieve these security requirements and examine on the advantages
and shortcomings of the techniques.
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2.1 Entities in a VANET
A VANET is composed of vehicles and stationary units along the road, known as road-
side units. In addition, there will be trusted parties such as national transportation
authorities or vehicle manufacturers, who may or may not be online. There also exist
malignant entities who aim to disrupt the system.
2.1.1 Vehicles and Onboard Units
A vehicle is equipped with an onboard unit (OBU) and tamper resistant device (TRD),
which is commonly assumed in the literature [24, 34, 36, 45, 92]. An onboard unit
(OBU) is at least equipped with a (short range) wireless communication device dedi-
cated for road safety, and potentially with other optional communication devices. Ve-
hicles equipped with OBUs will be able to broadcast and endorse messages. These
OBUs communicate directly if wireless connectivity exists between them. If there is
no direct connectivity, dedicated routing protocols allow multi-hop communications,
where messages are forwarded from one OBU to another, until it reaches the desti-
nation. Vehicles are also equipped with an application unit (AU) that can utilize the
OBU’s communication capabilities. Such units include hazard warning or a navigation
system like a global positioning system (GPS) receiver that also allow clock synchroni-
sation. Additional features such as speed, temperature, and wind sensors may also be
available, depending on manufacturing design.
A tamper resistant device (TRD) such as a black box is integrated as part of the
vehicle. The TRD is used to provide secure storage for private keys. Even in the pos-
session of an attacker, this private information cannot be retrieved. The device also
executes cryptographic operations correctly. Such operations include generating and
verifying signatures. An attacker who is in control of a black box may generate fake
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messages of his own choice. However, even though they control the input, the device
will operate according to the protocol. Furthermore, the TRD should be supported
with time stamping service [92]. The vehicle supplies the power source to recharge the
device. A clock is also installed, where it is securely resynchronised (for instance, when
passing by a roadside unit).
2.1.2 Roadside Units
A roadside unit (RSU) is a physical device located at fixed locations. Such locations
include along the highways, intersections, roundabouts or traffic lights. To allow com-
munications, a RSU is equipped with at least a network device for short-range wireless
communication. The main roles of a RSU include the sending, receiving and forward-
ing of data to an OBU when the OBU enters the RSU communication range. RSUs
may also communicate with other RSUs. An RSU may also act as information ser-
vice provider running safety applications such as low bridge warnings, virtual traffic
signalling or as an intersection controller. As it may be connected to an infrastructure
network, the RSU may provide internet connection to OBUs.
VANETs technology should be partially operating upon its launch in the next few
years. The basic functions and security mechanisms should be available during its
first few years of deployment. However, the availability of infrastructures will not be
pervasive, especially in the first years of deployments due to its administrative and in-
stallation cost. In this thesis, we will focus on anonymous authenticated announcement
(3A) schemes that do not rely on RSUs.
2.1.3 Trusted Parties
Trusted parties (TPs) may be vehicle manufacturers (VMs) or governmental transporta-
tion authorities (GTAs) with which the vehicles are registered [92]. These TPs may play
the role of certification authorities (CAs), registration authorities (RAs), key genera-
tor center (KGC) or reputation server (RS) and may be responsible for the distribution
and management of identities and cryptographic credentials of the vehicles. Vehicles
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registered with different TPs can communicate securely via cross-certification between
TPs. In the literature, the TPs are commonly referred to as the certification authorities
(CAs) [18, 28, 61, 92]. In some cases, the TP is known as a group manager (GM) and a
tracing manager (TM) [24, 35, 66]. In our schemes presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter
5 and in other reputation-based schemes, the reputation server (RS) and management
server (MS) plays the role of the TPs. Schemes differ on level of trust in TPs. Some
schemes rely on a fully trusted TPs [115]. Meanwhile, in some other schemes, partial
trust towards the TPs is assumed. The notion of partial trust is sometimes referred to
as honest-but-curious or semi-honest [24, 36]; these two terms are often interchangeable
in the literature. Informally, this assumption implies that the TPs faithfully follow all
protocol specifications. However, they may store and analyze intermediate results to
derive additional information [44]. The level of trust invested in these TPs may not
be absolute. In our schemes presented in Chapter 4 and 5, we adopt a weaker trust
assumptions that the TPs has no access to private secrets of a vehicle. A weaker trust
assumption implies more robust system against vehicle control, say by a malicious TP
or organized criminal, for whom it would be harder to access the vehicle’s private key
for instance. As the vehicle is the sole possessor of its private key, it also allows non-
repudiation if misbehaviour occurs. We further discuss this in section 3.2.
The main role of the TPs is to manage long-term identities, credentials and crypto-
graphic keys of vehicles. They are also responsible for revoking vehicles for adminis-
trative reasons or in case of misbehaviour. Periodic communication may take place
between TPs and vehicles. As the TP may not be available all the time, an oﬄine com-
munication is assumed between these two entities [24, 81]. The roadside infrastructure
or other infrastructure-based network (such as cellular radio network) may offer an
alternative means of interactions.
2.1.4 Adversary
One of the common assumptions in VANETs is the presence of a small fraction of
adversaries [24, 36, 45, 80, 92, 93] in the network. There are several types of adver-
saries discussed in the literature. More on the adversaries can be found in [83, 92].
There may be external or internal adversaries. An external adversary is an entity who
35
2.1 Entities in a VANET
is without possession of any cryptographic credentials or direct physical access to the
system. On the other hand, an internal attacker is a legitimate user of the VANET
who is in possession of the credentials and black box. Legitimate dishonest users may
cause more damage as they can control the black box to generate messages of their
choice.
Adversaries can also be categorised as rational or irrational attackers. This type of
adversarial model was considered in [10, 36]. A rational attacker has a plan for an
attack to achieve his personal benefit where the benefits outweigh the cost. Meanwhile,
an irrational attacker has no personal gain. For example in [92], a terrorist may in-
tentionally cause traffic accidents and delays to create chaos without considering the
consequences. An attack can also be performed by a group of colluding vehicles who
have mutual agenda or interest. For instance, these colluding vehicles may announce
a fake message regarding traffic congestion in a particular area to make way for them-
selves.
The adversarial model can be further categorised as active or passive attackers, which is
considered in some schemes, such as in [56]. An active attacker vigorously participate
in the network with intentions to cause disruption. Such attacks include generating
bogus information, replay legitimate messages and modify a message. Meanwhile, a
passive attacker attempts to learn and listen via eavesdropping for instance.
Another attributes to classify adversaries is that they can be local or extended [89, 92].
A local attacker has limited territorial control, despite controlling several entities (ve-
hicles or roadside units). An extended attacker controls several entities in a wider
coverage area scattered across the network, thus extending his scope.
In the anonymous authenticated announcement (3A) schemes proposed in the thesis,
the presence of internal adversaries is considered. This is common in the literature,
where most papers assume internal adversaries in the network [24, 45, 80]. As au-
thentication phase prevents most of the attacks performed by an external adversary,
the thesis focus on the existence of an internal adversary. An internal adversary can
exploit their legitimacy to cause harm to other vehicles. Having the same capabilities
as other legitimate vehicles, they can use their credentials issued by a trusted party
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(TP) to perform attacks that are likely to be successful, which pose a real threat to the
system.
2.2 Anonymous Authenticated Announcement (3A) Schemes
An announcement scheme is a system that facilitates dissemination of safety related
messages in vehicular ad hoc network. A safety-related message contain information
about speed, current time of the event, position, direction, acceleration and specific
message to traffic events such as congestion notification, accidents or potholes alert.
Transmission of safety messages in the network enable safer driving environment and
traffic efficiency provided that the information announced is reliable. A message is
considered to be reliable if the unmodified message was broadcasted by a legitimate
vehicle and is trustworthy. However, in a large VANET environment, vehicles do
not have a trust relationship with one another. This poses a challenging security
problem as verification of message reliability may reveal some information about the
sending vehicles. This contradicts with the requirement of privacy. At the same time,
should misbehaviour arise, a vehicle should be held accountable. We examine these
requirements in this section.
2.3 Requirements of Announcement Scheme in VANETs
Towards the deployment of vehicular communication systems, security and privacy are
critical concerns and significant challenges to be met. In this section, we discuss the
security objectives and performance efficiencies for a secure 3A scheme.
2.3.1 Reliability
To achieve traffic safety and efficiency, announcement messages have to be trustworthy,
that is, the messages reflect actual situations. A receiving vehicle that is, say, 600m
away from the reporting location may or may not be able to determine whether the
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message it receives is true. Since vehicles do not have a trust relationship with other
vehicles in general, a vehicle will only trust an announcement if it can be certain that
this announcement was broadcast unmodified by a legitimate vehicle, and that the
message is also not a falsehood. The first objective requires message authentication
and data integrity. The second objective, which we shall refer to as message truth-
fulness, is not easily achieved. Different techniques have been proposed to achieve
the second objective. These include threshold method and trust- and reputation-based
models. In a threshold method, message truthfulness is established by knowing that
messages of the same content were sent by many distinct legitimate senders. Mean-
while, in trust and reputation models, a message is considered reliable if the message
generator has “good” reputation.
2.3.2 Privacy
The need and requirement for privacy are addressed differently in different countries.
Some countries enforce drivers’ identification mechanism for crime prevention. Other
countries may adopt an opposite policy by mandatory privacy in the system. For in-
stance, under European Union (EU) law, everyone is entitled to the protection right
of personal data within the EU [30]. In this paper, we assume the requirement for
privacy as it is one of vital reasons for public acceptance towards the deployment of a
VANET [30, 37, 66, 92]. Communication in the network should be anonymous where
a message should not reveal any information about the user. User-related privacy infor-
mation should be protected in the presence of an unauthorised observer. Furthermore,
the activities of the sender should be unlinkable to its source. In some schemes, a
higher level of privacy is proposed where the identity of vehicles making announcements
are protected, even from the authorities. However, full anonymity may allow for misbe-
haviour as vehicles or attackers may act maliciously without the fear of being caught.
In recent papers [24, 35], some schemes allowing authorities to know the identity of
the vehicles are proposed which achieve conditional anonymity, that is, the identity
of the user remains anonymous unless they misbehave or malfunction of the device is
detected.
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2.3.3 Accountability
In a pervasive VANET environment, misbehaviour may take place as a result of hard-
ware malfunctioning or it may be intentional. For instance, the safety–related messages
may contain fake information, or may have been modified, discarded or delayed inten-
tionally. In such situations, it is desirable to achieve accountability. Misbehaviour
should be traceable to a source. It should also achieve non-repudiation, that is, a
source cannot deny having sent the message. Furthermore, misbehaved vehicles should
be revoked to prevent from future participation in the network. The identity of the
vehicle may also be revealed by the authorities.
2.3.4 System Robustness
System robustness implies that the communication channel is authentic and integrity
protected even in the presence of malicious or faulty nodes.
2.3.5 Efficiency
Computational Time. Safety-related applications in VANETs impose constraints
in terms of real-time processing. The time sensitivity of information requires that
processing latency on each vehicle is kept to an absolute minimum. Due to vehicle’s high
mobility, vehicles encounters short duration of connectivity. This implies that message
should be generated quickly enough to be transmitted before the short communication
ends. The authentication mechanism designed for a 3A scheme must also allow fast
message verification as delay in validating the information may render the message
unused.
Communication Cost. According to DSRC [40], a vehicle broadcasts safety messages
every 100-300 ms to other vehicles. A vehicle may receive many safety messages from
other vehicles within a short span of time. Hence, the messages should be lightweight
to not overload the communication medium, especially when the number of vehicles
within the communication range is high.
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Storage. Cryptographic authentication technique have been widely exploited to secure
vehicular communication. Cryptographic credentials have to be securely stored and
may have to be constantly updated due to various reasons. One of the reasons is to
achieve privacy. Two techniques commonly used to satisfy the property of privacy
is pseudonyms and group signature. In pseudonymous authentication, vehicles stores
a number of public/private key, and its corresponding certificate. The changing of
pseudonyms is required to make tracking of vehicles difficult. Therefore, the size of the
anonymous key should be small to reduce storage space on vehicle. The implementation
of group signature over anonymous certificate is that the former overcome the limitation
of pre-storing a large number of anonymous certificates. However, the issue associated
with group signature is that size of the signature is quite big.
2.4 Analysis of Security Mechanisms
In this section, we survey the literature for an overview of how these security require-
ments are achieved and evaluate their system performance.
2.4.1 Reliability of Messages
In a VANET safety application, building trust is vital. Vehicles are assumed to have
a weak (or absence of) trust relationship with each other [24]. A vehicle will only
trust an announcement if it can be certain that the message was generated by a le-
gitimate vehicle without unauthorized modification and is not a falsehood. The first
objective is commonly satisfied by some digital signature schemes, while the second is
not as straightforward. Different techniques have been proposed to achieve the second
requirement. These include threshold method and trust- and reputation-based models.
We will further discuss these techniques in the next subsection.
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2.4.1.1 Message Authentication and Data Integrity
One of the cryptographic mechanisms used to achieve message authentication and data
integrity is symmetric primitives. This includes a message authentication code (MAC)
appended to a message which is computed using a shared symmetric secret key. A
third party would have to be shown the secret key to validate a MAC, and even then
he would have not known which of the two parties computed the MAC. This technique
is used in [25, 28]. While symmetric based techniques are computationally efficient, it
does not provide the property of non-repudiation.
Digital signature of some form is more commonly used to solve the problem of au-
thentication and integrity. A variety of digital signature schemes is used in existing
literature: group signatures (GS) [18, 24, 66], message-linkable group signature (MLGS)
[36], “traditional” public key cryptography (PKC) [18, 61, 80], and identity-based sig-
natures [55]. Signing message using valid credentials from a trusted party (TP) will
satisfy authentication and data integrity.
2.4.1.2 Message Truthfulness
Different techniques have been proposed to evaluate message truthfulness, which in-
clude threshold method [24, 34, 36, 61, 90], network modelling [45, 99], and trust-based
and reputation-based models [38, 65, 70, 73, 84].
In a threshold method, a vehicle accepts a message if it receives messages with the
same content that have been announced by a number of distinct vehicles that ex-
ceeds a threshold within a time interval. This is a common approach and is used in
[24, 34, 45, 61, 90]. In a big VANET environment where the absence of initial trust
is assumed, the receiver will only accept a message if it has been sent by a sufficient
number of different vehicles in order to gain some assurance.
A threshold may be fixed system-wide [34, 90] or flexible [24, 45, 61]. In the first
case, the threshold is set to a certain value and applies to all participants in the sys-
tem. One of the weaknesses is that it may not be suitable for all scenarios. For instance,
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the threshold may be higher in a city with high traffic density, but this may not be
suitable for an area with a small density of road traffic. Meanwhile, a flexible threshold
allows the user to determine the bound based on the content of the message and situa-
tion. The threshold should not be too high that insufficient endorsement occurred that
might hinder the user from acting upon the information. It should not be too low that
the decision may be affected by the presence of adversaries. Decision methods based
on voting schemes were proposed in [79] to assist users to decide whether or not to rely
on the information when the messages are in conflict with each other.
The threshold method requires message origins to be distinguishable. When a ve-
hicle receives a number of announcements of a certain event, it needs to ensure that
each message originated from a different source. However, if there is also require-
ment for privacy, this will directly contradict the requirement for unlinkability. If
message origins cannot be distinguished then a Sybil attack [39] may be possible. In a
Sybil attack, a vehicle signs the same message multiple times using different identities
to deceive the receiver into accepting the fraudulent message. Hence, the threshold
method used should allow distinguishability of origin. This has been achieved in some
schemes [24, 36]. Meanwhile, in some other schemes, this requirement is not satisfied
[18, 56, 66, 92]. Distinguishability of message origin is not be a problem to some other
techniques. In schemes based on reputation system [65, 70], a receiving vehicle is only
required to verify a message provided that the message generator has sufficiently high
reputation. This allows computational efficiency. It also allows a vehicle to make a
decision quickly and act on the message received.
Another issue associated with threshold method is a concern on how to verify numerous
cryptographic signatures received by vehicles in a timely manner to allow vehicles to
make decision and act upon the message quickly.
Golle et al. [45] and Schmidt et al. [99] proposed the evaluation of message relia-
bility by modelling the network. In [45], a scheme that allows vehicles to detect and
correct malicious messages in VANETs was presented. Vehicles are assumed to main-
tain a “model” of the VANET, which contains all the knowledge that the vehicles
possess about the VANET. A vehicle can then compare the messages received against
the model of the VANET. A message that is consistent and agrees with the vehicle’s
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model is likely to be accepted as valid. Inconsistent messages are addressed using a
heuristic approach. A vehicle will search for explanations for the inconsistent messages
and rank all possible explanations according to the heuristic approach. The message
with the highest scoring explanation will be validated. However, requiring vehicles to
possess a wide knowledge of the network may be infeasible and impractical. Schmidt et
al. proposed a framework for vehicle behaviour analysis in [99]. A vehicle’s behaviour
refers to all observable information including its movement and position in the past and
present. A receiving vehicle accumulates a sequence of messages from a broadcasting
vehicle and these may provide sufficient information for behaviour analysis. The result
of this analysis will help to determine a vehicle as trustworthy, neutral or untrustwor-
thy. In this approach, vehicles are required to make observations before a decision can
be made. This may not be desirable in VANETs as vehicles are not able to act quickly
upon the messages received.
Several trust-based and reputation-based models, for example [38, 65, 70, 73, 84],
have been presented in the literature. In [65, 70], a centralised reputation-based an-
nouncement schemes for VANETs was proposed. The reliability of a message generated
by a vehicle is reflected by its reputation score. A message is considered reliable if the
message generator has sufficiently high reputation. A vehicle consistently announcing
reliable messages increases its reputation score. Meanwhile, the reputation score of an
unreliable message generator decreases, by means of a feedback mechanism. A feedback
report consists of a numerical score, which represents a receivers evaluation of the reli-
ability of the relevant message. For these schemes, distinguishability of message origin
is not a problem. A receiving vehicles is only required to verify a message provided that
the message generator has sufficiently high reputation. Not only is it computationally
efficient, it also allows a vehicle to make a decision quickly and act on the message
received.
The schemes proposed in [38, 73, 84, 99] adopted a decentralised infrastructure. In
[38], Do¨tzer et al. proposed a reputation system based on a mechanism called Opin-
ion Piggybacking. In this approach, a vehicle generates a message and broadcast to
its neighbouring vehicles. A receiving vehicle will append its own opinion about the
reliability of the message that may be based on the content of the message or the aggre-
gated opinions already appended to the message. Upon receiving a message, a vehicle is
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required to compute and aggregate previous opinions appended to the message before
it decides and generate its own opinion. This may cause computational burden on re-
ceiving vehicles. In addition, details of implementation such as the initialisation of the
reputation system and the update of reputation score of vehicles were not discussed.
Issues of revocation and robustness against possible collusion of adversaries were also
not addressed.
In the scheme by Minhas et al. in [73], message reliability is evaluated by modelling
the trustworthiness of the message generator. In this scheme, vehicle trustworthiness is
modelled based on the combination of three trust models: role-based trust, experience-
based trust and majority-based trust. Role-based trust exploits certain predefined roles
that are enabled through the identification of vehicles. For instance, vehicles may have
more trust towards traffic patrol or law enforcing authorities compared to other vehi-
cles. To avoid impersonation attack, each vehicle is required to possess a certificate
that includes its name, role and public key, issued by a trusted authority for authen-
tication purposes. Meanwhile, majority-based trust is similar to the threshold method
we discussed earlier. Experience-based trust is established based on direct interactions:
a vehicle determines who to trust based on how truthful they have been in their past
interactions. However, such a model requires vehicles to establish a long-term rela-
tionship with each other, which may not be practical in a big VANET environment.
Furthermore, it also requires vehicles to store information regarding vehicles it has
encountered in the past. This may lead to storage problem. A similar approach of
experienced-based trust was proposed by Patwardhan et al. in [84].
However, most of the trust- and reputation-based schemes such as in [38, 65, 73, 84, 99]
lack of privacy provision. In addition, the issue associated with schemes that adopted a
decentralised infrastructure such as in [38, 73, 84, 99] is the problem of accountability.
2.4.2 Privacy
Communication in VANETs requires the receiver of a message to authenticate sender.
However, such verification may reveal some information about the sender’s identity and
location. For example, in some signature scheme, the certificate of the signer’s public
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key may allow linking of activities. This is because signing a message may link the
certificate of the signing vehicle. There are two aspects of privacy that we consider;
anonymity and unlinkability. Anonymity means that the identity of a user is unknown
to the others in the network. It must not assume that individual vehicles can always be
identified by some unique code that is openly communicated. Meanwhile, unlinkability
indicates that the activities cannot be linked to a source. This is to avoid profiling of
a user based on their movement pattern.
2.4.2.1 Anonymity
A common approach to achieve anonymity is by using pseudonyms. In [45, 46, 51,
61, 92], randomly chosen and changing pseudonyms are used to prevent linking to real
identity. In [55, 56], these pseudonyms are used as public keys in place of identity in
ID-based announcement schemes. Each key may be used once for each message or used
to sign multiple messages over its short lifetime, where the key change frequency varies
on some factors such as vehicle’s speed. The pseudonyms is updated in order to prevent
linking of vehicle’s activities. However, the drawback from pseudonymous technique
includes secure distribution of keys, key management and complexity of storage.
Another approach to seek anonymity may be achieved by using group signature, where
the group is the set of all participating cars. 3A schemes based on group signature (GS)
has been designed for the V2V safety application [24, 36, 66]. Group signature allows
each group member to sign on behalf of the group. A verifier may know the signature
belong to which group without being able to associate it to a signer. In certain ciar-
cumstances, such as revocation, the TP may reveal the identity of the signer. The main
merit of group signatures based technique over the pseudonym approach is that the for-
mer overcomes the limitation of pre-storing a large number of anonymous certificates.
However, group signatures are usually much longer than the regular signatures. This
may causes an expensive storage load when messages are stored for liability purposes.
It also does not provide distinction of message origin.
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2.4.2.2 Unlinkability
Messages can be linked if it is signed using the same pseudonym. However, linking
message will be more challenging if vehicles change and update pseudonym regularly.
Pseudonyms can be preloaded or self-generated. The drawbacks of former method
include key management and large storage space [61]. To eliminate these problems,
[18] proposed that each vehicle generates its own pseudonyms. The rate at which
pseudonyms are updated depends on various factors such as the degree of privacy
required by a vehicle. However, an issue associated with this technique is the problem
distinguishability of message origin as discussed in Section 2.4.1.2. The property of
message unlinkability is also achieved using group signature [18, 24, 36, 66] where it is
computationally hard to determine whether two messages were announced by the same
group member or not.
A silent period was proposed in [17, 98] to achieve unlinkability. The level of un-
linkability is dependent on the number of vehicles presents at the time the change of
pseudonyms takes place. Higher velocity of vehicles present at the time of pseudonym
update decreases the ability of an adversary to probabilistically determine and link
pseudonyms and vice versa. During silent period, transmission of messages is tem-
porarily disabled for a period of time. A vehicle do not receive any incoming message
either. The drawback of this technique is that it restricts a vehicle from generating or
receiving a message, which defeats the purpose of VANETs deployment.
2.4.3 Accountability
Accountability is achieved if it satisfies the traceability, non-repudiation and revocation
requirement. The necessity for accountability in VANETs arises from the possibility of
misbehaviour among users that may harm public road safety and jeopardize its future
deployment. Misbehaviour in VANETs may occur as a result of hardware malfunction-
ing or malicious activities of users in the system. Such activities may include prevention
of broadcasting messages to other vehicles; generating fake messages; injection of non-
safety related message that may caused traffic in the network due to the overload of the
bandwidth; or escaping from an accident. While attacks performed by outsiders can
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be addressed by means of authentication, misbehaviour among legitimate senders is a
more challenging problem to address. This is because they possess valid credentials by
the authority and may be able to deceive receiving vehicles into trusting them.
2.4.3.1 Traceability
While traceability is desirable when dispute arise, this problem is difficult to address
with the privacy requirement. Different methods have been studied to solve this prob-
lem. For instance, in scheme that uses pseudonyms (for example, [45, 46, 51, 92]), the
pseudonyms can be linked to the real identity of the vehicle unique electronic license
plate (ELP) to trace the misbehaved user by the authorities. Meanwhile, in group
signature, some schemes allow a tracing manager to revoke the anonymity of malicious
vehicles by opening signatures [24, 36]. However, some schemes revoke the misbehaved
vehicles without being able to reveal the vehicles identity by any central authorities
(for example, [23]).
2.4.3.2 Non-Repudiation
Another aspect of accountability is non-repudiation. A vehicle cannot deny having
sent a message signed using an anonymous key that belong exclusively to the sender,
assuming forgery is not possible [24, 35]. Neither could they claim that the message is
replayed if a timestamp is included in each message. In some other schemes [28, 56],
non-repudiation is assumed in the presence of a fully trusted party (TP). A challenge-
response protocol is another approach to achieve non-repudiation in [24]: given a sig-
nature on a message, the challenge-response protocol determines whether a vehicle is
the signer of a message.
2.4.3.3 Revocation
In the literature, the most common approach is by updating and distributing certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) across the network via RSUs or other information service points.
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As the authority keep records of all issued certificates, an anonymous key used to sign
the malicious message can be associated to the misbehaved vehicle by matching the
information stored in the database. This may occur with the aid of the TP [80, 92] or
infrastructure [66, 92]. Such aid is required as the CRL is assumed to be large and the
vehicle has limited storage capacity. However, such design must be constructed carefully
as this may result in key management problem [92] or heavy reliance on infrastructure
[66, 92] which may render the protocol inefficient. An approach to address the problem
of large CRL was proposed in [66]. This hybrid method requires the unrevoked vehicles
to update their private key and group public key with the group manager (GM) when
the number of revoked vehicles exceed some predefined threshold. However, it leads to
scalability problem where it requires an effective approach to update the parameters of
remaining vehicles in the network. In reputation-based schemes [65, 70], revocation can
be achieved by ceasing to provide misbehaved vehicles with their reputation credentials.
A vehicle whose reputation score decreases to zero would then no longer be able to
continue its future participation in the network.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
In this chapter, we review schemes based on threshold mechanism and trust- and reputation-
based models. In the first part, we classify recent protocols using the threshold method
according to their main credential techniques. In a similar fashion, we classify re-
cent trust- and reputation-based models according to their main approaches. We then
examine the extent to which they satisfy the properties of reliability, privacy and ac-
countability.
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3.1 Abstraction of a 3A Scheme using the Threshold Method
In this section, we present a generalization of a 3A scheme using the threshold method
demonstrated in Figure 3.1. The network consists of a trusted party (TP) and vehicles;
sending vehicle Vs and receiver of the message Vr as described in Section 2.1.
TP
Á check(creVs(t))
?= valid.
If not, ⊥.
Â compute(creVs(t)) = cre
TP
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?= valid.
If not, ⊥.
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Figure 3.1: Abstraction of a Threshold Scheme.
We define a 3A scheme that satisfy the following properties. A 3A scheme must be
able to prove that (i) the message m originate from a legitimate sender Vs, (ii) that
the content of m has not been altered and (iii) a creTPVs(t) was issued from the TP. A
common 3A scheme is achieved using digital signature. The 3A is composed of sign3A()
and verify3A(). The sign3A() takes input a vehicle’s credential creTPVs(t) and message
associated with the event m and output a signature σ. The verify3A() takes input a
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message m, a signature σ generated on the message and V ’s credential creTPVs to verify
σ.
We first present the initialisation phase of a 3A scheme before we describe the abstrac-
tion of a threshold scheme. The actions of each entity are described as follow:
1. Trusted Party (TP).
(a) computation of public system parameters params. We assume the distribu-
tion of params to all entities in the network;
(b) installation of some part of the 3A scheme. For instance, it needs verify3A()
to check signed reports of misbehaviour.
2. Vehicles.
(a) A V has some initial credential. There are 2 types of credentials. A creV
may be documentation for proof of vehicle’s ownership, some secret unknown
to others or credentials already embedded within V which could be V ’s ID
before it is enrolled in VANETs. The second one is the type that is issued
by the TP.
(b) installation of a secure authenticated anonymous announcement scheme 3A.
We omit the initialisation phase in Figure 3.1 as not to crowd the diagram.
3.1.1 Description of the threshold scheme
In this section, we describe each phase for a threshold scheme. There are two channels
used to transmit information as depicted in Figure 3.1. The first one is called a secure
channel, denoted by →. We define secure channel that provides message authentica-
tion and confidentiality. Secondly, an authenticated and integrity protected channel,
denoted by 99K is called a public channel. The abstraction of a threshold scheme is
composed of the following phase.
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A Registration Phase.
Step À. Firstly Vs sends request for credentials request(creVs(t)) at time t to
participate in the network.
Step Á. The TP performs check(creVs(t)). This verifies that the request originated
from Vs and that Vs has not been revoked from the system. If the check fails the
request is denied.
Step Â. Upon success verification, the TP generates credentials for Vs by executing
compute(creVs(t)) = creTPVs(t) where cre
TP
Vs
(t) denotes credentials issued by TP for
Vs at time t. The credentials creTPVs(t) may be used by Vs to:
(a) make an announcement;
(b) generate other credentials;
(c) to report misbehaviour or to request new credentials.
Step Ã. The TP performs return(creTPVs(t)) where the TP sends credentials it has
computed to Vs.
Step Ä. When Vs receives the credentials, it performs validate(creTPVs(t)) that ver-
ifies creTPVs(t) indeed originate from the TP and the content has not been tampered.
This phase is performed over a secure channel.
Periodic Credential Provision. For future participation in the network, a
vehicle may periodically request credentials from the TP. We call this a periodic
credential provision. We note that in some schemes, Steps À to Ä may be repeated
periodically for vehicles to obtain new credentials. In this case the frequency of
retrieval will depend on the restrictions of the system. Long intervals between
retrieval period (for instance, annually during vehical maintenance) mean that the
vehicles will have to store a large number of credentials. Short intervals mean that
vehicles store fewer credentials, but may require more frequent communications with
the TP.
B Broadcast Phase.
Step Å. When Vs detects potential hazard on road, it will warn neighboring ve-
hicles and announce the event over a public channel. It generates a signature
σ = sign3A(m, creTPVs(t)). A vehicle Vs then broadcast (m,σ, cre
TP
Vs
) to neighbouring
vehicles.
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C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. A Vr performs verify3A(m, creTPVs(t), σ) where it accepts a message as valid
if Vs is legitimate and the integrity of the message is preserved. In a threshold
scheme, this step is repeated many times and Vr will accept a message to be true if
it receives a threshold number of messages of the same event reported by distinct
vehicles over a short period of time
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. If Vr experienced any misbehaviour from its encounter with Vs, it may lodge
a report, sign it with its credential and send it to the TP via the wireless channel.
Step È. Upon receiving reports, the TP verify Vr’s authenticity and integrity of the
report before arriving at a decision whether to revoke Vs from the system. The
TP may also periodically update revocation information and distribute it across the
network.
3.2 Reviews of 3A Techniques
In the past few years , significant interest has been displayed through the active re-
search related to VANETs. Various cryptographic primitives have been proposed to
design an efficient VANETs architectural system to solve security problems. In this
section we survey some recent 3A schemes providing the three goals and classify them
according to their main credential techniques. Our focus will be on vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communication and we shall not assume the availability of infrastructures. Each
subsection focuses on a different technique used to realise a 3A.
3.2.1 Schemes based on group signatures
A group signature scheme allows each member A of the group (comprising all members
registered with a particular TP) to sign a message on behalf of the group without
A’s identity being revealed to the verifier. In addition, two signatures of a legitimate
group member cannot to linked, that is, it is impossible to tell whether two signatures
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are produced by a specific signer. Hence group signature schemes provide anonymity
within a group, and activities of a signer cannot be linked. Some group signature
schemes (for example, [24] and [36]) allow a tracing manager to reveal group members’
identities (by opening signatures) but there are also schemes where members’ identities
cannot be revealed by any trusted parties (for example, [23]). We review five schemes
[18, 24, 36, 66, 118] based on group signatures and examine whether they achieve the
goals of reliability, privacy and accountability.
3.2.1.1 GSIS: Secure Vehicular Communications with Privacy Preserving
The GSIS scheme was proposed by Lin et al. in [66]. It uses group signatures and
identity-based signatures for secure and private announcement protocol in VANETs.
The scheme addresses the security of communication between vehicles (V2V) and be-
tween vehicles and RSUs (V2I). For a V2I communication, an ID-based signature
scheme is used. Here, we will only focus on the V2V communication. In the ini-
tialisation phase of the scheme, a vehicle has an initial credential IDV , the TP has
params = gpk and 3A is the group signature scheme [11].
A Registration Phase.
StepÀ. Each vehicle Vs with identity IDVs sends request(creVs(t)) = request(IDVs)
to the TP.
Step Á. The TP check(IDVs) to verify the request.
Step Â. If the request proves to be valid, the TP performs compute(creVs(t)) =
creTPVs(t) = gskVs , where gskVs is Vs unique group signing key. The TP stores tracing
information AVs with IDVs .
Step Ã. The TP return(gskVs) to Vs.
Step Ä. The Vs performed validate(gskVs) to verify that it originated from the TP
and integrity protected.
B Broadcast Phase.
Step Å. Given a message associated with an event m and gsk as an input to
sign3A(m, creTPVs(t)) = sign3A(m, gsk) = σ and broadcast (m,σ) to neigboring
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vehicles Vr.
C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. Once the message is received, Vr performs verify3A(m, gpk, σ) where the
message is accepted as valid if the signature σ is successfully verified using Vs group
public key gpk and that Vs who generated it has not been revoked.
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. This is not described in the scheme. We assume that misbehaviour can be
reported anonymously by a vehicle V by using sign3A.
Step È. The revocation is performed by hybrid membership revocation where the
CRL–based verifier-local revocation (VLR) is utilized. Below a threshold number of
revoked vehicles, revocation is similar to a traditional CRL–based revocation scheme
where revocation list are distributed in the network. Once the threshold is exceeded,
the gpk and private keys of all unrevoked vehicles are updated, leaving the revoked
vehicles unable to continue generating valid signature.
Discussion. As a vehicle uses credentials distributed by the authority for signing
messages, it guarantees the authenticity of the sender and integrity of the message.
However, it cannot be used in threshold mechanism because in this group signature
scheme, distinguishability is difficult to achieve without an online manager. This
scheme achieves anonymity where the resulting signature keeps the identity of the
signer secret, it also satisfy unlinkability where it is computationally hard to deter-
mine whether the valid signatures of two different group were computed by the same
group member. For accountability, the authority distributes the CRL to the infrastruc-
ture points. The revocation process is then performed by the aid of the infrastructure
which takes over the authority responsibility. However, this implies reliance on the
infrastructure and revocation can only be performed within vicinity. Moreover, while
conditional privacy preserves the anonymity of the user as long as they do not misbe-
have, this scheme allows the disclosure of an honest user’s identity by the authority.
In addition, as group signature scheme permit the issuer to create the private keys of
group members, it does not achieve non-repudiation as the signer is not the sole holder
of the signing key [24].
55
3.2 Reviews of 3A Techniques
3.2.1.2 Efficient and robust pseudonymous authentication in VANET
Callandriello et al. proposed a Hybrid scheme based on the group signature proposed in
[18]. In this scheme, a vehicle is initialised with an initial credential IDV and associated
cryptographic keys. Vehicles are managed by a certification authority (CA), who plays
the role as the TP which has params = gpk. The 3A is the group signature scheme
based on [11].
A Registration Phase.
StepÀ. A vehicle Vs sends request for credentials request(creVs(t)) = request(IDVs)
to the TP.
Step Á. The TP check(IDVs) to verify the request.
Step Â. The TP compute(creVs(t)) = creTPVs(t) = gskVs , where gskV is Vs unique
group signing key.
Step Ã. The TP return(gskVs) which denotes its group signing key.
Step Ä. Vs performs validate(gskVs) that it originated from the TP and integrity
protected.
B Broadcast Phase.
Step Å. Vs performs sign3A(m, creTPVs) = sign3A(m, gskVs) and output two-part
signature (σSKiVs
(m), σgskVs (PK
i
Vs
)) where {PKiVs , SKiVs} are temporary credentials
generated by Vs used as input for the sign3A(). The group signing key gskVs is used
to sign each PKiVs , essentially certifying PK
i
Vs
. It then broadcast the message tuple
(m,σSKiVs
(m), σgskVs (PK
i
Vs
)).
C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. A verifier can thus be convinced that the announcement m is sent by a
legitimate group member without being able to identify Vs indicated by perform-
ing verify3A(m,PKiVs , gpk, σ) = valid. Each pseudonym PK
i
Vs
is updated to
PKi+1Vs after its lifetime expires. A verifier cannot link a pseudonym with any other
pseudonyms used by Vs.
D Revocation Phase.
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Step Ç. This step is not included in the scheme. We assume that a vehicle uses
sign3A() to anonymously report a misbehaviour.
Step È. A TP can identify and revoke a group member, using updated CRL dis-
tributed into the network.
Discussion. While this scheme achieves a level of reliability in that it provides as-
surance of the legitimacy of a sender and integrity of the message, it cannot be used
in a threshold mechanism. Even though messages sent within the time period can be
linked, a rogue vehicle may generate and certify many pseudonyms within any time
period and thus masquerade as multiple vehicles. Without an online tracing manager,
such behaviour cannot be detected. In addition, if the time period τ is short (in order
to avoid linking) then messages cannot be linked and thus the scheme does not provide
distinguishability of message origins. A CRL is used for revocation. This ability allows
a level of accountability, but compromises privacy - a vehicle may be identified whether
or not it is misbehaving. Moreover, the scheme does not provide non-repudiation, since
the TP also holds the signing key.
3.2.1.3 Balanced Trustworthiness, Safety, and Privacy in Vehicle-to-Vehicle Com-
munications
Wu et al. proposed a general framework based on message–linkable group signature
(MLGS) in [35]. It is a variant of group signature where a message link identifier can
only be generated once for a message. This is an approach to prevent misbehaviour (i.e.
vehicles sign the same message more than once) among vehicles. Vehicles signing two
messages with the same content can be traced and punished by having its ID disclosed
or by exclusion from the network. Each vehicle is registered to a vehicle administration
office that acts as a group registration manager (GM). In addition, there exist tracing
manager (TM) who possess some secret information that allow traceability in case
of misbehaviour. The authorities are assumed to be honest and semi–trusted, which
means they do not have access to the vehicles private key.
A Registration Phase.
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Step À. A vehicle Vs sends request(creVs(t)) = request(pkVs , g
skVs ) to the TP
where pkVs and skVs is its self generated public and secret key pair.
Step Á. The TP check(pkVs , g
skVs ) to verify the request.
Step Â. If the request proven to be valid, the TP compute(creVs(t)) = creTPVs(t) =
σskTP(pkVs) = gc where gc is Vs group certificate.
Step Ã. The TP return(gc) to Vs.
Step Ä. Vs performed validate(gc) to verify that it originated from the TP and
integrity protected.
B Broadcast Phase.
StepÅ. A sending vehicle Vs takes input a messagem and (skVs , pkVs , gc) to generate
sign3A(m, γ(m), skVs , pkVs , gc) which output a signature σ. A γ(m) is a message-
link identifier that can only be produced once for the same message. An identical
γ(m) is produced if Vs attempt to sign the same message more than once. A vehicle
can be trivially linked by comparing two signatures on the same message. Vs then
broadcast (m, γ(m), σ).
C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. Upon receiving the message, receiving vehicle Vr will validate the gc using
the TP’s public key and later verify the signature. If such verification holds for all
n signatures received from n distinct vehicles which exceed certain threshold, Vr is
likely to accept the message as valid.
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. This is not described in the scheme. We assume that misbehaviour can be
reported anonymously by a vehicle V by using sign3A.
Step È. If a vehicle V is found to act maliciously (e.g. signing a message more than
once), V can be traced. The validity of σ and m is first verified. The TP who possess
some trapdoor information of Vs public key will look up its local database to match
it with V ’s identity for revocation.
Discussion. This scheme satisfies all requirement for a reliable announcement. A Vs
who possesed valid credentials issued the by TP assures user authenticity and message
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integrity. Sybil attacks in VANETs can be thwarted with this technique as a vehicle
is traceable if it signs a message more than once. Therefore, a threshold method can
be adopted. This scheme achieves anonymity where the resulting signature keeps the
identity of the signer secret, it also satisfy unlinkability where it is computationally
hard to determine weather the valid signatures of two different group were computed
by the same group member. For accountability, they face the same adverse conditions
in group signature-based protocol in which the verification time grows linearly with
the number of revoked vehicles and every remaining vehicle need to update its private
key and group public key when the number of revoked vehicles exceed some predefined
threshold.
3.2.1.4 Threshold Anonymous Announcement in VANET
A threshold anonymous announcement (TAA) scheme was proposed by Chen et al.
in [24]. The protocol uses direct anonymous attestation technique [23] and k-time
anonymous [105]. The DAA scheme is used as a method to assure the verifier that the
anonymous signer possesses valid credentials by the TPs. It can also be seen as a group
signature schemes without the facility to trace the signature to its signer [24]. Mean-
while, a k-time anonymous signature scheme allows a signer identity to be recovered by
the TP if he signs the message more than k times (k = 1 in an announcement scheme).
A Registration Phase.
Step À. A Vs sends a request(commVs) to the TP where commVs is a commitment that
binds a secret value fVs generated by Vs and its private signing key skVs embedded
within Vs prior to the system set up.
Step Á. The TP check(commVs) to verify if the request holds to be valid.
Step Â. If it verifies correctly, the TP compute(creVs) = creTPVs = (A,B,C). It stores
a trapdoor information commVs associated with fVs .
Step Ã. The TP return(A,B,C) to Vs.
StepÄ. The Vs verifies the correctness of the credentials by performing validate(A,B,C).
B Broadcast Phase.
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Step Å. A Vs sign3A(m, (A,B,C)) = σ and broadcast (m,σ).
C Message Verification.
Step Æ. A receiving vehicle Vr perform verify3A(m,σ, gpk). In this scheme, a Vr
can link two signatures and the identity of Vs can be revealed if Vs announce the
same message more than once.
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. Each Vr maintains a list β of l events and associated information. It created
a new event if it hasn’t been reported before. If the event exist in β, the signature
σ is checked against the list of σ already received.
Step È. When a revocation list gets longer, the TP update its key pair (skTP, pkTP).
It then update (A,B,C) to (A,B,C ′) of unrevoked vehicles. The revoked vehicles
will not have their credentials updated and hence they would not be able to generate
a valid signature under the new TP public key pk′TP.
Discussion. The requirement of message reliability is satisfied in this scheme. The
assurance of message authentication and data integrity is provided by using credentials
issued by the TP. Distinguishability of message origin is achieved, where it can deter-
mine whether two signatures for the same event were generated by the same signer of
not. This permits the adoption of a threshold method. A vehicle can anonymously sign
on behalf its group without being identified as the message generator, which preserves
user’s anonymity. The property of unlinkability is satisfied where its computation-
ally hard to determine whether two valid signatures was generated by the same group
member or not. For accountability, non-repudiation is achieved as the signer is the sole
holder its secret key. The TP holds V ’s trapdoor information that allows traceability
when misbehaviour issue arise. To address the problem of long rogue list commonly
occur in group signature schemes, this scheme proposed permanent revocation. The
TP’s key pairs and signer’s credentials cre are updated, preventing it to continue par-
ticipating in the network.
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3.2.2 Schemes based on pseudonyms
In these schemes, pseudonyms are anonymous public keys certified by a TP that does
not contain any identifying information to associate it with a user. Each pseudonym
may be used once or has a short lifetime before it is updated to prevent linkability
of vehicle’s activities. There are a few schemes proposed using pseudonyms which we
shall review [27, 34, 92, 115] in this section. We then analyse the extent of security
goals achieved.
3.2.2.1 Securing vehicular ad hoc networks
To achieve authentication and conditional privacy, Raya and Hubaux proposed the use
of public key cryptography in [92].
A Registration Phase.
Step À. Each vehicle Vs with identity IDVs sends request(creVs , t) = request(IDVs)
to the TP.
Step Á. The TP check(IDVs) to verify the request.
Step Â. If the request proven to be valid, the TP compute a set of credentials as
follows: compute(creVs(t)) = creTPVs(t) = (pkVs , skVs , Cert
TP
Vs
). This corresponds to
Vs’s public and private key, and its corresponding public key certificate, which is
TP’s signature on Vs public key.
Step Ã. The TP return(pkVs , skVs , CertTPVs) to Vs.
Step Ä. Vs validate(pkVs , skVs , CertTPVs)) to verify the correctness of the credentials
provided before they are stored.
Periodic Credential Provision.
Periodic credential provision is performed over a long interval between retrieval pe-
riod (for instance, semi-annual or annually) where the credentials are transmitted
over a secure channel. This can be done during regular vehicle maintenance or
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renewal vehicle’s registration. The reason being is that a large number of creden-
tials for longer term usage may not be feasible to be transmitted over the wireless
medium. In some countries, periodic vehicle inspection are mandatory to allow ve-
hicles operate on public road [31]. These occasion can be used to update software,
perform system consistency check, and upload new cryptographic materials. In this
scheme, Step À to Step Ä as described in Registration Phase above is performed to
retrieve credentials.
B Broadcast Phase.
Step Å. To broadcast a message, Vs takes input m and a randomly selected skVs to
generate sign3A(m, skVs) which output σ on m. It then broadcast (m,σ,CertTPVs)
where CertTPVs is its corresponding certificate.
C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. A receiver Vr verify3A(m,σ,CertTPVs) where pkVs is extracted and verified
using CertTPVs . It then verify Vs signature σ on the message using pkVs .
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. This is not described in the scheme. We assume that a vehicle can anony-
mously report a misbehaviour using sign3A().
Step È. Identity resolution in this scheme is preformed by the TP who maintains a
mapping between long term identity IDVs and credentials issued. To revoke a vehicle
from the network, three revocation protocols were designed. Revocation protocol
of tamper-proof device (RTPD) relays revocation message via the infrastructures to
the misbehaving vehicle Vm. All stored keys will be erased once the message which is
encrypted with the Vm’s public key is received and decrypted by the TPD. When lo-
cating a vehicle is infeasible and partial revocation is desired, the revocation protocol
using compressed certificate revocation lists (RCCRL), which is based on traditional
CRL, is adopted. It reduced communication and storage overhead by employing a
compression technique to the CRL. Slightly different from the above two protocols,
distributed revocation protocol (DRP) uses a detection malicious technique similar
to [45] for revocation. Neighbouring vehicles will report an accumulated accusation
against Vm once they reach an infrastructure point. The CA will then update and
distribute the CRL within the network.
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Discussion. This scheme achieves reliability in sense of authenticity and data integrity.
However, their scheme do not prevent Sybil attacks as, for the same message, a signing
vehicle can disguise as multiple vehicles. Therefore, threshold mechanism can not be
adopted. For signing purpose, each key can only be used once to achieve the need for
privacy. In case of dispute, these keys have to be traceable which requires an exhaustive
search in the certificate database by the TP. Moreover, it raise manufacturing cost as
an advanced storage for key pairs must be issued to maintain privacy over a significant
amount of time. This subsequently results in substantial amount of communication
overhead to the TP who needs to manage many certificates per vehicle. Associated
with revocation techniques, the RTPD protocol is only employed when revoking the
keys of Vm is required as it does not allow partial revocation. It also relies heavily on
the infrastructures and require the TP to locate and trace the current location of Vm
where the message will be send through infrastructures until it is reachable. Similar
to RTPD, the RCCRL protocol also depends on the availability of infrastructures to
distribute CRL, which may lead to scalability problem. While these three protocols
works well with conventional public key infrastructure, using anonymous credentials
for preserving privacy whilst achieving traceability and revocation may results in large
CRL managed by the TP. This is because each vehicle has many anonymous public key
and revoking a vehicle requires revoking all its anonymous keys.
While this scheme achieves authenticity of the sender and integrity of the message, in
case where vehicles collude to lie, it is difficult to distinguish and trace misbehaviour
as a group of vehicles is assigned with the same key material. Non-repudiation is also
not achieved as the VM also possess a copy of the r shares of the signature scheme.
All these problems subsequently leads to the problem of irrevocable anonymity.
3.2.2.2 Efficient and Spontaneous Privacy-Preserving Protocol for Secure Vehic-
ular Communication
Xiong et al. proposed a VANET announcement scheme based on revocable ring signa-
tures in [115]. To compare the properties between group signature and ring signature,
the anonymity of the signer in group signature is revocable by a trusted party called
the group manager. The group manager is also responsible for the formation of groups
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of users and distribute specially designed keys to their members. Meanwhile, these
ring signatures schemes [96] are simplified group signatures which only have users and
no group manager. It does not allow anyone to revoke the signer anonymity, while
allowing the actual signer to form a set of possible signers including himself, and sign a
message by using his secret key and other’s public keys without getting their approval
or assistant. Another variant of ring signature called revocable ring signature [67] al-
lows a real signer to form a ring arbitrarily while allowing revocable anonymity of the
actual signer by the trusted party.
A Registration Phase.
Step À. A vehicle Vs with identity IDVs sends request(creVs(t)) = request(IDVs)
to the TP.
Step Á. The TP check(IDVs) to verify the request.
Step Â. The TP then compute a set of credentials as follows: compute(creVs(t)) =
creTPVs(t) = (pkVs , skVs , Cert
TP
Vs
). This denotes Vs’s public and private key, and its
corresponding public key certificate respectively. The TP stores (IDVs , pkVs) in its
database.
Step Ã. The TP return(creTPVs(t)) = (pkVs , skVs , Cert
TP
Vs
) to Vs.
Step Ä. Vs then verify the validity of the credentials received.
B Broadcast Phase.
Step Å. The sending vehicle Vs dynamically has a set of public keys, say P =
{pk1, · · · , pkn} collected from other vehicles it encounter along its way, where pkVs ∈
P . The set P is updated to avoid from being traced and it defines the ring of unre-
voked public keys. Vs generate sign3A(P, sks, pkGTA,m), output σ and broadcast
it.
C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. Upon receiving the message, Vr performs verify3A(m,P ). A message is
accepted only if σ is validated. Otherwise it is rejected.
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. This is not described in the scheme. We assume that a vehicle can anony-
mously report a misbehaviour using sign3A().
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Step È. Given the signature σ, the TP can determine and trace the real identity of
malicious Vs which is stored in its database. The TP broadcast (pkVs , IDVs) to all
vehicles in the network. Each vehicle will then add pkVs into their local revocation
list.
Discussion. The scheme achieves the authenticity of the sender and integrity of the
message as the ring signature can only be generated by a valid ring member. However,
the message is indistinguishable due to the changing public key set P and therefore, a
threshold mechanism cannot be adopted in this scheme. While anonymity is achieved,
it does not achieve unlinkability as the vehicle public key pkVs is always the same despite
changing and updating the other public keys in the set P . For accountability, once a
signature is disputed, as only the TP knows their private key, the TP have the ability
to trace and revoke the anonymity of misbehaving vehicle. However, non-repudiation
is not achieve as the TP also hold Vs’s private key.
3.2.2.3 A Security Framework with Strong Non-Repudiation and Privacy in VANETs
A security framework for an announcement scheme using identity-based public key
cryptography (ID-PKC) was presented in [27]. This scheme proposed an approach to
solve the inherent key escrow problem in ID-PKC. The essence of the idea is to use the
identity of the trusted party as a verifier of vehicles’ identity.
A Registration Phase.
Step À. The Vs sends request(creVs , t) = request(IDVs , pkVs) to the TP where pkVs
is the self-generated public key pkVs by Vs while keeping its corresponding secret
key skVs private.
Step Á. The TP check(IDVs , pkVs) to verify the request.
Step Â. If the request proven to be valid, the TP compute a set of credentials as
follows: compute(creVs(t)) = creTPVs(t) = (PIDVs , Cert
TP
Vs
). The PIDVs is Vs’s anony-
mous identity which is generated using the TP’s secret value. Meanwhile CertTPVs is
Vs public key certificate, which is TP’s signature on PIDVs and the self-generated
public key by Vs.
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Step Ã. The TP return(PIDVs , CertTPVs) to Vs.
Step Ä. Vs validate(PIDVs , CertTPVs) to verify the correctness of the credentials pro-
vided before they are stored.
Periodic Credential Provision.
The periodic credential phase for this scheme is similar to the scheme in [92] de-
scribed earlier.
B Broadcast Phase.
Step Å. When Vs wishes to broadcast a message, Vs takes input m and a randomly
selected skVs to generate sign3A(m, skVs) which output σ on m. It then broadcast
(m,σ, pkVs , Cert
TP
Vs
, PIDVs).
C Message Verification Phase.
Step Æ. A receiver Vr verify3A(m,σ, pkVs , Cert
TP
Vs
, IDTP).
D Revocation Phase.
Step Ç. This is not described in the scheme. We assume that a vehicle can anony-
mously report a misbehaviour using sign3A().
Step È. Identity resolution in this scheme is preformed by the TP who maintains a
mapping between long term identity IDVs and credentials issued. To revoke a vehicle
from the network, three revocation protocols were designed. Revocation protocol
of tamper-proof device (RTPD) relays revocation message via the infrastructures to
the misbehaving vehicle Vm. All stored keys will be erased once the message which is
encrypted with the Vm’s public key is received and decrypted by the TPD. When lo-
cating a vehicle is infeasible and partial revocation is desired, the revocation protocol
using compressed certificate revocation lists (RCCRL), which is based on traditional
CRL, is adopted. It reduced communication and storage overhead by employing a
compression technique to the CRL. Slightly different from the above two protocols,
distributed revocation protocol (DRP) uses a detection malicious technique similar
to [45] for revocation. Neighbouring vehicles will report an accumulated accusation
against Vm once they reach an infrastructure point. The TP will then update and
distribute the CRL within the network.
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Discussion. The TP signs self-generated pkVs from Vs, essentially certifying Vs. Mes-
sages signed using valid credentials satisfies message authentication and data integrity.
However, it cannot adopt the threshold method as message origin is indistinguishable.
In terms of privacy, anonymity is achieved using pseudonyms that does not contain
any identifying information that associates it to Vs. Messages sign using the same
pseudonym is linkable over it’s short lifetime. For accountability, non-repudiation is
achieved as the vehicle is the sole holder of its secret key. In case of misbehaviour, a
vehicle is traceable using the database maintained by the TP and revoked from future
participation in the system.
3.2.3 Others
3.2.3.1 Balancing Auditability and Privacy in Vehicular Networks
Choi et al. proposed the use of symmetric cryptosystem for a VANET security archi-
tecture design in [28]. The security mechanism is of two types: between vehicles (V2V)
and between a vehicle and an infrastructure (V2I). Symmetric key technique is used
in a V2V communication, while public/private key for the V2I communication. The
infrastructure is responsible for the issuance of pseudonyms which are used to generate
anonymous communication in a V2V network.
Initialisation Phase. The TP initializes the system by issuing V ’s long term pseudonym
PKxV , for x = {1, · · · ,m}. The long term pseudonym provides a way to correlate an
identity based on a short term pseudonym that will be issued by the infrastructure,
also known as the roadside unit (RSU), to V . The uses of the two tiers are used to
obscure the vehicles privacy. The TP then creates a database for every vehicle admitted
into the network. Each vehicle then perform a preliminary handshake with the RSU
whenever it enter new area or switch to a new RSU to obtain its set of short term
pseudonyms pkiV and its corresponding session key KS
i
V for i = {1, · · · , n}.
Broadcast Message. To broadcast an event, a sending vehicle Vs randomly choose
a pseudonym pkiVs and the corresponding session key KS
i
Vs
to compute MACi. Once
the MACi is generated, Vs broadcast the message Mi. A receiving vehicle Vr will store
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Mi in its database and send to a nearby RSU. The RSU will run pseudonym lookup to
match the session key corresponding to the Vs pseudonym attached to Mi. Once the
message is verified, RSU will send Mi back to Vr.
Revocation. Three revocation protocols are proposed in the scheme. Pseudonym
auditing (PA) is used to determine the location at a certain time of a vehicle of a
given identity. Basic identity auditing (BIA) determine the identity of a vehicle by
linking pseudonyms and only the TP can reveal the identity of the vehicle. Meanwhile,
application of identity auditing (AIA) aim to find vehicle at a certain time or certain
place by querying its database.
Discussion. While the scheme achieves user authenticity and data integrity, it could
not distinguish whether two message were signed by the same vehicle or not. This imply
threshold mechanism cannot be used in this scheme. For decryption and verification
of each message, Vr is required to contact RSU. This may not be ideal and feasible
taking into account the real time demand and high mobility of vehicles in the network.
To revoke a vehicle, the scheme relies heavily on the infrastructure for revocation
computation. Even though symmetric primitives are efficient in terms of computation
overhead, it requires preliminary handshake between communicating parties. In a
VANET pervasive environment, this is challenging. Furthermore, due to the nature of
key symmetric, non-repudiation could not be achieved.
3.2.3.2 Trustworthy Privacy-Preserving Car-Generated Announcements in Vehic-
ular Ad Hoc Networks
Daza et al. proposed group-based (t, n)-threshold signature schemes in [34]. A (t, n)-
threshold signature distributes the signing operation among a group of n participants.
Each participant in a distributed signature scheme is given a share ski of the secret key
sk in such a way that to sign a message, every participant computes a partial signature
σi(m) using his share of the secret key. Then, any set of at least t participants can
compute a valid signature σ(m) on the message by combining their partial signatures.
This essentially implies that a valid signature σ(m) could only be computed if at least
t participants participated before a message is announced. This is a different technique
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compared to the threshold method in our work, where in a threshold method, a message
is considered reliable if at least t messages of the same content were announced by at
least t distinctive legitimate participants within a certain time interval. In their paper
in [34], three variants of privacy-preserving schemes were proposed, namely group-
based private protocol (GBPP), extended group-based private protocol (E-GBPP) and
semiprivate protocol for sparse VANETs (SPSV). Here, we only focus on SPSV as it is
the most relevant for comparison purposes.
Initialisation Phase. In a group of n participants, the trusted parties TPs sets up
d′ different (t, n)-threshold signature schemes. The TPs partitioned n vehicles into d′
sub-range, each assign to a TP. For k = 1, · · · , d′, the kth scheme consists of a public
key pkk and n shares secret skki , where i = 1, · · · , n. Each vehicle V is assigned with
the public keys (pk1, · · · , pkd′) and the secret key shares (sk1i , · · · , skd
′
i ) which assures
legitimacy of users.
Broadcast Phase. To send a message m, Vi randomly select one of the d′ threshold
signature schemes and compute its partial signature σki (m) using sk
k
i . It then broad-
casts σki (m) and m, which includes signature scheme k that was being used. Upon
receiving the message, Vy uses the kth threshold scheme to compute its partial signa-
ture σky (m) on m. It then broadcasts σ
k
y (m) and H(m), where H(m) is the hash of
the message input. If exist at least t different partial signatures on m, Vi can compute
the signature σk(m) and broadcast it, along with m. The announcement m will be
considered as valid if it can be verified by neighbouring vehicles using the public key
pkk.
Revocation. This scheme did not address revocation techniques for accountability
purposes.
Discussion. While this scheme achieves authenticity of the sender and integrity of the
message, it does not achieve distinguishability of message origin. Hence, the threshold
method cannot be adopted. The other downfall of this scheme is that a valid signature
σ(m) could not be computed if less than t participants participated, hence a vehicle
would not be able to announce a message, rendering the scheme to fall apart. In
terms of privacy, the property of anonymity and unlinkability is satisfied. However, the
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level of unlinkability is dependent on the value of d′ where unlinkability improves by
choosing a large value d′. This scheme lack discussion on accountability where the issue
of revocation was not addressed. Non-repudiation is also not achieved as the vehicle is
not the sole holder of their secret key.
3.3 Conclusion
In Section 3.1 and 3.2, we started our contributions in the area by giving construction
of a generic abstraction for 3A scheme using threshold method. To our knowledge, this
is the first construction of such abstraction proposed in the literature that systemati-
cally studies and generalise threshold-based 3A schemes. We classified them according
to their main credentials techniques which are (i) group signature, (ii) pseudonyms and
(iii) for other schemes. We then presented an extensive research of different crypto-
graphic approaches for 3A schemes in VANETs. We thoroughly analyse the advantages
and shortcomings of these schemes. Our analysis cast light on one of the main problems
of VANET security where we deduced that the problems of conflicting security goals is
a non-trivial matter. This can be seen from Table 3.1 that shows only a small number
of schemes which are prevalent to be a secure privacy-preserving system.
In Table 3.1 below, the “X” indicates the security objective is achieved while the
“×” implies the security requirement is not satisfied. Meanwhile, the “X∗” in the
unlinkability column implies the scheme achieve partial unlinkability, where messages
signed using the same pseudonym are linkable over its short lifetime. The summary of
the security goals achieved by the schemes we have reviewed is depicted in Table 3.1
below.
1. Group signature. In a group signature, all group members are assigned with
the same group public key while possessing their own individual secret key to
sign a message. A verifier can verify that the message was signed by a group
member without able to determine the signature generator. The properties of
group signature satisfy the privacy requirement deemed by most VANETs ap-
plications. However, most group signature does not allow indistinguishability of
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Security Analysis
XXXXXXXXXXXSchemes
Sec. goals Reliability Privacy Accountability
Auth. Int. Thres. Anony. Unlink. Trace. Revoke. Non-Rep.
GSIS [66] X X × X X X X ×
Hybrid [18] X X × X X∗ X X ×
MLGS [35] X X X X X X X X
TAA [24] X X X X X X X X
Raya [92] X X × X X∗ X X ×
Ring signature [115] X X × X × X X ×
ID-PKC [27] X X × X X∗ X X X
Symmetric [28] X X × X X X X ×
Daza et al. [34] X X × X X X × ×
Table 3.1: Comparison of Security Analysis.
message origin without the presence of an online group manager. This may not
be feasible in practise. Furthermore, group signature often involves expensive
computation and incur considerable signature size.
2. Public Key Cryptography. In a public key cryptography (PKC), each user
has a pair of keys; one called the public key and the other is called the private
key. The public key is made public while the private kept is kept secret. The
public key is associated to the user in a trusted manner. This is achieved using
a certificate issued by a trusted party (TP), which vouching for the fact that a
given public key belongs to its rightly owner. Inevitably, this causes the TP to
require large amount of storage and computing time managing the certificates.
3. Symmetric Cryptography. Approaches based on symmetric cryptography re-
quires an establishment of pairwise symmetric key during authentication phase
before a message is transmitted. Relying on a key establishment phase is prob-
lematic in most VANETs scenarios due to their high velocity and thus, short
communication span. This is one of the challenges to deploy symmetric-based
techniques in VANETs, as a secure and efficient mechanism to distribute sym-
metric keys into wireless nodes needs to be well-devised. Some schemes (such as
in [28]) requires communication with the TP before a secret key is shared between
two communicating parties. This may cause the scheme to fall apart with an
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oﬄine TP as the shared secret key could not be established, hence hinder com-
munication to take place. On the other hand, distributing symmetric keys in the
absence of an online TP (such as in [15]) introduces security concerns. Indeed
message authenticated using symmetric techniques can be verified efficiently and
involves cheaper computation cost. However, it often occur at the expense of de-
layed message authentication. This may not be desirable for safety applications
in VANETs where messages needs to be processed quickly to allow vehicles utilize
and responds to the event announced. Another inherent problem of symmetric
cryptography is that it does not support non-repudiation and would need to be
extended accordingly to achieve the accountability requirement.
4. Secret Sharing. A secret sharing scheme, known as threshold cryptography,
requires the participation of at least t of n entities to announce a message. Each
entity generates a partial signature and t partial signatures computed on a mes-
sage will construct a full signature before a message can be broadcasted. The
issue associated with this techniques is that the scheme falls apart if less than
t entities participates. Therefore, the message could not be broadcasted and
utilized.
5. Ring Signature.
Ring signature is a form of group signature. It allows a ring of possible signers
to sign messages on behalf of the group without revealing whose signature it
belongs to. In contrast to a group signature, the formation of group members in
a ring signature is completely ad hoc and it does not require a centralized group
manager. However, the drawback of this technique is the lack of accountability.
This raises the question on how to revoke misbehaved vehicles in the absence of
a trusted party. Most schemes [18, 24, 27, 28, 34, 35, 65, 66, 70, 92] assigned
the trusted party to be the sole authority to revoke a vehicle off the network,
rather than delegating the task to a group of vehicles. This choice of design is to
safeguard the scheme against collusion attack and retain accountability.
6. Identity-based Public Key Cryptography.
In identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC), the public key of a user is
some unique information associated to its identity, such as their email address or
phone number. The direct derivation of its public key in ID-PKC eliminates the
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necessity of certificates. However, its inherent problem is that it suffers the key
escrow problem. A trusted party, commonly known as the key generator center
(KGC) has access to a user’s private key as it manages and distributes users’
private keys in the system.
3.4 Reviews of Trust- and Reputation-based Models
In this section, we review some recent trust- and reputation-based system for a secure
anonymous announcement scheme in VANETs. We extract the essence of their work
and summarize them.
3.4.1 Schemes based on Trust and Reputation Models
Ma´rmol et al. [72] proposed a trust and reputation infrastructure-based protocol for
VANETs called TRIP. In their scheme, a vehicle generates a message and broadcast it
to neighboring vehicles. To evaluate the reliability of the message, the receiving vehi-
cle Vr computes the reputation score of the sending vehicle Vs. The reputation score
is the combination of three different sources; its direct previous experience with the
sending vehicle, recommendation by surrounding vehicles, and recommendation from
the trusted party. For instance, the roadside unit who maintains a database of mali-
cious vehicles in the network. The results of the reputation score will assist the Vr to
determine whether a Vs vehicle is untrustworthy, partially trusted or fully trusted. In
order for a reputation score to be computed, the proposed scheme requires communi-
cation with the trusted party and neighboring vehicles to obtain their recommendation
about Vs. This may not be ideal for a time-constraint safety application in VANETs.
Furthermore, it requires a vehicle to establish a long term relationship, which may not
be feasible in a fast moving and large scale of VANETs. A vehicle is also required to
store its past encounters with other vehicles. This may lead to a storage problem. It
also does not address details of the scheme main operations such as the initialisation
phase, message announcement and verification, and revocation of misbehaved vehicles.
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The schemes proposed in [38, 73, 84, 99] adopted a decentralised infrastructure. In [38],
Do¨tzer et al. proposed a reputation model using an approach called opinion piggyback-
ing. Upon receiving a message, each receiving vehicle appends its opinion about the
reliability of the message before it forwards the message to neighboring vehicles. The
opinion may be based on the content of the message or previous aggregated opinions
attached to the message. To generate an opinion, a receiving vehicle has to verify, com-
pute and aggregate all previous opinions appended to the message. This may cause
significant computational burden on receiving vehicles. Issues of revocation and ro-
bustness against possible collusion of adversaries were also not addressed. In addition,
details of implementation such as the initialisation of the reputation system and the
update of reputation score of vehicles were not discussed.
A multifaceted trust modelling framework for VANETs was developed by Minhas et
al. in [73]. The scheme employs three variation of trust models to evaluate the reli-
ability of a message: role-based trust, majority-based trust and experience-based trust.
Role-based trust assumes vehicles with certain predefined role, such as the traffic patrol
or law enforcing authorities, have higher trust value compared to other vehicles. Each
vehicle possesses a certificate from a trusted authority, for identification and authenti-
cation purposes. Meanwhile, majority-based trust is similar to the threshold method.
In experience-based trust, the trustworthiness of a vehicle is evaluated based on how
truthful they were in their past direct interaction. Such a model requires a vehicle to
establish long term relationship with other vehicles. Similar to the problem encounter
in [72], this may not be practical in a large VANET environment. This also implies
that a vehicle is required to store information of other vehicles encountered in the past,
which may cause storage problem. A similar approach of experience-based trust was
proposed by Patwardhan et al. in [84].
In [65, 70], a centralised reputation-based announcement scheme for VANETs was
proposed. The reliability of a message is evaluated based on the reputation of the
vehicle who generates the message. A message is considered reliable if the message
generator has sufficiently high reputation. The reputation of a vehicle reflects the
extend it has broadcasted reliable messages in the past. It is computed and updated
by means of a feedback mechanism. A feedback report consists of a numerical score,
which represents a receivers evaluation of the reliability of the relevant message. The
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reputation score of all vehicles are managed and certified by a trusted party. During
a message broadcast, a vehicle attaches its reputation certificate to the message it
intends to announce, which allows a receiving vehicle to determine the reliability of the
message. A misbehaved vehicle whose reputation score decreases to 0 will be revoke
from the system by the trusted party who no longer provides it with new reputation
certificate in the future. These schemes are computationally efficient as evaluation of
message reliability only requires a receiving vehicle to verify one signature provided
that the message generator has sufficient high reputation. This will allow a vehicle to
make a decision quickly and act on the message received.
3.4.2 Schemes based on Network Modelling
Golle et al. [45] and Schmidt et al. [99] proposed the evaluation of message reliability
by modelling the network. In [45], a scheme that allows vehicles to detect and correct
malicious messages in VANETs was proposed. Vehicles are assumes to maintain a
“model” of the VANET where it contains all the knowledge that the vehicle possess
about the VANET. The vehicle can then compare the messages received against the
model of the VANET. A message which is consistent and agrees with the vehicles model
is likely to be accepted as valid. Inconsistent messages is addressed by a heuristic
approach termed adversarial parsimony. The parsimony assumes a small fraction of
adversaries is more likely than a large number of colluding vehicles. A vehicle will
search for explanantions for the inconsistent messages based on the possible presence
of malicious vehicles and rank all possible explanations according with the parsimony
heuristic. The message with the highest scoring explanation will be validated. However,
a strong assumption is drawn where it requires vehicles to construct a model of the
VANET. This requires vehicles to possess a wide knowledge of the network, which may
be infeasible and render the scheme to be impractical.
Schmidt et al. proposed a framework for vehicle behaviour analysis in [99]. The be-
haviour is referred to all observable information on a vehicle that includes its movement
and position in the past, present and (predicting) future movements. Their scheme
requires receiving vehicles to accumulate multiple messages from a vehicle that may
provide sufficient information for behaviour analysis. The result of this analysis will
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help to determine a vehicle as trustworthy, neutral or untrustworthy. In this approach,
vehicles are required to make observations before a decision can be made. This may
not be desirable in VANETs as vehicles are not able to act quickly upon the messages
received and be aware of the situation ahead of them.
However, the schemes in [38, 45, 72, 73, 84, 99] does not address the matter of privacy.
In addition, the issue associated with decentralised infrastructure for the schemes in
[38, 45, 73, 84, 99] is that robustness is often not guaranteed.
3.5 Conclusion
In Section 3.4, we have reviewed and analysed some recent trust- and reputation-based
announcement scheme in VANETs. While trust- and reputation-based system has been
widely deployed in computer interactions [89], the application of this mechanism is still
at a preliminary stage for an announcement scheme in VANETs. Our survey proves
the lack of proposal in the area. Nevertheless, this implies there are more rooms for
research and this is where our work steps in.
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Chapter 4
Reputation-based VANETs
In this chapter we design a secure authenticated anonymous reputation-based announce-
ment scheme. It allows evaluation of message reliability that is practical, efficient while
preserving privacy of vehicles in the network.
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4.1 Introduction
4.1 Introduction
Mechanism for reputation system has been widely deployed in computer interactions
(for example, e-commerce) that focused on building trust in specific entities over a
series of interactions [89]. However, this existing notion of trust establishment is not
suitable to be adopt in VANETs. This is because the large number of vehicles moving
around and encountering each other perhaps only for a brief moments making it not
possible to build a long term relationship with each other. This means that building
reputation system for a large scale system is excessively complex.
In the thesis, we adopt reputation system for vehicular ad hoc network. For a message
announcement scheme in VANETs, the reliability of a message is evaluated according
to the reputation of the vehicle that generates this message. The reputation system
computes the reputation score for an entity that allows evaluation of its trustworthi-
ness to other entities. A message is considered reliable if the vehicle that generates
the message has sufficiently high reputation. The reputation of a vehicle is represented
by a numerical score. This reflects the extent to which the vehicle has announced
reliable messages in the past. It is computed based on feedback reported by other vehi-
cles. Feedback contains a numerical score representing the feedback-reporting vehicles
evaluation of the reliability of the message. These feedback accumulate to a vehicle’s
reputation score. The score is collected, updated, and certified by a trusted party.
The reputation score evolves, as time elapses, based on the reliability of messages that
the vehicle announces. Vehicles tend to give positive feedback for reliable messages.
This increases the reputation score. Meanwhile, a reputation score decreases when
negative feedback is reported. Hence, short term encounter leads to a long term trust,
represented by a vehicle’s reputation score.
To determine the reliability of messages in VANETs, a majority of the announcement
schemes in the literature such as [18, 24, 27, 28, 34, 35, 66, 92, 115] adopted the
threshold method. In a threshold method, a message is likely to be reliable if it has
been announced by a number of distinct vehicles within a time interval. However,
as depicted in Table 3.1 in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, it shows that most schemes
[18, 27, 28, 34, 66, 92, 115] does not achieve message reliability. This is because
distinguishability of message origin is not achieved, which is a prerequisite property for
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the threshold method.
Another approach to evaluate the reliability of messages is trust- and reputation-based
system. There have been several other announcement schemes based on reputation
systems [38, 73, 84, 99]. However, these schemes does not provide a comprehensive
construction that efficiently address the three security requirements for a secure an-
nouncement scheme. Discussion on robustness against colluding adversaries was also
not included.
Our scheme do not rely on multiple messages to evaluate reliability. We also do not
require distinguishability of message origin. Indeed our scheme only require a vehicle
to verify one message, provided that the message reporter has sufficiently high repu-
tation. Not only this is computationally efficient, this also enables a vehicle to quickly
determine the reliability of the message, make decision accordingly and act upon the
message.
4.2 The Reputation System
In [65], we proposed a robust reputation-based announcement scheme for VANETs
that achieves message reliability and accountability. The reliability of a message is
evaluated according to the reputation of the sending vehicle who announce the message.
A message is consider to be reliable if the vehicle that generates the message has a
sufficiently high reputation. The reputation of a vehicle reflects the extent to which the
vehicle has announced reliable messages in the past, which may reflect the likelihood
it will announce reliable messages in the future. A vehicle periodically retrieves its
reputation credentials from a trusted party who certifies and manages the reputation
scores of all vehicles in the system. A vehicle attaches its reputation credential when
it announce a message, which will assist receiving vehicles to evaluate the reliability of
the message based on its reputation score. A vehicle whose reputation score decreases
below a certain threshold is revoke from the system by the trusted party who no longer
provides it with new reputation credentials in the future. However, this scheme does
not provide much privacy since the identities of all sending and reporting vehicles are
made public. The provision of privacy in a reputation system is a nontrivial matter.
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In this chapter, we provide an abstraction for a 3A scheme using reputation system
based on [65]. We then construct a secure 3A scheme based on this abstraction that
also provides privacy for vehicles.
The adoption of the reputation system in our schemes requires the installation of pro-
tocols and algorithms as follows.
• The Aggr. The Aggr algorithm is used by the RS to compute and update reputa-
tion scores for vehicles based on the feedback received. We will discuss it in more
detail in Section 4.5.7.1;
• the TimeDiscount. The TimeDiscount is a non-increasing function that takes input
a non-negative value representing a time difference, and output a number between
0 and 1. For example, it can be defined as:
TimeDiscount(t) =
 1− t/ΨTD if t < ΨTD;0 if t ≥ ΨTD,
where ΨTD is a positive constant. In our schemes, the TimeDiscount algorithm
is used to determine the freshness of a vehicle’s reputation score. We take the
absolute value of the difference between the current time when a message is re-
ceived and the time the reputation certificate was retrieved. This difference value
is directly proportional to the freshness of the reputation certificate used. Larger
difference value indicates older reputation certificate was used, which results in
lower value of discounted reputation score. In a similar fashion, smaller differ-
ence value between these two times imply updated reputation certificate was used,
which results in a higher value of discounted reputation score. A receiving vehicle
will accept a message from a sending vehicle whose discounted reputation score
is above ΨRS, where ΨRS is a reputation threshold that deem whether a vehicle is
reputable or not. The purpose to determine the freshness of a vehicle’s reputation
score is to prevent them from abusing the system. For instance, a vehicle may
continue to announce messages using its old reputation credential with higher
reputation score in order to avoid retrieving its latest reputation credentials that
may have lower reputation score after knowingly misbehaved. The TimeDiscount
is incorporated in the scheme to ensure that even if this is the case, the use of
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old reputation score will results in a higher value of discounted reputation score;
• three configurable public parameters ΨRS, Ψt and T. The parameter ΨRS acts as
a threshold and is used by a vehicle to determine whether or not another vehicle
is reputable. It is a constant between 0 and 1. The parameter Ψt also acts as
a threshold and used to determine whether or not a message tuple is sufficiently
fresh for feedback reporting. Feedback needs to be generated within short pe-
riod of time below the threshold Ψt. Any feedback generated after that will be
considered invalid. This prevent attackers generating fake feedback after a while
once they get hold of the message. The assumption is the message propagation
is slow, so attackers can get a message after a while once it is broadcast. The
parameter T is a large time interval, over which a sufficiently large number of
vehicles report feedback relating to a vehicle. Large interval is to ensure there
are sufficient number of feedback for most of vehicles. The system needs enough
feedback to calculate accurate reputation. If the interval is too short, then there
will not be many feedback. This may caused the reputation not be accurate.
4.3 Abstraction of a Reputation System Scheme
In this section, we present an abstract scheme for a reputation system. The network
consists of vehicles as discussed in Section 2.1. In this abstract scheme, we rely on the
presence of two fully trusted parties: a reputation server and a management server.
Communication between entities is performed over two channels: a secure and a public
channel. We define a secure channel, denoted by “→”, that provides message au-
thentication and confidentiality. Meanwhile, an authenticated and integrity protected
channel is define as the public channel, denoted by “99K”. The reputation server (RS)
computes and aggregates feedback to produce reputation scores for vehicles. The man-
agement server (MS) is responsible for the distribution and management of identities
and cryptographic credentials of the vehicles. They also collect feedback from vehicles.
The MS is also responsible for revoking vehicles. A secure confidential communication
takes place between the RS and the MS. Periodic communication takes place between
the MS and vehicles for reputation score retrieval via the secure channel and for feed-
back reporting via the public channel. The MS does not need to be online otherwise.
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We also assume that the MS is equipped with a secure clock. There is also an access
point (AP) as the roadside unit. An AP is a physical device located at fixed locations.
Such locations include along the highways, roads, intersections, roundabouts or traf-
fic lights. An AP is equipped with at least a network device for short-range wireless
communication. Access points are connected with the reputation server, acting as a
communication interface between vehicles and the MS. The purpose of access points is
to allow vehicles to communicate with the MS in a convenient and frequent manner.
We begin with the description of the initialisation phase of a reputation system scheme.
We describe the initialisation phase of each entity accordingly as follows.
1. Management server (MS).
(a) computation of system parameters params which is made available to all
entities in the network;
(b) issuance of cryptographic keys, referred to as credentials, to all entities in
the network;
(c) the MS creates a database;
(d) installation of a secure authenticated anonymous announcement scheme 3A
algorithm. The properties of 3A are described below:
• the message m originate from a message generator Vs that possesses
valid credentials issued by the MS;
• the message m is integrity protected.
A common 3A scheme is achieved using digital signature. The 3A is composed
of sign3A() and verify3A() which can be used when a vehicle wishes to send
and verify a message. We utilise 3A during message broadcast and feedback
reporting phase;
(e) installation of the Ψt and T.
2. Reputation server (RS).
(a) installation of the Aggr;
(b) the RS maintains a database that stores a vehicle’s reputation score. In our
scheme, we assign that the initial reputation score of a new vehicle is zero.
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This configuration often causes a bootstrapping problem in a reputation sys-
tem, where a newcomer has difficulty establishing its reputation. However,
in our scheme, a new vehicle with zero initial reputation score is still able
to establish its reputation. This is because, although messages broadcast by
the new vehicle will not be considered as reliable, the receiving vehicles are
still able to report feedback for these messages. Gradually, the new vehicle
will be able to establish its own reputation. It is also worth noting that
assigning zero initial reputation score to a new vehicle, as described in our
scheme, is conservative. The purpose of this is to discourage a vehicle with
bad reputation from whitewashing its reputation by rejoining the system
with a new identity. This is useful when the cost of rejoining the system
with a new identity is negligible. However, in a VANET, it is often difficult
or costly for a vehicle to reenter the system with a different identity. In
this case, a new vehicle could be initialized with a positive reputation, thus
alleviating the bootstrapping problem.
3. Vehicles.
(a) Each vehicle is assigned with a unique identity IDV ∈ {0, 1}∗;
(b) the MS installs 3A;
(c) the MS installs TimeDiscount, ΨRS, and Ψt onto V ;
(d) generate and send credentials to be used by V .
The initialisation phase is conducted during registration phase but we do not include
the description in Figure 4.1 as not to crowd the diagram.
4.4 Description of a Reputation System Scheme
The abstraction of a reputation system scheme is composed of the following phases.
1. Registration Phase.
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Figure 4.1: Abstraction of a Reputation System Scheme.
The registration of a new vehicle Vs is performed by the MS as follows.
Step À. A Vs sends request for its reputation credentials request(creVs(t)) at
time t to join the network.
Step Á. The MS performs check(creVs(t)) = check(IDVs). This ascertain that
the request was sent unmodified from an unrevoked vehicle Vs. The request is
denied otherwise.
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Step Â. Upon success verification, the MS acquire Vs’s reputation score by sending
the RS retrieve(creVs(t), repVs(t)).
Step Ã. The RS generates reputation score for Vs by executing compute(creVs(t),
repVs(t)) = (repscoreVs , tVs) where repscoreVs denotes reputation score issued
for Vs at time tVs .
Step Ä. The RS securely sends the MS with Vs reputation information as requested
by performing provide(repscoreVs , tVs).
StepÅ. The MS ties creVs(t) to (repscoreVs , tVs) by performing bind(repscoreVs ,
tVs , creVs(t)) = repcreMSVs(t) and creates a database for Vs that stores these infor-
mation. The bind of V ’s reputation score to its credential essentially certifying
that the authenticity and integrity of its reputation score is protected.
Step Æ. The MS performs return(repscoreMSVs(t)) that securely sends Vs with its
reputation credentials.
Step Ç. When Vs receives the credentials, it performs validate(repcreMSVs(t))
that verifies repcreMSVs(t) = (repscoreVs , tVs , creVs(t)) originate from the MS and
the content has not been tampered.
The registration phase is performed over a secure channel.
2. Reputation Score Retrieval.
When Vs intend to retrieve its reputation credentials, Step À to Step Ç described
in Figure 4.1 is performed. The creVs used may be Vs long term key or previous
reputation credential repcreMSVs obtained from MS.
3. Broadcast Phase.
Step È. When Vs wishes to announce a message, it takes a message associated
with the event m and reputation credential repcreMSVs(t) as input to generate
sign3A(m, repcreMSVs(t)) and outputs a signature σ as below:
Vs → Vr : sign3A(m, repcreMSVs(t)) = σ and send (m,σ, repcreMSVs(t)).
4. Message Verification Phase.
Step É. A Vr performs verify3A(m, repcreMSVs(t), σ) to verify the validity of
the signature. It then compute the time-discounted reputation repscore′Vs =
repscore · TimeDiscount(tr − tb), where tr and tb denotes time the message was
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received and announced respectively. If repscore′Vs ≥ Ψ, then Vs is considered
to be reputable.
5. Feedback Reporting Phase.
Step 11○ When Vr has its own experience about the event m announced by Vs, it
would be able to judge the reliability of m and rate the experience it has encoun-
tered with Vs. It takes input feedback and its reputation credential repcreMSVr(t),
where the feedback consist of it’s feedback rate about Vs and associated informa-
tion about Vs. It outputs a signature σVr and sends (feedback, repcreMSVr(t), σVr)
to the MS.
Step 12○ The MS then perform verify3A(feedback, repcreMSVr(t), σVr) that deter-
mines whether the feedback sent is valid or not.
Step 13○ Upon successful verification, the MS sends information associated to the
feedback to be process(feedback, Vs, Vr) to the RS to update Vs reputation score.
Step 14○ The RS uses Aggr that computes and updates Vs latest reputation.
6. Revocation Phase.
A vehicle whose reputation decreases to 0 will be revoked from the system. The
MS will stop issuing reputation credentials to malicious vehicles and therefore,
would not be able to continue to participate in the network.
4.5 An Anonymous Authenticated Reputation-Based Announce-
ment Scheme in VANETs
4.5.1 Scheme Overview
We propose a new authenticated anonymous announcement scheme in vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs) based on techniques used in public key cryptography [92]
and reputation system [65]. In [65], the scheme does not provide much privacy since
the identities of all sending and reporting vehicles are made public. The provision of
privacy in a reputation system is a nontrivial matter. Here, we present an extension to
our previous work in [65] where the matter of privacy is addressed. To achieve privacy,
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we uses randomly chosen anonymous public key bind to its reputation score, which is
certified by the management server MS.
The management server MS initialises the system by installing a secure digital signa-
ture scheme DS, together with a secure signature scheme SS, a secret key encryption
scheme SKE and a public key encryption scheme PKE. The MS computes and distribute
its public system parameters to all entities in the network. The installation of the
various schemes and associated keys onto vehicles is performed during the admission
of vehicles into the network. Operation of the scheme composed of setup, reputation
score retrieval, message broadcast, message verification, feedback reporting, reputation
update and revocation.
To communicate in the network, a vehicle V periodically retrieves a set of anonymous
reputation certificates from the MS via its nearest access point. The retrieval period
varies, depends on how often a vehicle would like to obtain its latest reputation score
or before it runs out of its certificates. A message signed with its reputation certificate
attached satisfy the requirement of sender’s authenticity and message integrity. Upon
receiving a message, a receiving vehicle Vrverifies the message based on the validity of
the signature and the reputation of V . A Vr may or may not provide a feedback about
V . If it chooses to, Vr provides a feedback score to rate its experience with V and signs
a feedback to report to the MS. The MS verifies the report based on Vr’s signature and
timing of the feedback reported. These information associated to the feedback is then
sent to the reputation server RS who computes the latest reputation of V and updates
its database. In our scheme, revocation is achieved without the need of an explicit
revocation mechanism to address the issue of accountability. This is because the revo-
cation technique is “embedded” within our scheme. Once a vehicle whose reputation
score decreases to 0, the authority will no longer provides new reputation credentials.
This is an act of revocation where these vehicles will not be able to participate in future
communication in the network.
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4.5.2 The Setup
We present the setup phase into two compartments: initialisation phase and registra-
tion phase. The initialisation phase is performed during registration phase but is not
included in Figure 4.1 as not to crowd the diagram.
4.5.2.1 Initialisation Phase
The initialisation phase requires the installation of:
1. secure signature schemes, namely:
(a) a secure digital signature scheme DS = (KGenDS, DSsign, DSverify). We will
use DS to realise a 3A;
(b) a secure signature scheme, defined by SS = (KGenSS, SSsign, SSverify)
where KGenSS, SSsign and SSverify denotes key generation, signing and
verifying operation for a signature scheme respectively. The SS is used to
allow Vs to authenticate itself during reputation credential retrieval.
We use two signature schemes because they will be used for different purposes
and hence, different requirements for each scheme.
2. A secure symmetric key encryption scheme, defined by SKE = (KGenSKE, SKEnc,
SKDec) where KGenSKE, SKEnc and SKDec denotes symmetric key generation, en-
cryption and decryption respectively.
3. A secure public key encryption scheme, defined by PKE = (KGenPKE, PKEnc, PKDec)
where KGenPKE, PKEnc and PKDec denotes public key generation, encryption and
decryption respectively.
Each entity is then initialised as follows.
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1. Management server (MS). In addition to Step 1e of the initialisation phase for the
MS depicted in Section 4.1, the MS then runs:
(a) the algorithm DSverify() to validate feedback reported by vehicles;
(b) the KGenPKE to generate a key pair (PKMS, SKMS) used to encrypt and decrypt
session keys (please refer to Section 4.5.3) ;
(c) the KGenSS to generate a key pair (pkMS, skMS) used to sign V long term keys;
(d) selects another secure hash function H : {0, 1}n → Z∗q ;
(e) publishes params = 〈H, PKMS, pkMS〉.
2. Reputation server (RS). The RS is initialised as described in Section 4.1, which
are as follows.
(a) Installation of the Aggr;
(b) the RS maintains a database that stores a vehicle’s reputation score.
3. Vehicles. In addition to Step 3a and Step 3c of the initialisation phase for vehicles
in Section 4.1, vehicles are initialised as follows.
(a) The MS installs DS, SS, SKE and PKE schemes onto each vehicle V ;
(b) a V generates a pair of unique long term key pair (pkV , skV ) using KGenSS.
The authentication process to validate pkV to the MS takes place during the
V ’s registration before it is admitted into the system;
(c) The MS creates a database that will store the following data for every vehicle
in the system: a vehicle’s identity IDV , a unique long term public key pkV ,
a set of pseudonyms pkiV , reputation scores repscore
i
V , timestamps t
i
V on
(pkiV , repscore
i
V ), and all feedback reported for the vehicle (see Section
4.5.6).
4.5.2.2 Registration Phase
Step À A V sends a request to the MS for its reputation credentials and to authenticate
its self-generated pkV and a a set of pseudonyms pkiV request(IDV , pkV , pk
i
V ). A pkV is
V self-generate credential associate to its identity IDV assigned by the MS. Meanwhile,
89
4.5 An Anonymous Authenticated Reputation-Based Announcement
Scheme in VANETs
pkiV is its set of pseudonyms generated by V , with its corresponding set of secret keys
skiV , where these key pairs are generated using KGenDS. To run this step, a V first
generate a signature σ = SSsignskV (IDV , pkV , pk
i
V ) while keeping its corresponding
secret key skV private. A random session key skeyV is generated using KGenSKE to
encrypt the request reqV = SKEncskeyV (IDV , pkV , pk
i
V , σ). It encrypts the session key
keyV = PKEncPKMS(skeyV ) and sends {reqV ; keyV } to the MS via the secure channel.
Step Á The MS check(IDV , pkV , pkiV ) to authenticate V . To do this, it first decrypts
keyV by using PKDecSKMS . The session key obtained is used to decipher reqV using
SKDecskeyV . This will allow the MS to verify σ on (IDV , pkV , pk
i
V ) using SSverify.
Step Â If the check succeed, the MS securely communicate with the RS to obtain V ’s
reputation score by running retrieve(creVs(t), repVs(t)).
Step Ã Upon receiving request from the MS, the RS compute(creVs(t), repVs(t)) =
(repscoreVs , tVs). The computation of repscoreV to be used at time beginning t
i
V is
done by calculating repscoreiV = repscore · TimeDiscount(tc − tiV ), where tc denotes
the current time, until repscoreiV goes below the reputation threshold ΨMS.
Step Ä The RS performs provide(repscoreVs , tVs) that sends back the generated rep-
utation score to the MS.
StepÅ The MS ties the reputation score to V ’s credential by performing bind(repscoreVs ,
tVs , creVs(t)) = repcreMSVs(t) = repcert
i
Vs
(t) = (pkiVs , repscore
i
Vs
, tiVs , Cert(pk
i
Vs
,
repscoreiVs , t
i
Vs
)). The certificate Cert() is a signature generated by the MS on the
tuple (pkiVs , repscore
i
Vs
, tiVs). This essentially binds vehicle’s reputation to its creden-
tial. The MS also generate a signature σskMS(pkV ) that informed V that pkV has been
certified by the MS. The MS then creates a database that will store the following data
for every vehicle in the system: a vehicle’s identity IDV , a unique long term public key
pkV and a set of pseudonym pseuiV and its reputation score repscore
i
V issued to V .
Step Æ The MS encrypts (σskMS(pkV ), repcreMSV (t)) = (σskMS(pkV ), repcert
i
Vs
(t)) with
the session key skeyV using the secret key encryption algorithm SKEnc and sends the
ciphertext to V by running return(σskMS(pkV ), repcertiVs(t)) to Vs.
90
4.5 An Anonymous Authenticated Reputation-Based Announcement
Scheme in VANETs
Step Ç A V decrypts the ciphertext acquired using SKDec with skeyV . It then performs
validate(σskMS(pkV ), repcertiVs(t)), where σskMS() is verified using pkMS.
4.5.3 Reputation Score Retrieval
In this phase, a vehicle V retrieves from the MS a set of its credentials repcreMSV (t) =
repcertiV (t) = {(pkiV , repscoreiV , tiV , Cert(pkiV , repscoreiV , tiV )) : i = 1, · · · , n}, where
pkiV is a random string, repscore
i
V is a reputation score, t
i
V is a timestamp when
repscoreiV were generated, and Cert() is its corresponding certificate.
When it drives into the wireless communication range of an access point, the commu-
nication takes place as follow.
Step À A V first generate a set of key pairs (pkiV , sk
i
V ) using KGenDS. A request for
reputation credentials is made by V by sending request(pkV , pkiV ) to the MS. To
identify itself to the MS, a V generate a signature σ = SSsignskV (pkV , pk
i
V ). A ran-
dom session key skeyV is generated using KGenSKE to encrypt the request reqV =
SKEncskeyV (pkV , pk
i
V , σ). It encrypts the session key keyV = PKEncPKMS(skeyV ) and
sends {reqV ; keyV } to the MS via the secure channel.
Step Á The MS check(pkV , pkiV ) to authenticate V . A V first decrypts keyV by using
PKDecSKMS . The session key obtained is used to decipher reqV using SKDecskeyV . This
will allow the MS to verify σ on (pkV , pkiV ) using SSverify.
Step ÂUpon successful verification, the MS securely communicate with the RS to obtain
V ’s reputation score by running retrieve(creVs(t), repVs(t)).
Step Ã The RS compute(creVs(t), repVs(t)) = (repscoreVs , tVs) upon receiving request
from the MS. The computation of repscoreV to be used at time beginning t
i
V is done
by calculating repscoreiV = repscore · TimeDiscount(tc − tiV ), where tc denotes the
current time, until repscoreiV goes below the reputation threshold ΨMS.
Step Ä The RS runs provide(repscoreVs , tVs) that sends back the generated reputation
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score to the MS.
StepÅ The MS binds the reputation score to V ’s credential by performing bind(repscoreVs ,
tVs , creVs(t)) = repcreMSVs(t) = repcert
i
V (t) = (pk
i
V , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , Cert(pk
i
V , repscore
i
V ,
tiV )).
StepÆ The MS encrypts repcreMSV (t) = repcert
i
V (t) = {pkiV , repscoreiV , tiV , Cert(pkiV ,
repscoreiV , t
i
V )} with the session key skeyV using the secret key encryption algorithm
SKEnc and sends the ciphertext to V by running return(repcertiV (t)) to Vs.
Step Ç A V decrypts the ciphertext received using SKDec with skeyV . It then runs
validate(repcertiV (t)). The secret keys are stored within a V ’s black box while the
public keys and its corresponding certificates are kept within its onboard unit.
The retrieval period varies, depends on how often a vehicle would like to obtain its latest
reputation score or before it runs out of keys. A vehicle is likely to retrieve its credentials
when its time-discounted reputation value repscoreiV ·TimeDiscount(tc− tiV ), where tc
denotes the current time, is approaching or below the reputation threshold ΨMS. There
is a tradeoff between the frequency a vehicle retrieves its keys from the MS and the
efficiency of the scheme. Long interval between retrieval period may be desirable as it
may ease management to the MS who does not need to generate certificates for a vehicle
frequently. However, it will lead to storage problem to a vehicle that needs to preload
a lot of keys over a long period of time.
Meanwhile, a shorter interval between retrieval period solves the storage problem as a
vehicle only needs to store fewer keys for a shorter time duration. It also provides a
simpler means of revocation. Once it runs out of keys, a misbehaved vehicle would not
be able to obtain the next set of certificates from the MS. However, it implies frequent
interaction between the MS and a vehicle.
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4.5.4 Broadcast Phase
An announcing vehicle, say Vs generates a road-related message msg and broadcasts it
to its neighbouring vehicles. This is described as follows.
1. Vs forms a MSG = (h = H(msg), tb) where h = H(msg) is a hash of the message
and tb is the time when the message was announced.
2. Vs perform Step È where the SSsign() takes as input hash of the message h =
H(msg), the current time tb and a user’s signing key skiVs . It returns a signature
θVs .
θVs ← DSsignskiVs (H(msg), tb)
3. Vs forms a message tuple M = (msg, tb, θVs , repcertiVs) and broadcasts M to its
neighbouring vehicles.
4.5.5 Message Verification Phase
Upon receiving the message tuple M , a receiving vehicle, say Vr, performs the following
procedure:
1. it determine whether it is interested in the message msg. If it is, it computes
h = H(msg);
2. Vr inputs θVs into its trusted hardware. The trusted hardware retrieves the
current time tr from its embedded clock, and then stores the tuple (θVs , tr) within
the trusted hardware. The trusted hardware outputs tr to Vr.
3. Vr performs Step É where it first determines whether the broadcasting vehicle is
reputable, that is, repscoreiVs · TimeDiscount(tr − tiVs) ≥ ΨMS;
4. Vr then determines message freshness. A message is considered to be fresh if
tr− tb ≤ Ψt where Ψt is very short time period after a sending vehicle announced
a message.
93
4.5 An Anonymous Authenticated Reputation-Based Announcement
Scheme in VANETs
5. whether the certificate Cert() generated by the MS is valid; and
6. Vr runs DSverify(msg, tb, θVs , pkiVs). If it returns accept, then the signature θVs
is considered valid. Otherwise Vr rejects the message.
The message msg is considered reliable if all the above requirements are satisfied. The
message tuple M is kept for future feedback reporting. If it does not fulfill the require-
ments, Vs is not considered as trustworthy and msg is not considered as reliable and will
not be taken into consideration. In the latter case, if Steps 1, 4 and 6 are positive,
then the message tuple M is still stored for future feedback reporting. Otherwise it is
discarded.
4.5.6 Feedback Reporting Phase
In this phase, when vehicle Vr, has its own experience about the event that the message
msg describe, it is able to judge the trustworthiness of the message. Then if Vr wants
to report feedback to the reputation server, it performs Step 11○ elaborated by the
following procedures.
1. Vr generates a feedback rating feedrate ∈ {0, 1} where feedrate = 1 if msg is
reliable and feedrate = 0 if msg is not reliable.
2. Vr forms a feedback = (feedrate, h, tr, tb, θVs , pkiVs).
3. Vr runs the DSsign() that takes as input a feedback, a feedback reporter’s signing
key skjVr and Vr’s public key pk
j
Vr
. It returns a signature θVr .
θVr ← DSsign(feedback, skjVr , pk
j
Vr
)
4. Vr casts a feedback report = (feedback, θVr , repcert
j
Vr
).
When Vr drives into the wireless communication range of a AP, it sends the feedback
report to the MS via the AP.
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4.5.7 Reputation Update Phase
In this phase, the reputation server updates the reputation score repscoreVs of vehicle
Vs. The MS first verifies the feedback received from other vehicles as in Step 12○. This
is further elaborated as below.
1. it determine whether tr − tb ≤ Ψt where Ψt is small. This is performed to ensure
that a receiving vehicle cannot forward this message to other colluding vehicles
and together launch an attack to manipulate the reputation of the broadcasting
vehicle;
2. runs DSverify(feedback, θVr , repcert
j
Vr
). If it returns accept, then the signa-
ture θVr is considered valid. Otherwise MS rejects the feedback.
3. runs DSverify(msg, θVs , repcertiVs). If it returns accept, then the signature θVs
is considered valid. Otherwise MS rejects the feedback.
4. If the checks pass then the reputation server considers the feedback report as
valid and stores it in the database.
The MS sends the RS (feedback, Vs, Vr) to be processed to the RS as shown in Step
13○, who stores these information into its database. The RS then execute Step 14○
which applies the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr (Section 4.5.7.1) on all stored
feedback relating to Vs in order to compute the latest reputation score for vehicle Vs.
It then replaces the previous reputation score in the database with its latest reputation
score.
4.5.7.1 The Reputation Aggregation Algorithm
In this section, we describe the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr from [65]. The
Aggr computes the latest reputation score for a vehicle V based on all stored feedback,
as follows:
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1. The Aggr selects all feedback reported for V whose corresponding message tuple
was broadcast from T time ago up to now. Any feedback whose corresponding
message was broadcast earlier than T time ago is ignored, and deleted if necessary
for data storage efficiency. We denote ta as the time when this aggregation is
running.
2. Multiple feedback reported by a vehicle Vz for V is aggregated into one intermedi-
ate value rˆVz . Let FVz denote the set of feedback reported by Vz for V and whose
corresponding message was broadcast from T time ago up to now. Each entry in
FVz has feedback rating feedrateb corresponds to the message broadcasted at
time tb. The value rˆVz is aggregated using weighted average as follows:
rˆVz =
∑
feedback ∈ FVz
feedrateb ·
(
T− (ta − tb)
)
∑
feedback ∈ FVz
(
T− (ta − tb)
) . (4.1)
This gives more recent feedback a greater weight than less recent feedback. Let
V denote the set of vehicles that each has reported at least one feedback for V in
the past T time. The value rˆVz is computed for each vehicle Vz ∈ V.
3. Let V− denote the set of vehicles reporting at least one negative feedback for V in
the past T time. The latest reputation score repscoreV is computed as follows:
repscoreV =

P
Vz ∈ V
rˆVz
|V| if |V−| < Ψnf;
0 otherwise,
(4.2)
where Ψnf is a configurable public parameter. The intuition of this equation
is that repscoreV is computed as the average of rˆVz if not too many vehicles
reported negative feedback for V in the past T time; otherise repscoreV decreases
to 0, indicating that V has conducted message fraud attack.
4.5.8 Revocation Phase
A vehicle whose reputation score decreases to 0 will be revoked from the system. If a
vehicle is revoked, the MS will stop issuing its reputation certificates. Feedback reported
by the revoked vehicle will also not be considered as valid. We note that the previously
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issued reputation certificate will gradually expire as time elapses. A misbehaved vehicle
would then not be able to participate in future communication in the network.
4.6 Analysis
In this section, our scheme is compared with threshold schemes, which have been the
mainstream announcement schemes. We first compare the security of our scheme with
pseudonymous public key (PPK) [92] and TAA [24]. We then evaluate and compare
the performance of these schemes in terms of communication cost, computational cost
of signing and verifying a signature, signature length and storage cost.
4.6.1 Security Analysis
We compare the schemes based on three main security requirements of reliability, pri-
vacy and accountability. These are further divided into eight security requirements as
discussed in Section 2.3. We summarised our finding in Table 4.1 below.
4.6.1.1 Reliability
In all three schemes, the property of sender authenticity and message integrity are
satisfied, provided that the digital signature schemes used are secure. This also applies
for feedback reporting phase where reporter authenticity and report integrity are as-
sured provided that the digital signature used are secure. The signature, public and
symmetric key encryption used during reputation score retrieval phase in Section 4.5.3
are also required to be secure. This will enable the MS to issue the correct credentials
after proven the authenticity of a requesting vehicle.
Message truthfulness is not achieved in PPK as a receiving vehicle could not distinguish
the origin of the message. Hence a threshold method could not be adopted. In TAA,
a misbehaved vehicle who attempt to sign two messages of the same content can be
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detected, as these two signatures can be linked to each other. This allows a receiving
vehicle to distinguish the origin of messages, and therefore, allows the adoption of the
threshold method. In our scheme, a message is considered truthful provided that the
message generator has sufficiently high reputation. To lie successfully, an adversary
may attempt to manipulate the content of an announcement (message fraud) or it
manipulate the reputation score of the sending vehicle.
To evaluate the robustness of our scheme against message fraud, neither an external
or internal adversary can modify the content of a message if the digital schemes used
are secure. On the other hand, an internal adversary whose reputation is greater than
the threshold ΨMS may be able to deceive neighbouring vehicles into accepting a fake
message as valid. However, if it persistently broadcast false messages over a long time
period, then the negative feedbacks reported with respect to the announced event will
decreases its reputation score. If it continues to act maliciously, this will results in its
reputation score decreasing to 0 and thus, it will be revoked from the system.
With respect to robustness against reputation manipulation, our scheme is secure
against external adversary. An external adversary who attempt to perform reputa-
tion manipulation attack may be motivated to impersonate as a legitimate vehicle Vr
to forge and report a feedback for a target vehicle Vt with its own choice of feedback
score. However, an external adversary who is not in the possession of a valid creden-
tials would not be able to generate a valid signature as the secret key is determined
by the feedback reporter’s public key. Meanwhile, an internal adversary performing
reputation manipulation may intentionally report a fake feedback upon receiving a
message M from a target vehicle Vt. An internal adversary who acts on its own can
only report a false feedback for each announced event by Vt. However, this only has
a small impact on Vt’s reputation score. In the worst case, it collude with a group
of adversaries to magnify the impact on Vt’s reputation score. However, the impact
on Vt’s reputation score remain small if the number of colluding adversaries are small
relative to the number of all vehicles that have reported at least one feedback related
to Vt.
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4.6.1.2 Privacy
Anonymity is satisfied in all schemes. In TAA, the group signature allows the group
member to sign on behalf of the group without the ability to tell who produced the
signature. The use of randomly chosen public keys that does not contain any identify-
ing information associating it to its user, also known as pseudonyms, allow anonymous
communication in PPK. In our scheme, this is similar for message broadcast and feed-
back reporting phase. Communication during reputation score retrieval is guarded by
means of signature and encryption. A vehicle and its credentials remain anonymous
provided that these schemes are secure. Therefore, anonymity is satisfied in reputation
score retrieval, message announcement and feedback reporting phase.
Only TAA achieves complete unlinkability. In our scheme and PPK, pseudonyms tech-
nique adopted allows messages to be linkable over its short lifetime. We call this partial
unlinkability, denoted by a “X∗” in Table 4.1. This applies to both message announce-
ment and feedback reporting phase in our scheme. This is a tradeoff between privacy
and storage and communication cost. However, the lifetime of a pseudonym can be ad-
justed corresponds to the level of privacy required. Communication during reputation
score retrieval phase is also unlinkable using the public and symmetric key encryption
schemes, provided that these schemes are secure.
4.6.1.3 Accountability
All schemes addresses the issue of revocation. In PPK, the TP maintain a pseudo-
identity mapping that will assist it to find the matching identity of misbehaved vehicles
in its huge database. In our scheme, the MS revokes malicious vehicles by no longer
providing them with their reputation credentials in the future. In TAA, a verifier
must check against a list of compromised vehicles to determine whether the message
generator has been revoked or not. Message verification takes longer as the revocation
list grows. To avoid the inefficiency of long revocation list, a permanent revocation
mechanism was proposed. The TP’s key pairs and vehicles’ credentials are updated.
Vehicles to be revoked will not have their credential updated and hence their signature
will be able to be verified correctly under the new TP’s public key.
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Traceability is fulfilled in all schemes. In PPK and our scheme, a vehicle is traceable
via the database maintained by the TP. In TAA [24], a misbehaved vehicle who attempt
to sign messages of the same content more than once can be traced and its identity can
be revealed.
The requirement of non-repudiation is not satisfied in PPK. The TP is responsible for
the generation of secret keys for vehicles in the system. Hence, non-repudiation is not
achieved as the vehicle is not the sole holder of the secret key. In TAA, the TP do not
possess the knowledge of the secret f , which is an important element of the signing
key. In addition, a challenge-response protocol was also proposed to assure a receiving
vehicle that the sending vehicle is indeed the message generator. Our scheme provide
non-repudiation as vehicles self-generate their own secret keys, and thereby, the sole
holder of the signing key.
Security Analysis
Security goals Security components PPK [92] TAA [24] Our scheme
Reliability
Sender’s Authenticity X X X
Message Integrity X X X
Message truthfulness × X X
Privacy
Anonymity X X X
Unlinkability X∗ X X∗
Accountability
Non-repudiation × X X
Revocation X X X
Traceability X X X
Table 4.1: Comparison of security analysis
4.6.2 Performance Analysis
This section presents comparison of performance efficiency between our scheme with
PPK [92] and TAA [24]. We choose to employ ECDSA (elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm) [14, 52, 54] as the signature algorithm to sign messages in PPK and our
scheme. We set security level l = 80 bits for message signatures and l = 128 bits for
certificates in these schemes. We summarise our finding in Table 4.2 below.
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Computational cost. We evaluate the computational cost of signature generation
and verification in broadcast of message, as they are among the factors that determines
the performance of a secure vehicle-generated announcement protocol. As observed in
[23, 24], the two most expensive operations are multiplications in G1 and pairing eval-
uation, which we shall consider here. We compare the cost between our scheme with
PPK [92] and TAA [24] for t = 1, as our scheme require only one message provided
that the message generator has sufficiently high reputation.
A similar signature technique is adopted in PPK and our scheme, resulting in similar
computational cost. In both schemes, the signing operation requires two scalar mul-
tiplications and the verification requires four scalar multiplications. Our scheme has
additional operations where Vr may choose to provide a feedback to rate its experience
with the message generator. In this case, the computational cost is that of a signature.
The verification of feedback requires two signatures verifications. This is performed by
the MS and can be done oﬄine. In TAA, the signing operation requires nine scalar mul-
tiplications and one pairing operation. Meanwhile, the verification operation consume
eight scalar multiplications and five pairing operations.
Signature length. The signature in our scheme and PPK is generated using elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)[14, 52, 54]. It comprises of two elements
of G1. To provide a security level 280, we can set q to be 190-bit long and the element
in G1 is 191-bit long by choosing an appropriate curve such as NIST curve [14]. Thus,
the length of signature generated on a message is 48 bytes in our scheme and PPK. In
TAA, the size of the signature comprise of seven elements of G1 and three elements of
q. This results in the length of 238 bytes for a group signature in TAA.
Communication cost. An announcement message M in PPK consists of: (θsk(msg),
msg, certTP(pk), pk, t), which denotes signature generated on an announced message,
a message announced, its certificate which essentially is the signature of the TP on a
vehicle’s public key, a vehicle’s public key and a timestamp to specify signature gener-
ation time respectively. To provide a security level of 280, we can set q to be 190-bit
long and the element in G1 is 191-bit long. According to [7] the size of safety messages
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is 100 bytes and we choose 8 bytes for timestamp, using the unix 64-bit timestamp.
Based on the implementation in [14, 60], the size of the public key is 25 bytes, message
signature is 48 bytes and TP certificate is 64 bytes. Hence the length of the message in
PPK is L = 48 + 100 + 25 + 64 + 8 = 245 bytes.
In our scheme, a message is composed of: (θVs(msg), msg, pkiVs , Cert(pk
i
Vs
, repscoreiVs ,
tiVs), repscore
i
Vs
, tis, tb), where θVs(msg), msg, pk
i
Vs
, Cert(), repscoreiVs , t
i
s and tb denotes
a signature generated on an announced message, a message announced, a vehicle’s
public key, its certificate, its reputation score and a timestamp on the reputation score
and message broadcasted respectively. The size of the public key is 25 bytes, message
signature is 48 bytes and MS certificate is 64 bytes, each timestamp is of 8 bytes and
reputation score of size 1 byte. Therefore the size of the message size is L = 48 + 100 +
25 + 64 + 1 + 8 + 8 = 254 bytes.
In TAA, a message consists of: (θsk(msg), msg, t, groupID), where θsk(msg) is the signa-
ture generated on the announced event, msg is the event anounced, t is the timestamp
when the message was generated and the group ID (groupID) is used to identify which
group does the vehicle belongs to. The length of the signature is 238 bytes, the size
of the message is 100 bytes, 2 bytes for the group ID and 8 bytes for the timestamp.
Hence, the size of the message is L = 238 + 100 + 2 + 8 = 348 bytes.
Storage and Generation costs. We compute the storage and generation costs of
preloading credentials in PPK and our scheme. We note that the TAA scheme does not
require storage of credentials, hence is not included in this discussion. For each creden-
tial retrieval period, PPK preloads a large set of key pairs (sk, pk), its corresponding
anonymous certificate certTP(pk) onto each vehicle, for its usage over a long period of
time (i.e. a year). The next retrieval may occur during periodical vehicle maintenance
visits, for instance. The public and private key is 25 bytes and 24 bytes respectively,
using ECDSA-192 and a TP certificate is 64 bytes using ECDSA-256. This sums up to
storage space of 25 + 24 + 64 = 113 bytes per key. If a vehicle uses his car 2 hours
per day on average, as assumed in [91], where the lifetime of each key is one minute,
then the number of required keys per year is approximately 43800. This amounts to
storage space of 4.95 MBytes on each vehicle. Given the long credential period in PPK,
we consider heaviest car usage of 8 hours per day to ensure each vehicle has sufficient
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credentials until the next retrieval session. This would sum up to 19.80 MBytes storage
cost.
In our scheme, a vehicle retrieves four credentials from the MS; a set of its certificates
Cert(), pseudonyms pk, reputation scores repscore and timestamp on the reputation
score ts. The Cert is of 64 bytes, pk is of 25 bytes, repscore is of 1 bytes, and ts is of
8 bytes. The sum of storage space is of 25 + 64 + 1 + 8 = 98 bytes per key, which is
more efficient as it is less compared to PPK for each key. The retrieval period in our
scheme is shorter and flexible, depends on whether a vehicle would like to obtain its
latest reputation score or when it runs out of credentials.
Performance Analysis
Scheme Communication cost Sign Verify Sig. length Storage cost
PPK 245 bytes 2 ·G1 4 ·G1 2|G1| 113 bytes/key
TAA 348 bytes 9 ·G1 + 1 · P 8 ·G1 + 5 · P 7|G1|+ 3|q| -
Ours 254 bytes 2 ·G1 4 ·G1 2|G1| 98 bytes/key
Table 4.2: Comparison of performance analysis
Regarding the network modelling approach [45, 99] and the trust- and reputation-
based approaches [38, 73, 84] that were discussed in Chapter 2, these schemes are still
at a conceptual level and lack technical details and performance evaluation. We thus
cannot provide a detailed security performance comparison between our schemes and
these schemes.
4.6.3 Simulation Evaluation
In this section, we show some simulation results to examine the efficiency and perfor-
mance of the scheme proposed in this chapter. This is evaluated from the following
aspects.
1. Message drop rates: the average that reliable messages are rejected by a receiving
vehicle due to low reputation scores of the announcing vehicles.
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2. The percentage of attack success, as this is important for security context.
3. Temporary unavailability of the reputation server: The average increase of mes-
sage drop rate due to the temporary unavailability of the reputation server.
4. Temporary unavailability of access points: The average increase of message drop
rate due to the temporary unavailability of some access points.
In order to fully estimate the real world implementation of vehicular network, we use
an event-based real street map vehicular network simulator called GrooveNet [71]. The
road network used in the simulations is an urban area chosen from the city of Pitts-
burgh, PA. This simulation makes use of the publicly available TIGER (Topologically
Integrated Geographical Encoding and Referencing) database obtained from the U.S.
Census Bureau [109].
The simulations were carried out with conditions and configurations in line with other
studies in the literature, for example [36, 65, 89]. Since the reputation system de-
ployed here is based on the previous work in [65], similar configurations and values of
parameters were used in the simulations to standardize the results.
1. Access points are generated and populated randomly over the selected road net-
work.
2. Vehicles are generated, populated randomly, and move in the selected road net-
work. We consider the participation of legitimate vehicles who are in possession
of valid credentials issued by the trusted party. Their mobility models are as
follows: A vehicle follows the vehicle in front, and a vehicle moves at the speed
limit of a street when it is leading on the street. Their trip models are as follows:
a vehicle randomly moves until it is 10 km from its starting point; the vehicle
then takes the shortest path back to the starting point and starts again along a
different path.
3. Road events randomly occur in the road network throughout the experiment.
The time that an event will last is set randomly from 1 to 120 s.
4. Each vehicle broadcasts periodic messages every 300 ms over a range of approx-
imately 100 m, in line with the DSRC specification [40].
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5. A vehicle broadcasts a message regarding an event that it experiences, along with
its latest reputation certificate.
6. A message receiving vehicle determines whether it accepts the received message
by evaluating the reputation of the broadcasting vehicle, as specified in Section
4.5.5. The reputation threshold parameter ΨRS is set conservatively to 0.8. The
time discount parameter ΨTD is set conservatively to 1 hour. Note that ΨTD in
a real-world implementation should be much longer than 1 hour, perhaps a few
days or even longer. The purpose of setting it to 1 hour is to make the effect
of the time discount function more visible during the experiments as well as to
make it in line with 30 minutes of experiment time.
7. A message receiving vehicle may report feedback if it later experiences the event
described by the message within the time when the event still exists. The prob-
ability that the vehicle will report a feedback is set conservatively to 0.1.
8. When a vehicle moves into communication range of an access point, it retrieves
and then updates its latest reputation certificate and reports all feedback that it
has generated and not yet reported.
9. The reputation server updates the reputation of each vehicle based on feedback
received from all vehicles and generates a new reputation certificate accordingly,
as specified by Sections 4.5.7 and 4.5.7.1. The time interval T is set to 10 min.
Note that T in a real-world implementation should be much longer than 10 min:
perhaps weeks or even longer. The purpose of setting such a short time interval
T in the experiments is, again, to make it in line with 30 min of experiment time.
4.6.3.1 Effects of the Credential Retrieval Period
In this experiment, we deployed 600 vehicles whom are uniformly assigned with rep-
utation score of 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0 respectively. Figure 4.2 shows the simulation results
of message drop rate with respect to the credential retrieval period. As seen from
the graph, the result shows that the message drop increases as the retrieval period in-
creases. This is reasonable since longer period between retrieval phase implies a higher
discounted reputation score. As a result, vehicles tend to broadcast messages with less
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“fresh” reputation certificates, and the reputation scores tend to be more discounted
by receiving vehicles using the discount function TimeDiscount. This results in higher
rejection of reliable messages and thus an increase in the message drop rate.
The reputation score of vehicles also impacts on the message drop rate. We observe
a slight increase for vehicles whose reputation score is 0.8 and 1.0. Meanwhile, the
message drop rate for vehicles whose reputation score is 0.6 is bigger. This is reasonable
as the reputation threshold ΨRS is set to 0.8. Therefore, for vehicles whose reputation
is below ΨRS will become lesser reputable than it already is due to its discounted
reputation score as the credential retrieval period increases .
Figure 4.2: Effects of the Credential Retrieval Period
4.6.3.2 Effects of the Reputation Scores
Figure 4.3 shows the simulation results on the effects of the reputation score relative
to the message drop rate. As seen from the graph, a decrease of message drop is
observed as the reputation score of the announcing vehicle increases. This is natural
as message broadcasted by vehicles with higher reputation is more likely to be reliable,
hence decreases the message drop rate.
The density of vehicles also impacts on the message drop rate. We observe a decrease
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of message drop rate when the density of vehicles increases. A modest but noticeable
decrease is seen when the density of vehicles increases from 200 to 600 vehicles in the
selected road network of 10 km2. This is reasonable because more feedback tends to
be reported for a vehicle in a vehicle-dense road network. Consequently, it is more
likely that feedback whose corresponding message tuple was broadcast within the past
T time is reported for a vehicle, and thus, a reputation certificate becomes available
for the vehicle. This results in the reliable messages broadcast subsequently by the
vehicle being accepted by the receiving vehicles, given that the broadcasting vehicle
has a sufficiently high reputation score. Hence, we observe a decrease in the message
drop rate.
Figure 4.3: Effects of the Reputation Scores
4.6.3.3 Impact of Misbehaving Vehicles with Good Reputation Score
In Figure 4.4, we observe the impact of misbehaving vehicles with good reputation
relative to the percentage of a success attack. In this scenario, we assume these misbe-
haved vehicles to conduct message fraud attack, where it broadcasted false information
to neighbouring vehicles. We only consider this attack as a misbehaved vehicle with
good reputation score has little impact to its target’s vehicle reputation score if it acts
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on itself. The impact of reputation manipulation attack is more obvious if these mis-
behaved vehicles act together in a group. We shall consider a reputation manipulation
attack in the next experiment.
In this simulation, we deployed 600 vehicles who are uniformly assigned with a repu-
tation score of 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0 respectively. The attack is 100% successful at t = 0
minutes for vehicles whose reputation score are 0.8 and 1.0. This is straightforward
as an adversary with a time-discounted reputation score greater than ΨRS can deceive
its neighboring vehicles into believing that a false message is reliable. If these vehicles
continue to actively misbehaved, as time increases, the chances of an attack to be suc-
cessful decreases. This is because the number of negative feedbacks reported for it will
results in its reputation score decreasing, as shown in the graph.
Figure 4.4: Impact of Misbehaving Vehicles with Good Reputation Score
4.6.3.4 Effects of Colluding Misbehaved Vehicles
In this experiment, we determine the effects of colluding misbehaved vehicles relative
to the percentage of a success attack. As our scheme only require a vehicle to verify
one message provided that the message generator has sufficiently high reputation, the
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message fraud attack is not consider here. Rather, we focus on reputation manipulation
attack. In this attack, an adversary unfairly inflates or deflates the reputation score
of a target vehicle. This target vehicle can be the adversary itself. The attack has
also more impact when it is performed in a group of colluding vehicles. Note that
reputation manipulation may lead to message fraud, since an adversarial vehicle can
get its reputation unfairly inflated by a reputation manipulation attack and only then
launch a message fraud attack.
We consider the worst situation where all adversaries collude together to attack the
same target vehicle with the same goal (to inflate or deflate the reputation score of a
vehicle). If we set ψt ≤ 1.0 s (ψt is denoted by t in the Figure 4.5), we observe that as the
presence of colluding misbehaved vehicles increases, the percentage of an attack success
increases as well. This is inevitable as the group of colluding vehicles increases and ψt
increases (below the permitted threshold), it gives the colluding vehicles sufficient time
to send a number of false feedback to manipulate its target vehicle’s reputation score.
This increases the percentage for an attack to be successful, as illustrated in the Figure
4.5.
If the number of adversaries is relatively small compared with the size of vehicles
in the network, then the maximum unfair impact of internal adversaries conducting
reputation manipulating attack is still small. In this case, the adversaries only adds a
small noise into the reputation score of the target vehicle. It is reasonable to assume
that in a VANET, there is only a small proportion of internal adversaries compared
with the entire population of vehicles. This is consistent with the assumption we adopt
in the thesis. Hence, the unfair impact of internal adversaries conducting reputation
manipulating attack remains small.
4.6.3.5 Effect of temporary unavailability of MS and AP
The question of how usable the system is measured in terms of message drop rate and
the effect of the availability of the MS and AP is demonstrated in simulation results in
[65]. We will summarise the findings here (Section 4.6.3)and refer the reader to [65] for
details.
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Figure 4.5: Effects of Colluding Misbehaved Vehicles
If MS and AP are all functioning continuously, the message drop rate depends (ob-
viously) on the density of the vehicles and the density of APs. It appears that the
message drop rates decreases drammatically when the density of AP is increased from
very low. Subsequent increases have much smaller effect. For example, if there are
2 APs per km2, the message drop rate is 0.1 if the density of vehicles is 500 per 10
km2, while the message drop rate is less than 0.05 if there are 4 APs per km2. This
also confirms that even with initial reputation score of 0, a new vehicle will be able to
establish its own reputation fairly reasonably. This is because a receiving vehicle may
still provide a feedback even if it considered a message unreliable due to low reputation.
Temporary unavailability of MS. With 2 to 5 APs per km2, the message drop rates
increases proportionally as the length of unavailability of MS, until a certain point where
the message drop rate is 1. This point is dependent upon the time discount parameter
ΨTD and the reputation threshold ΨMS. If ΨTD and ΨMS are set conservatively to 1 hour
and 0.8 respectively (and the experiment time is only 30 minutes) then the message
drop rate reaches 1 in 12 minutes. It is expected that in a real-world implementation
with a much longer ΨTD the time to reach message drop rate 1 would be much longer.
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Temporary unavailability of APs. The simulation result shows that for 5 APs per
km2 with the density of 500 vehicles per 10 km2, even the unavailability of up to 50%
of APs for 25 minutes contribute only slightly to the increase in message drop rate.
Again, this is not unexpected, since a vehicle can always retrieve its reputation score
and report feedback when it comes across another functioning AP.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented an abstraction of a reputation system for a broad-
cast scenario in VANETs. Based on this construction, we presented a novel reputation-
based announcement scheme for VANETs. We have shown that our scheme is robust,
practical and efficient while satisfying the requirement of reliability, privacy and ac-
countability.
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Chapter 5
Certificateless-based VANETs
In this chapter, we construct two schemes using a certificateless signature scheme (CLS)
based on (i) reputation systems and (ii) a threshold mechanism. The adoption of CLS
does not require the use of certificates, which can be unwieldy in a large VANET en-
vironment, and yet does not have the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based
signature. This allows for an efficient as well as secure and anonymous announcement
scheme for VANETs.
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5.1 Cryptographic Background
In this section, we review some fundamental background for a certificateless signature
scheme.
5.1.1 Certificateless Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography. In public key cryptography (PKC), each user has a pub-
lic and a private key. The private key is kept secret while the public key is published.
A public key of a user is associated with the user by a certificate, that is, a signature
of a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) on the public key. This allows the receiver to
be sure that the public key that they have is the correct public key for the sender.
A receiver who wants to use the public key must verify the corresponding certificate
for the validity of the key. Hence, we require a public key infrastructure - a series of
trusted third parties that can be relied upon to vouch for the connection between an
identity and a particular public key. Inevitably this feature causes a CA to require a
large amount of storage and computing time managing the certificates.
Identity-based Cryptography. To avoid the certificate management problem, Shamir
[101] introduced the concept of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). The
idea was then practically deployed by Boneh and Franklin in [12]. An identity-based
scheme removes the need for a public key infrastructure by setting an entity’s public key
to be equal to its digital identity. A key generator center (KGC) generates the entity’s
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private key using a master secret. An inherent problem of ID-PKC is thus the “key es-
crow” problem: the KGC knows the user’s private keys and has to be complete trusted.
Certificateless Cryptography. In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [5] introduced
the concept of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) which eliminates the
use of certificates in PKC and solves the key escrow problem in ID-PKC. The basic
idea of CL-PKC is that the user constructs a public/private key pair by combining a
value generated by a TP using its master key with a random secret value generated by
the user. We describe such a signature scheme in the next section.
5.1.2 A Certificateless Signature Scheme
5.1.2.1 Pairings and Computational Problems
Let G1 and G2 and be an additive group and a multiplicative group, respectively, of
the same prime order q. Let P denote a random generator of G1 and e : G1×G1 → G2
denote a bilinear map which is typically constructed by Weil or Tate pairing with
properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(Q,W + Z) = e(Q,W ) · e(Q,Z) and e(Q + W,Z) = e(Q,Z) ·
e(W,Z) ∀ Q,W,Z ∈ G1. Consequently, we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab,∀ P,Q ∈
G1 and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q .
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃ P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(aP, bQ) ∀ P,Q ∈
G1.
We assume that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard in both G1 and G2. The
DLP is defined as follows: Given a generator P of a cyclic additive group G with order
q, and Q ∈ G∗, find an integer a ∈ Z∗q such that Q = aP . In addition, we assume the
computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) in G1. The CDHP is defined as follows:
Given a generator P of a cyclic additive group G with order q, and given (aP, bP ) for
unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q , compute abP .
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5.1.2.2 Certificateless Signature Scheme
The certificateless signature scheme (CLS) from [117] initialises the system by running
the set up algorithm CLSsetup(1k) where 1k is a security parameter. CLSsetup()
chooses the groups 〈G1,G2, e〉, where G1,G2 are groups of prime order q and e is a
bilinear pairing, e : G1 × G1 → G2. It also selects 3 cryptographic hash functions
H1,H2,H3, each of which maps from {0, 1}∗ to G1. It chooses an integer s ∈R Z∗q
(where s ∈R Z∗q denotes choosing an element s uniformly at random from the set Z∗q)
as its master secret key. It sets P0 = s · P ∈ G1 as the master public key. CLSsetup()
outputs 〈s, CLSparams = 〈G1,G2, e, q, P, P0,H1,H2,H3〉〉. The master secret key s is
kept confidential while CLSparams is published as system parameters. From now on we
will assume the availability of CLSparams in the description of the remaining protocols
and algorithms.
During the enrolment of an entity V with an identifier IDV ∈ {0, 1}∗, the enrolment
protocol CLSenrol(IDV ) is performed by the TP and V in a secure environment. This
protocol consists of two parts: CLSenrolTP(IDV ) and CLSenrolV (xV ) as below.
CLSenrol(IDV )
TP runs CLSenrolTP(IDV )
computes QV = H1(IDV );
computes xV = sQV ;
outputs a partial private key xV .
TP sends xV securely to V .
V runs CLSenrolV (xV )
selects a secret value yV ∈R Z∗q ;
sets skV = (xV , yV );
sets pkV = yV P ;
outputs (skV , pkV ).
To sign and verify a message M , the singing and verifying algorithms, denoted by
CLSsign()and CLSverify() respectively, are performed as follows.
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CLSsign(M, skV = (xV , yV ), IDV , pkV )
computes U = u · P for u ∈R Z∗q ;
sets v = xV + u · H2(M, IDV , pkV , U) + yV · H3(M, IDV , pkV );
outputs signature θV = (U, v).
CLSverify(M, (U, v), IDV , pkV )
computes QV = H1(IDV );
checks if the equality e(v, P ) = e(QV , P )e(H2(M, IDV , pkV , U), U)e(H3(M, IDV ,
pkV ), pkV ) holds. If it does, outputs valid, otherwise outputs ⊥.
We will use this scheme CLS = (CLSsetup, CLSenrol, CLSsign, CLSverify) in our an-
nouncement scheme in Section 5.2.2.
5.2 A Certificateless Anonymous Authenticated Announce-
ment Scheme in VANETs
5.2.1 Scheme Overview
The management server MS initialises the system by installing a secure certificateless
signature scheme CLS adopted from [117], along with a secure signature scheme SS, a
secret key encryption scheme SKE and a public key encryption scheme PKE. The MS
generates and publishes system parameters to vehicles in the network. The installation
of the various schemes and associated keys onto vehicles is conducted during the admis-
sion of vehicles into the network. Operation of the scheme consists of setup, reputation
score retrieval, message broadcast, message verification, feedback reporting, reputation
update and revocation.
To communicate in the network, a vehicle V periodically retrieves a set of credentials
from the MS via its nearest access point. To announce a safety related message, V
anonymously sign the message with its reputation score attached and broadcast to
neighboring vehicles. Each signing key key is valid over a short period. A receiving
vehicle V ′verifies the message based on the validity of the signature and the reputation
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of V . It may or may not provide a feedback about V . If it chooses to, V ′ provides a
feedback score to rate its experience with V and signs a feedback to report to the MS.
Upon receipt of the feedback, the MS validates the report based on V ′’s signature and
timing of the feedback reported. These information associated to the feedback is then
sent to the reputation server RS who computes the latest reputation of V and updates
its database.
5.2.2 Scheme Operation
We describe our scheme by showing how reputation of a vehicle is formed, propagated,
updated and utilised to determine the trustworthiness of vehicles. We note that the
CLSsetup(), CLSenrol(), CLSsign() and CLSverify() used in this section has been pre-
sented in Section 5.1.2.2. We further note that the description of our scheme will be
presented based on the abstraction of a reputation system discussed in Section 4.4 of
Chapter 4.
The operation of the scheme consists of the following phases: setup, reputation score
retrieval, message broadcast, message verification, feedback reporting, reputation update
and revocation.
The setup phase composed of the setup of the reputation server (RS), management
server (MS) and admission of new vehicles V s into the network. Such setup include
generation of required cryptographic keys, installation of algorithms, regulation of their
clocks and creation of database that stores V ’s information. To communicate in the
network, a vehicle V periodically retrieves its latest reputation credentials from the
MS when it drives into the proximity of a wireless communication range. We call this
a reputation score retrieval phase. A V then generates a set of its secret and public
key pairs (skV , pkV ) after receiving its reputation scores and partial keys from the MS.
During a message broadcast phase, a sending vehicle Vs anonymously sign the message
and attach its reputation score before announcing the message to neighboring vehicles.
Upon receiving the message, a receiving vehicle Vr performs message verification check
to determine the reliability of a message. When Vr has its own experience about the
event described by the message, it is able to judge the reliability of the message and
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the scheme operation.
lodge a feedback report to the MS regarding its encounter with Vs. The validity of the
feedback reported is determined before the RS aggregate and update the reputation
score of Vs during the reputation update phase. A V repeats the cycle of retrieving its
credentials to obtain its latest reputation score or when it needs to reload its credentials.
Otherwise, it is revoked from the system by the MS if its reputation score decreases to
0.
5.2.3 The Setup
We present the setup phase into two compartments: initialisation phase and registra-
tion phase. The initialisation phase is performed during registration phase but is not
included in Figure 4.1 as not to crowd the diagram.
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5.2.3.1 Initialisation Phase
The initialisation phase requires the installation of:
1. a secure certficateless signature scheme CLS = (CLSsetup, CLSenrol, CLSsign,
CLSverify) as described in Section 5.1.2.2. We will use CLS to realise a 3A.
2. a secure signature scheme, defined by SS = (KGenSS, SSsign, SSverify) where
KGenSS, SSsign and SSverify denotes key generation, signing and verifying op-
eration for a signature scheme respectively.
3. a secure symmetric key encryption scheme, defined by SKE = (KGenSKE, SKEnc,
SKDec) where KGenSKE, SKEnc and SKDec denotes symmetric key generation, en-
cryption and decryption respectively.
4. a secure public key encryption scheme, defined by PKE = (KGenPKE, PKEnc, PKDec)
where KGenPKE, PKEnc and PKDec denotes public key generation, encryption and
decryption respectively.
Each entity is then initialised as follows.
1. Management server (MS). In addition to Step 1e of the initialisation phase for the
MS depicted in Section 4.1, the MS then runs:
(a) the algorithm CLSsetup(1k) as in section 5.1.2.2 to get 〈s, CLSparams =
〈G1,G2, e, q, P, P0,H1,H2,H3〉〉 ;
(b) the algorithm CLSenrol() to admit new vehicles into the system and the
algorithm CLSverify() to validate feedback reported by vehicles;
(c) the KGenPKE to generate a key pair (PKMS, SKMS) used to encrypt and decrypt
session keys (please refer to Section 5.2.4) ;
(d) the KGenSS to generate a key pair (pkMS, skMS) used to sign V long term keys;
(e) selects another secure hash function H4 : {0, 1}n → Z∗q ;
(f) publishes params = 〈CLSparams,H4, PKMS, pkMS〉.
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2. Reputation server (RS). The RS is initialised based on Step 2a and Step 2b of the
initialisation phase for the reputation server in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4, which
are as follows.
(a) Installation of the Aggr;
(b) the RS maintains a database that stores a vehicle’s reputation score.
3. Vehicles. In addition to Step 3a and Step 3c of the initialisation phase for vehicles
in Section 4.1, vehicles are initialised as follows.
(a) The MS installs CLS, SS, SKE and PKE schemes onto each vehicle V ;
(b) A V generates a pair of unique long term key pair (pkV , skV ) using KGenSS.
The authentication process to validate pkV to the MS takes place during the
V ’s registration before it is admitted into the system;
(c) The MS creates a database that will store the following data for every vehicle
in the system: a vehicle’s identity IDV , a unique long term public key pkV , a
set of pseudonyms pseuiV , reputation scores repscore
i
V , timestamps t
i
V on
(pseuiV , repscore
i
V ), and all feedback reported for the vehicle (see Section
5.2.7).
5.2.3.2 Registration Phase
Step À A V sends a request to the MS for its reputation credentials and to authenticate
its self-generated pkV request(IDV , pkV ). A pkV is V self-generate credential associate
to its identity IDV assigned by the MS. This allows V to identify itself to the MS. To
run this step, a V first generate a signature σ = SSsignskV (IDV , pkV ) while keeping
its corresponding secret key skV private. A random session key skeyV is generated
using KGenSKE to encrypt the request reqV = SKEncskeyV (IDV , pkV , σ). It encrypts the
session key keyV = PKEncPKMS(skeyV ) and sends {reqV ; keyV } to the MS via the secure
channel.
Step Á The MS check(IDV , pkV ) to authenticate V . To do this, it first decrypts keyV by
using PKDecSKMS . The session key obtained is used to decipher reqV using SKDecskeyV .
This will allow the MS to verify σ on (IDV , pkV ) using SSverify.
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Step Â If the check succeed, the MS securely communicate with the RS to obtain V ’s
reputation score by running retrieve(creVs(t), repVs(t)).
Step Ã Upon receiving request from the MS, the RS compute(creVs(t), repVs(t)) =
(repscoreVs , tVs). The computation of repscore
i
V to be used at time beginning t
i
V is
done by calculating repscoreiV = repscore · TimeDiscount(tc − tiV ), where tc denotes
the current time, until repscoreiV goes below the reputation threshold ΨMS.
Step Ä The RS performs provide(repscoreVs , tVs) that sends back the generated rep-
utation score to the MS.
StepÅ The MS ties the reputation score to V ’s credential by performing bind(repscoreVs ,
tVs , creVs(t)) = repcreMSVs(t). To do this, the MS runs CLSenrolMS({pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV })
to obtain xiV for each i. This essentially binds vehicle’s reputation to its credential. The
MS also generate a signature σskMS(pkV ) that informed V that pkV has been certified
by the MS. The MS then creates a database that will store the following data for every
vehicle in the system: a vehicle’s identity IDV , a unique long term public key pkV and
a set of pseudonym pseuiV issued to V .
StepÆ The MS encrypts (σskMS(pkV ), repcreMSV (t)) = {σskMS(pkV ), (pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV ,
xiV )} with the session key skeyV using the secret key encryption algorithm SKEnc and
sends the ciphertext to V by running return(IDV , σskMS(pkV ), pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , x
i
V )
to Vs.
Step Ç A V decrypts the ciphertext acquired using SKDec with skeyV . It then per-
forms validate(σskMS(pkV ), pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , x
i
V ) where σskMS(pkV ) is verified us-
ing pkMS. It then runs CLSenrolV (x
i
V ) that generate its set of secret value y
i
V and
compute a set of its key pairs (pkiV , sk
i
V ). The secret key is stored within a V ’s black
box while the public key is kept within its onboard unit.
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5.2.4 Reputation Score Retrieval
In this phase, a vehicle V retrieves from the MS a set of its credentials repcre =
{(pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV , xiV ) : i = 1, · · · , n}, where pseuiV is a random string, repscoreiV
is a reputation score, tiV is a timestamp when (pseu
i
V , repscore
i
V ) were generated, and
xiV is a partial secret key.
When it drives into the wireless communication range of an access point, the commu-
nication takes place as follow.
Step À A request for reputation credentials is made by V by sending request(pkV ) to
the MS. To identify itself to the MS, a V generate a signature σ = SSsignskV (pkV ). A
random session key skeyV is generated using KGenSKE to encrypt the request reqV =
SKEncskeyV (pkV , σ). It encrypts the session key keyV = PKEncPKMS(skeyV ) and sends
{reqV ; keyV } to the MS via the secure channel.
Step Á The MS check(IDV , pkV ) to authenticate V . A V first decrypts keyV by using
PKDecSKMS . The session key obtained is used to decipher reqV using SKDecskeyV . This
will allow the MS to verify σ on (IDV , pkV ) using SSverify.
Step ÂUpon successful verification, the MS securely communicate with the RS to obtain
V ’s reputation score by running retrieve(creVs(t), repVs(t)).
Step Ã The RS compute(creVs(t), repVs(t)) = (repscoreVs , tVs) upon receiving request
from the MS. The computation of repscoreiV to be used at time beginning t
i
V is done
by calculating repscoreiV = repscore · TimeDiscount(tc − tiV ), where tc denotes the
current time, until repscoreiV goes below the reputation threshold ΨMS.
Step Ä The RS runs provide(repscoreVs , tVs) that sends back the generated reputation
score to the MS.
StepÅ The MS binds the reputation score to V ’s credential by performing bind(repscoreVs ,
tVs , creVs(t)) = repcreMSVs(t). To do this, the MS runs CLSenrolMS({pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV })
to obtain xiV for each i.
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Step Æ The MS encrypts repcreMSV (t) = {pseuiV , repscoreiV , tiV , xiV } with the session
key skeyV using the secret key encryption algorithm SKEnc and sends the ciphertext
to V by running return(pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , x
i
V ) to Vs.
Step Ç A V decrypts the ciphertext received using SKDec with skeyV . It then runs
validate(pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , x
i
V ). A V execute CLSenrolV (x
i
V ) that generate its
set of secret value yiV and compute a set of its key pairs (pk
i
V , sk
i
V ). The secret key is
stored within a V ’s black box while the public key is kept within its onboard unit.
The retrieval period varies, depends on how often a vehicle would like to obtain its latest
reputation score or before it runs out of keys. A vehicle is likely to retrieve its credentials
when its time-discounted reputation value repscoreiV ·TimeDiscount(tc− tiV ), where tc
denotes the current time, is approaching or below the reputation threshold ΨRS. There
is a tradeoff between the frequency a vehicle retrieves its keys from the RS and the
efficiency of the scheme. Long interval between retrieval period may be desirable as it
may ease management to the MS who does not need to compute the keys for a vehicle
frequently. However, it will lead to storage problem to a vehicle that needs to preload
a lot of keys over a long period of time.
Meanwhile, a shorter interval between retrieval period solves the storage problem as
a vehicle only needs to store fewer keys for a shorter time duration. It also provides
a simpler means of revocation. Once it runs out of keys, a misbehaved vehicle would
not be able to obtain the next set of keys from the MS. However, it implies frequent
interaction between the MS and a vehicle.
5.2.5 Broadcast Phase
An announcing vehicle, say Vs generates a road-related message msg and broadcasts it
to its neighbouring vehicles. This is described as follows.
1. Vs forms a MSG = (h = H4(msg), tb) where h = H4(msg) is a hash of the message
and tb is the time when the message was announced.
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2. Vs perform Step È where the CLSsign() takes as input MSG, Vs’s signing key
skiVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs} and Vs’s public key pkiVs . It returns a signature
θVs = (U, v).
θVs ← CLSsign(MSG, skiVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}, pkiVs)
3. Vs forms a message tuple M = (msg, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, repscoreiVs , t
i
Vs
) and
broadcasts M to its neighbouring vehicles.
5.2.6 Message Verification Phase
Upon receiving the message tuple M , a receiving vehicle, say Vr, performs the following
procedure:
1. it determine whether it is interested in the message msg. If it is, it computes
h = H4(msg);
2. Vr inputs θVs into its trusted hardware. The trusted hardware retrieves the
current time tr from its embedded clock, and then stores the tuple (θVs , tr) within
the trusted hardware. The trusted hardware outputs tr to Vr.
3. Vr performs Step É where it first determines whether the broadcasting vehicle is
reputable, that is, repscoreiVs · TimeDiscount(tr − tiVs) ≥ ΨMS;
4. Vr determines message freshness. A message is considered to be fresh if tr−tb ≤ Ψt
where Ψt is very short time period after a sending vehicle announced a message.
5. Vr runs CLSverify(MSG, θVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}, pkiVs). If it returns ac-
cept, then the signature θVs is considered valid. Otherwise Vr rejects the mes-
sage.
The message msg is considered reliable if all the above requirements are satisfied. The
message tuple M is kept for future feedback reporting. If it does not fulfill the require-
ments, Vs is not considered as trustworthy and msg is not considered as reliable and
will not be taken into consideration. In the latter case, if Steps 2 and 3 are positive,
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then the message tuple M is still stored for future feedback reporting. Otherwise it is
discarded.
5.2.7 Feedback Reporting Phase
In this phase, when vehicle Vr, has its own experience about the event that the message
msg describe, it is able to judge the trustworthiness of the message. Then if Vr wants
to report feedback to the management server, it performs Step 11○ elaborated by the
following procedures.
1. Vr generates a feedback rating feedrate ∈ {0, 1} where feedrate = 1 if msg is
reliable and feedrate = 0 if msg is not reliable.
2. Vr forms a feedback = (feedrate, h, tr, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
).
3. Vr runs the CLSsign() that takes as input a feedback, a feedback reporter’s
signing key skjVr , {pseu
j
Vr
, repscorejVr , t
j
Vr
} and Vr’s public key pkjVr . It returns
a signature θVr = (U ′, v′).
θVr ← CLSsign(feedback, skjVr , {pseu
j
Vr
, repscorejVr , t
j
Vr
}, pkjVr)
4. Vr casts a feedback report = (feedback, θVr , pk
j
Vr
).
When Vr drives into the wireless communication range of a AP, it sends the feedback
report to the MS via the AP.
5.2.8 Reputation Update Phase
The MS first verifies the feedback received from other vehicles as in Step 12○. It retrieves
(repscoreiVs , t
i
Vs
, repscorejVr , t
j
Vr
) from its database based on (pseuiVs , pseu
j
Vr
) for Vs
and Vr respectively in order to carry out the verification describe as follows.
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1. It determine whether tr − tb ≤ Ψt where Ψt is small. This is performed to ensure
that a receiving vehicle cannot forward this message to other colluding vehicles
and together launch an attack to manipulate the reputation of the broadcasting
vehicle;
2. runs CLSverify(feedback, θVr , {pseujVr , repscore
j
Vr
, tjVr}, pk
j
Vr
). If it returns ac-
cept, then the signature θVr is considered valid. Otherwise MS rejects the feed-
back.
3. runs CLSverify(MSG, θVs , {pseuiVs , repscoreiVs , tiVs}, pkiVs). If it returns accept,
then the signature θVs is considered valid. Otherwise MS rejects the feedback.
4. If the checks pass then the reputation server considers the feedback report as
valid and stores it in the database.
Upon successful verification, the MS sends the RS (feedback, Vs, Vr) to be processed as
shown in Step 13○. The RS then execute Step 14○ which applies the reputation aggregation
algorithm Aggr (Section 5.2.8.1) on all stored feedback relating to Vs. It then replaces
the previous reputation score in the database with its latest reputation score.
5.2.8.1 The Reputation Aggregation Algorithm
In this section, the reputation aggregation algorithm Aggr used for this scheme is similar
as described in Section 4.5.7.1 of Chapter 4. The function of Aggr is to compute the
latest reputation score for a vehicle V based on all stored feedback.
5.2.9 Revocation Phase
In our paper, a vehicle retrieves a set of credentials repcre = (pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V , x
i
V )
from the MS. The design of our scheme allows a shorter interval of credentials retrieval.
Frequent credentials retrieval allows a vehicle to obtain its latest reputation score as
the reputation score of a vehicle evolves, based on the reliability of messages that the
vehicle announces. A vehicle whose reputation score decreases to 0 will be revoked from
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the system. The MS will stop issuing pseudonyms, reputation scores, timestamps and
the partial keys. A misbehaved vehicle would then not be able to compute its secret and
its public key. Therefore, it would not be able to participate in future communication
in the network.
5.3 A Threshold-based Certificateless Anonymous Authenti-
cated Announcement Scheme in VANETs
In this section, a modification of the CLS scheme presented in Section 5.2.2 is described.
We adopt the threshold method as another means to evaluate the reliability of messages.
The modification mainly affects the initialisation phase, periodic credential retrieval,
broadcast phase, message verification phase and revocation phase.
In this CLS threshold-based scheme, we assume the presence of the key generator center
(KGC) who plays the role as the trusted party. We note that the CLSsetup(), CLSenrol(),
CLSsign() and CLSverify() used in this section has been presented in Section 5.1.2.2.
This scheme will be presented based on the steps of the abstraction scheme in Figure
3.1 located in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3.
Initialisation Phase
The initialisation phase of the scheme requires the installation of:
1. a secure certficateless signature scheme CLS = (CLSsetup, CLSenrol, CLSsign,
CLSverify) as described in Section 5.1.2.2. We will use CLS to realise a 3A.
2. a secure signature scheme, defined by SS = (KGenSS, SSsign, SSverify) where
KGenSS, SSsign and SSverify denotes key generation, signing and verifying op-
eration for a signature scheme respectively.
3. a secure symmetric key encryption scheme, defined by SKE = (KGenSKE, SKEnc,
SKDec) where KGenSKE, SKEnc and SKDec denotes symmetric key generation, en-
cryption and decryption respectively.
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4. a secure public key encryption scheme, defined by PKE = (KGenPKE, PKEnc, PKDec)
where KGenPKE, PKEnc and PKDec denotes public key generation, encryption and
decryption respectively.
The KGC then runs:
1. the algorithm CLSsetup(1k) as in section 5.1.2.2 to get 〈s, CLSparams = 〈G1,G2, e, q,
P, P0,H1,H2,H3〉〉 ;
2. the KGenPKE to generate a key pair (PKKGC, SKKGC) used to encrypt and decrypt
session keys (please refer to Section 5.2.4) ;
3. the KGenSS to generate a key pair (pkKGC, skKGC) used to sign V long term keys;
4. selects another secure hash function H4 : {0, 1}n → Z∗q ;
5. installation of the CLS;
6. publishes params = 〈CLSparams,H4, pkKGC, PKKGC〉.
When a new vehicle is admitted into the network, it is initialised as follows.
1. Each vehicle is assign with a unique identity IDV ∈ {0, 1}∗.
2. The KGC installs CLS, SS, SKE and PKE schemes onto each vehicle V .
3. A V generates a pair of unique long term key pair (pkV , skV ) using KGenSS.
4. We require a configurable public parameter Ψt. The parameter Ψt acts as a
threshold and used to determine whether or not a message tuple is sufficiently
fresh.
The authentication process to validate pkV to the KGC takes place during the V ’s
registration before it is admitted into the system. This is performed in Section 5.3.1
below.
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5.3.1 Registration Phase
Step À A V sends a request to the KGC for its credentials and to authenticate its self-
generated pkV request(IDV , pkV ). A pkV is V self-generate credential associate to its
identity IDV assigned by the KGC. To perform this step, a V first generate a signature
σ = SSsignskV (IDV , pkV ) while keeping its corresponding secret key skV private. A
random session key skeyV is generated using KGenSKE to encrypt the request reqV =
SKEncskeyV (IDV , pkV , σ). It encrypts the session key keyV = PKEncPKKGC(skeyV ) and
sends {reqV ; keyV } to the KGC via the secure authenticated channel.
Step Á The KGC check(IDV , pkV ) to authenticate V . To do this, it first decrypts
keyV by using PKDecSKKGC . The session key obtained is used to decipher reqV using
SKDecskeyV . This will allow the KGC to verify σ on (IDV , pkV ) using SSverify.
Step Â Upon successful verification of σ, the KGC compute(creV (t)) = creKGCV (t) =
(IDV , σskKGC(pkV ), pseuiV ). The signature generated on pkV essentially informed V that
pkV has been certified by the KGC. The KGC then creates a database that will store the
following data for every vehicle in the system: a vehicle’s identity IDV , a unique long
term public key pkV and a set of pseudonym pseuiV issued to V .
Step Ã The KGC return(IDV , σskKGC(pkV ), pseuiV ) to Vs.
Step Ä A V performs validate(σskKGC(pkV ), pseuiV ) using pkKGC. A V then stores pkV
and pseuiV after successful verification.
Periodic Credential Provision
In this phase, a vehicle V retrieves from the KGC a set of its pseudonyms pseuiV . When
it drives into the wireless communication range of an access point, the communication
takes place as follow.
StepÀ To request for credentials request(creV (t)) = request(pkV ), a V first identifies
itself to the KGC. It signs a request message σ = SSsignskV (pkV ). A random session key
skeyV is generated using KGenSKE to encrypt the request reqV = SKEncskeyV (pkV , σ).
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A V then encrypts the session key keyV = PKEncPKKGC(skeyV ) and sends {reqV ; keyV }
to the KGC via the wireless channel.
StepÁ To check(creV (t)) = check(pkV ), the KGC first decrypts keyV by using PKDecSKKGC .
The session key obtained is used to decipher reqV using SKDecskeyV .
Step Â Upon verification of σ using SSverify, the KGC generates a set of pseudonyms
compute(creV (t)) = pseuiV . It then encrypts pseu
i
V with the session key skeyV using
the secret key encryption algorithm SKEnc and sends the ciphertext to V via the secure
channel.
Step Ã The KGC return(pseuiV ) to V .
Step Ä To validate(pseuiV ), V decrypts the set of pseu
i
V acquired using SKDec with
skeyV . It runs CLSenrolV (x
i
V ) that generate its set of secret value y
i
V and compute a
set of its key pairs (pkiV , sk
i
V ). The set of secret keys sk
i
V is stored in the black box
while the rest of the other parameters and public keys are stored in the vehicle’s OBU.
Our scheme provides flexibility where the retrieval period varies. There is a tradeoff
between the frequency a vehicle retrieves its keys from the KGC and the efficiency of
the scheme. Long interval between retrieval period may be desirable as it may ease
management to the KGC who does not need to compute the keys for a vehicle frequently.
However, it will lead to storage problem to a vehicle that needs to preload a lot of keys
over a long period of time. Meanwhile, a shorter interval between retrieval period
solves the storage problem as a vehicle only needs to store fewer keys for a shorter time
duration. It also provides a simpler means of revocation. Once it runs out of keys,
a misbehaved vehicle would not be able to obtain the next set of keys from the KGC.
However, it implies frequent interaction between the KGC and a vehicle.
5.3.2 Broadcast Phase.
An announcing vehicle, say Vs generates a road-related message msg and broadcasts it
to its neighbouring vehicles. This is described as follows.
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1. Vs forms a MSG = (h = H4(msg), tb) where h = H4(msg) is a hash of the message
and tb is the time when the message was announced.
2. A vehicle Vs perform Step Å where the CLSsign() takes as input MSG, Vs’s signing
key skiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, and Vs’s public key pkiVs . It returns a signature θVs = (U, v).
θVs ← CLSsign(MSG, skiVs , pseuiVs , pkiVs)
3. Vs forms a message tuple M = (msg, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
) and broadcasts M to
its neighbouring vehicles.
5.3.3 Message Verification Phase
Upon receiving the message tuple M , a receiving vehicle, say Vr, performs the following
procedure:
1. it determine whether it is interested in the message msg. If it is, it computes
h = H4(msg);
2. The trusted hardware retrieves the current time tr from its embedded clock and Vr
determines message freshness. A message is considered to be fresh if tr − tb ≤ Ψt
where Ψt is very short time period after a sending vehicle announced a message.
3. Vr perform Step Æ where it runs CLSverify(MSG, θVs , {pseuiVs , pkiVs). If it returns
accept, then the signature θVs is considered valid. Otherwise Vr rejects the
message.
The message msg is considered reliable if all the above requirements are satisfied. Vr
will act upon the message and make decisions quickly once it collects and verifies t
messages of the same event reported by t distinct vehicles within a period of time.
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5.3.4 Revocation Phase.
Step Ç If a vehicle found to be malicious, the KGC will stop issuing its credentials.
Therefore, Vs won’t be able to generate its full key pair (pkVs , skVs) to continue partic-
ipating in the network.
5.4 Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of our schemes, and evaluate its performance.
We compare our schemes with schemes that adopt a pseudonyms method [18, 92],
which is of the most interest to us in this work.
5.4.1 Security Analysis
We compare our schemes with Hybrid [18] and pseudonymous public key (PPK) [92]
based on three main security requirements of reliability, privacy and accountability. We
consider the eight security requirements as discussed in Section 2.3 and summarised
our finding in Table 5.1 below.
5.4.1.1 Reliability
The requirement of sender authenticity and message integrity are satisfied in all four
schemes, as long as the digital signature techniques used are secure. Similarly, in
feedback reporting, reporter authenticity and report integrity are achieved if the digital
signature schemes are secure. We also require the signature, public and symmetric key
encryption schemes adopted during reputation score and keys retrieval phase in Section
5.2.4 and 5.3.1 to be secure. This is to ensure that the trusted authority provides the
correct credentials after verifying the legitimacy of a requesting vehicle V .
However, the property of message truthfulness is not provided in Hybrid as distin-
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guishability of message origin is difficult to achieve without an online trusted party.
Hence, the threshold technique cannot be adopted. It is also not satisfied in the scheme
proposed in PPK as, for the same message, a signing vehicle can disguise as multiple
vehicles. A similar problem occur for our threshold-based scheme CLST . In our other
scheme using reputation system CLSRS, a message is regarded as truthful if the message
originator has a “good” reputation. Hence in order to lie successfully, an adversary
could do one of two things: it can manipulate the reputation score of the sending
vehicle, or it can manipulate the message content of an announcement.
In the latter case, neither an external nor an internal adversary will be able to convince
receiving vehicles that a modified message is valid if the certificateless signature scheme
is secure. On the other hand, an internal adversary with a high reputation score can
deceive a receiving vehicle into accepting a false message easily: it simply broadcasts the
false message. However, if it does this persistently over a long period, then the negative
feedback will result in a decrease in its reputation score. Eventually its reputation score
will decrease to 0 and it will be revoked from the system.
To manipulate the reputation score of a target vehicle V , firstly an adversary could
impersonate V and broadcast false messages in order for V to receive negative feedback
and thereby decrease its reputation score. This cannot be done if the certificateless
signature scheme is secure. Secondly an adversary could instead replace V ’s reputation
score with a lower one in a broadcast message. Again this could not be done if the CLS
is secure. Lastly an adversary could provide negative feedback for announcements made
by V . Clearly an external adversary cannot perform this attack given that the CLS is
secure. An internal adversary acting on its own can only report a false feedback per
announcement, and this will have only a small impact on V ’s reputation score. Even
if the internal adversary colludes with a group of other internal adversaries, the effect
will remain small if the proportion of dishonest vehicles is small, as is the assumption.
In addition, the provision of timestamps limits the vehicles who can provide feedback
to those in proximity when the message is announced.
Hence we see that our scheme provides reliability and also provides system robustness
in the presence of a small fraction of adversaries.
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5.4.1.2 Privacy
In PPK and both our schemes, messages are linkable only over the short validity period
of a pseudonym. In Hybrid, a vehicle uses its group signing key to certify a self-
generated pseudonym. The rate at which pseudonyms are updated depends on the
various factors. Hence, similar to our schemes and PPK, messages signed using the
same pseudonym are linkable over its short lifetime (marked X∗ in Table 5.1). This is
a slight compromise of privacy in favour of reducing storage and communication costs.
The length of the validity period can be adjusted according to the level of privacy
required. In CLSRS, this applies to both announcements and feedback reporting. The
request activity for credentials made by V is also unlinkable using a secure symmetric
key encryption scheme where a random session key is generated to encrypt each request.
The session key is then encrypted using a secure public key encryption scheme.
Anonymity of broadcast messages is achieved by both Hybrid and PPK. In CLSRS,
communications for the retrieval of reputation scores and pseudonyms are protected
by signatures and encryptions. As long as these schemes are secure, a vehicle and its
credentials will be anonymous. Hence our scheme preserves anonymity in reputation
score retrieval, message announcements and feedback reporting.
Note that the above refers to privacy against any eavesdropper apart from the trusted
authority. None of the schemes provide any privacy against the TP (MS and KGC in our
case) in the sense that if a set of broadcast messages were presented to the TP, it would
be able to link the messages to the senders. There is also no privacy against the MS in
feedback reporting. Since the MS is trusted to correctly manage the reputation system,
this is not a great compromise. Note though that the MS does not know the activities
of the vehicles since a feedback report only contains a hash of the message content.
5.4.1.3 Accountability
The property of traceability is satisfied in all schemes. The group signature in Hybrid
allows a TP to open signature of malicious vehicles, where the identity of misbehaved
vehicles is revealed by law enforcement authorities for liability purposes. In PPK as
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well as our scheme, the TP is able to search in its database and trace the identity of
misbehaved vehicles.
Neither Hybrid nor PPK provides non-repudiation. The group signature technique
used in Hybrid permit the issuer to create the private keys of group members. In
the scheme in PPK, the TP generates the secret key for all vehicles. Therefore, these
schemes does not achieve non-repudiation as the signer is not the sole holder of the
signing key. In our schemes, the MS and KGC does not have access to entities’ private key
as it only generates an entity with a partial private key. This satisfies the requirement
of non-repudiation.
Revocation in Hybrid is achieved by having a vehicle’s revocation token added into the
revocation list. Upon verifying a message, signature generated from a revoked vehicle
will not be accepted. In PPK, the TP exhaustively search in its huge database where
it stores all the anonymous certificates issued to vehicles to find the real identity of a
misbehaved vehicle. In our schemes, the MS and KGC maintains a map from a vehicle’s
long term identity to its set of pseudonyms. The MS can perform an inverse mapping
and identify the vehicle whose reputation score decreases to 0 for CLSRS. The authority
will then stop issuing pseudonyms, reputation scores and partial keys (pseudonyms
and partial keys for CLST ) to misbehaved vehicles and hence, these vehicles would not
be able to generate its secret value, its public key and compute a full secret key to
announce a message.
5.4.2 Performance Analysis
We compare the performance of our scheme with Hybrid [18] and PPK [92]. The
group signature (GS) in Hybrid used to certify self-generated pseudonym is adopted
from [13] and we choose to employ elliptic curve cryptosystem, such as ECDSA scheme
[14, 52, 54] as the basic signature algorithm to sign messages, which will also be used
in PPK. We set security level l = 80 bits for message signatures and l = 128 bits
for certificates in Hybrid and PPK. This is a similar adoption of values and signature
algorithm as in Hybrid, to ease the purpose of comparison. We summarise our findings
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
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Security Analysis
Security goals Security components Hybrid [18] PPK [92] CLSRS CLST
Reliability
Sender’s Authenticity X X X X
Message Integrity X X X X
Message truthfulness × × X ×
Privacy
Anonymity X X X X
Unlinkability X∗ X∗ X∗ X∗
Accountability
Non-repudiation × × X X
Revocation X X X X
Traceability X X X X
Table 5.1: Comparison of security analysis
Computational cost. We evaluate the computational cost of signature generation
and verification in the broadcast of messages. As observed in [23, 24], the two most
expensive operations are multiplications in G1 and pairing evaluation, which we shall
consider here. We compare the cost between our scheme with Hybrid [18] and PPK
[92] for t = 1, as our scheme requires only one message provided that the message
generator has sufficiently high reputation.
The signing operation in PPK requires 2 scalar multiplications and the verification
requires 4 scalar multiplications. Meanwhile, the Hybrid scheme requires a vehicle to
generate 2 signatures; a group signature adopted from [13] to certify a self-generated
pseudonym pk and a signature similar to PPK on the announced message. The group
signature requires 8 scalar multiplications and 1 pairing operation for the signing phase,
while the verification phase requires 5 scalar multiplications and 3 pairing operations.
The signature generation and verification on a message is then similar to PPK described
earlier.
The signing procedure of both our schemes requires 3 scalar multiplications and the
verification requires 4 pairing operations. These findings are summarised in Table 5.2.
We see that the computational cost for our scheme is comparable to PPK and more
efficient compared to Hybrid. In addition, as noted before, in our scheme, a receiving
vehicle may make a decision on whether to rely on a broadcast message immediately,
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while in PPK and Hybrid, a receiving vehicle typically requires a few messages before
reliability can be confirmed.
Our CLSRS scheme has additional operations where Vr may choose to provide a feedback
to rate its experience with the message generator. In this case, the computational cost
is that of 1 signature. The verification of feedback requires 2 signatures verifications.
This is performed by the MS and can be done oﬄine.
Signature length. The signature in PPK generated using elliptic curve digital signa-
ture algorithm (ECDSA)[14, 52, 54] comprises of 2 elements of G1. A group signature
in Hybrid comprises of 2 elements of G1 and 5 elements of Zq. Meanwhile, the length
of signature in both our schemes composed of 2 elements of G1, which is similar to
PPK. To provide a security level 280, we can set q to be 190-bit long and the ele-
ment in G1 is 191-bit long by choosing an appropriate curve such as NIST curve [14].
Thus, the length of signature generated on a message is 48 bytes in our scheme and
PPK. In Hybrid, the message signature is 48 bytes and the length of signature on the
certified pseudonym is of 224 bytes (for a security level 2128, we have |q| = 255 bits
and |G1|=256 bits), which sums up to 272 bytes generated by a vehicle. This again
shows that our scheme provides message signatures with length comparable to those of
existing schemes. This result is summarised in Table 5.3.
Communication cost. A message M in Hybrid and PPK consists of: (θsk(msg), msg,
certTP(pk), pk, t), which denotes signature generated on an announced message, a mes-
sage announced, its certificate which essentially is the signature of the TP on a vehicle’s
public key, a vehicle’s public key and a timestamp to specify signature generation time
respectively. To provide a security level of 280, we can set q to be 190-bit long and
the element in G1 is 191-bit long. According to [7] the size of safety messages is 100
bytes and we choose 8 bytes for timestamp, using the unix 64-bit timestamp. Based
on the implementation in [14, 60], the size of the public key is 25 bytes, message sig-
nature is 48 bytes and TP certificate is 64 bytes. Hence the length of the message
in PPK is L = 48 + 100 + 64 + 25 + 8 = 245 bytes. In Hybrid, the message size is
L = 48 + 100 + 224 + 25 + 8 = 405 bytes. We note that the implementation of GS in
[13] adopted by Hybrid is not available to us, hence we use the similar values in Hybrid
which were calculated using the number of 32-bit word multiplications required for GS
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signing and verifying, extracted from [14, 60].
In CLSRS, a message is composed of: (θVs(msg), msg, pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, repscoreiVs , t
i
rsVs
, tb),
where θVs(msg), msg, pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, repscoreiVs , t
i
rsVs
and tb denotes a signature gen-
erated on an announced message, a message announced, a vehicle’s public key, its
pseudonym, its reputation score and a timestamp on the reputation score and message
broadcasted respectively. The size of the public key and pseudonym is of an element
G1 each, and reputation score of size 1 byte. Therefore the size of the message size
is L = 48 + 100 + 24 + 24 + 1 + 8 + 8 = 213 bytes. Meanwhile, in CLST , a message
is composed of: (θVs(msg), msg, pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
, tb). The the size of the message size is
L = 48 + 100 + 24 + 24 + 8 = 204 bytes. We observed that our schemes yield the
shortest message size compared to these two schemes. This result is summarised in
Table 5.3.
Our CLSRS scheme is also composed of a feedback reporting phase where a receiving
vehicle Vr may choose to rate its experience with the message generator Vs. A feedback
report is composed of: ((feedrate, h, tr, tb, θVs , pkiVs , pseu
i
Vs
), θVr , pk
j
Vr
). The size of
the feedrate is of 1 byte, the timestamp tr and tb is of 8 bytes each, and hash of the
announced event h is of an element q, which is 24 bytes. The pseudonym pseuiVs and
both public keys pkiVs and pk
j
Vr
is an element of G1 each respectively. The signature
generated by Vr on the feedback is of two elements of G1, similar to θVs . Hence the
length of the feedback report is F = 1 + 24 + 8 + 8 + 48 + 24 + 24 + 48 + 24 = 137 bytes.
Storage cost. We compare the storage cost of our scheme with PPK during credential
retrieval phase given the similar approach of preloading credentials onto a vehicle.
For each credential retrieval period, PPK preloads a large set of key pairs and their
corresponding certificate onto each vehicle, for its usage over a long period of time (i.e.
a year). The next retrieval may occur during periodical vehicle maintenance visits,
for instance. The public and private key is 25 bytes and 24 bytes respectively, using
ECDSA-192 and a TP certificate is 64 bytes using ECDSA-256. This sums up to storage
space of 25 + 24 + 64 = 113 bytes per key. In [91], they assumed an average a driver
uses his car is 2 hours per day, where the lifetime of each key is one minute. Then the
number of required keys per year is approximately 43800, which amounts to storage
space of 4.95 Mbytes on each vehicle.
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In CLSRS, a vehicle retrieves from the MS a set of credentials Cre = (pseuiV , repscore
i
V , t
i
V ,
xiV ). The partial key x
i
V and pseudonym pseu
i
V is an element of G1 each, hence xiV
and pseuiV is of 24 bytes each for |G1| = 191 bits. The sum of storage space is of
8 + 1 + 24 + 24 = 57 bytes per key, which is more efficient as it is less than half com-
pared to PPK for each key. The retrieval period in our scheme is shorter and flexible,
depends on whether a vehicle would like to obtain its latest reputation score or when
it runs out of credentials. In CLST a vehicle retrieves from the KGC a set of pseudonyms
and partial keys. The sum of storage space is of 24 + 24 = 48 bytes per key, which is
more efficient.
Msg signature Msg signature Group signature Group signature
Scheme Sign Verify Sign Verify
PPK 2 ·G1 4 ·G1 N/A N/A
Hybrid 2 ·G1 4 ·G1 8 ·G1 + 1 · P 5 ·G1 + 3 · P
CLSRS 3 ·G1 4 · P N/A N/A
CLST 3 ·G1 4 · P N/A N/A
Here n ·G1 denotes n scalar multiplications and n · P denotes n pairing operations.
Table 5.2: Comparison of computational cost
Signature Communication Storage
Scheme length (bytes) cost cost
PPK 2|G1| (48) 245 bytes 113 bytes/key
Hybrid (Group sig) 2|G1|+ 5|q| (224) 405 bytes -
(Msg sig) 2 ·G1 (48) -
CLSRS 2 ·G1 (48) 213 bytes 57 bytes/key
CLST 2 ·G1 (48) 204 bytes 48 bytes/key
Table 5.3: Comparison of communication and storage cost (l = 80)
5.5 Conclusion
We have presented two novel privacy-preserving authentication protocols for VANETs
based on certificateless signature. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first
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certificateless announcement schemes for VANETs that has been proposed in the lit-
erature. We have shown that our schemes are efficient and robust, and achieves the
desirable property of a reliable, anonymous and accountable announcement scheme
without inducing the problem of certificate management and overhead.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we highlight the contributions of this thesis and discuss future research.
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6.1 Concluding remarks and Summary of Contributions
Wireless networks have developed over time to be sophisticated enough to meet the
demands from evolving modern communication technologies. One of the emerging tech-
nologies in wireless networks is VANET. The rise of collaborative safety applications
in VANETs that utilize wireless communicating vehicles may have the potential to
mitigate the implication of traffic accidents and even prevent them altogether. These
applications allow a vehicle to broadcast information associated with each event on the
road. The information announced include real-time speed and position of a vehicle to
warn neighbouring vehicles about potential dangerous situations ahead of them.
Despite the safety benefits derived from these services, privacy is a critical concern
in VANETs. A lot of personal information can be inferred from vehicle-generated
messages as it contains signature, location, and other associated information from the
sending vehicle. The privacy of a vehicle may be compromised if extensive position
information is compiled, leading to profiling of a vehicle. Techniques on anonymous
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communication can be employed to protect a vehicle’s privacy. At the same time, the
system should allow for identity resolution when misbehaviour issues arise.
In this thesis, we constructed authenticated anonymous announcement schemes, which
we called as 3A. We considered the challenging setting of conflicting security require-
ments, in order to strike a balance between a reliable and privacy-preserving 3A in
VANETs while enabling a vehicle to be held accountable in case of dispute. First, we
systematically studied different credential techniques of an announcement scheme in
the literature and discussed their advantages and limitations. We defined the secu-
rity model we consider in an announcement scheme and elaborated the composition
of entities and their role in the system. We constructed a generic abstraction based
on threshold method. As far as we are aware of, this is the first construction of such
abstraction exist in the literature. We also provide a generic abstraction based on a
reputation system.
Within these abstractions, we constructed three secure privacy-preserving announce-
ment schemes. The first scheme uses reputation system, which is integrated with public
key cryptography. Through reputation mechanism, vehicles can be assisted to choose
a reputable message announced by neighboring vehicles, based on their aggregated his-
torical trust, represented by its reputation score. While the use of signature schemes
in VANET has been widely deployed and effective, the use of reputation system in
conjunction with signature scheme is not as widely studied. Furthermore, the use of
reputation system is efficient as it does not face the problem of distinguishing message
origin; a prerequisite security property unfortunately suffered by most threshold-based
announcement schemes. We performed simulations using GrooveNet simulator and
demonstrate that our scheme is efficient and usable for real-world implementation.
The other two schemes were constructed using certificateless signature (CLS). To our
knowledge, our schemes are the first certificateless announcement schemes for VANETs
proposed in the literature. These schemes use CLS that eliminate the need of certifi-
cates and the associated processing and management overheads of PKI in a traditional
PKC. It also enjoys the implicit certificate property of ID-PKC without suffering the
inherent key escrow problem. Our schemes are robust and outperforms some previous
schemes in the literature in terms of message length and storage cost.
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6.2 Future research
The work presented in this thesis has identified some open problems that remain to
be solved and possible extension to some of the presented contributions that can be
pursued.
• One of the key constraints of the reputation model constructed in this thesis is
that it requires vehicles to consistently communicate with the TP to acquire its
latest reputation score. It would be interesting to develop a different technique
using reputation systems to the setting where this communication can be reduced
or eliminated, while allowing a vehicle to establish its reputation or enabling trust.
Research in this direction may yield another variant of reputation mechanism
deployed in an announcement scheme for VANETs in the literature.
• In the same vein, the reputation model developed in this thesis can be extended in
several ways. For instance, the feedback aggregation algorithm presented in this
thesis is based on binary feedback ratings. It might be of interest to investigate
alternative approaches which allow continuous feedback ratings and thus provide
richer results.
• In our schemes, an announced event is only utilised by its neighbouring vehicles.
It might be of interest to extend the current scheme to where a message can be
utilised by vehicles in a greater area. How this may be done without compromis-
ing the security against reputation manipulation attacks is the subject of future
research.
• The MAC construction of [28] that we analysed in Chapter 3 provides an attrac-
tive tradeoff between cheaper computational cost and delay of message authenti-
cation. It would be interesting to introduce and analyse a construction in which
we incorporate time-release cryptography into the existing work. This construc-
tion may provide another means to solve the problem associated with delayed
message authentication.
• Privacy threats imposed onto a security protocol depends on the data accessible
to an adversary. An interesting open problem would be to ‘profile’ an adversary
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on its ability to derive information about vehicles. Specifically, analytical models
capturing the strategy of the adversary, as well as the cost to implement and
execute attacks, would definitely improve the understanding of location privacy
threats and have an impact on our protocols design and simulation results.
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